Overview
The case In re Patrick F., Super. Ct. No. SJ14023322, concerns the conditions placed on a juvenile delinquent’s dispositional order (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 1). On June 11, 2014, then-17 year old Patrick F. burglarized his next door neighbor’s home and stole a valuable gold ring and coins (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 1). Patrick F. was soon apprehended by the police as a potential suspect and admitted to entering the home and stealing the items while the relative stood watch (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 1).
The district attorney submitted a juvenile wardship petition asserting that Patrick F. had committed first-degree burglary (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 2). This petition was subsequently changed to second-degree burglary (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 2). An interview with a probation officer revealed that Patrick F. had burglarized and stolen from his neighbor because he wanted the money to buy marijuana and did not want to ask his parents for the money (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 2). At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the judge declared Patrick F. a ward and put him on probation (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 2). The conditions of probation required Patrick F. to “[s]ubmit person and any vehicle, room or property [and] any electronics and passwords under your control to searchwith or without a search warrant” (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 2).
The defense objected to the terms of the condition that included the cell phone and electronics. The defense raised two main arguments. First, the condition of including the cell phone and electronics is invalid because it does not bear a relationship to the crime that the defendant was convicted of (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 4). Second, the inclusion of the cell phone and electronics within the search is constitutionally overbroad because it compels the defendant to relinquish his right to privacy concerning matters that have no reasonably relationship to deterring criminal conduct (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 6). While the court rejected the defense’s argument that the whole search term be stricken in entirety, the court modified the order to protect defendant’s privacy interest from unwarranted intrusion (In re Patrick F., 2015, pp. 10-11).
Key Questions
The first important question that the In re Patrick F. case raised was the extent that a probation condition permitting a search of the juvenile’s cell phone and electronics was reasonably related to the crime of burglary. Essentially, this question boils down to how to properly balance and weigh the respective interests of the juvenile and the state. It is well-recognized that goals and purposes of the juvenile justice system differ markedly from the adult criminal justice system. With respect to a juvenile, the state stands in the shoes of the child’s parent (In re D.G., 2010, p. 52). Because juveniles lack maturity and need additional supervision and guidance, the juvenile court has broader flexibility in imposing conditions over a juvenile than that of an adult (In re D.G., 2010, p. 52).
At the same time, however, a juvenile court does not have unfettered discretion in imposing conditions on probation over a juvenile offender (In re D.G., 2010, p. 53). The case People v. Lent set forth the test for when conditions on probation will be invalidated (People v. Lent, 1975, p. 486). A condition will not be deemed invalid unless it 1) has no relationship to the crime of which the defendant was convicted, 2) relates to conduct that is not criminal in and of itself, and 3) requires or prohibits conduct that is not reasonably related to future criminality (People v. Lent, 1975, p. 486). The In re Patrick F. court went through a step-by-step analysis of the Lent test. The court found a reasonable relationship between future criminality and the electronics search and therefore, found that the search was reasonable under Lent.
The second key question raised in In re Patrick F. touched upon the need for conditions to be narrowly tailored so as to not unnecessarily infringe upon a defendant’s constitutional rights. This question examined the extent of privacy rights that extended to the juvenile’s cell phone and other electronic devices. In support of the defense’s argument that there were significant privacy interests at stake that warranted the probation conditions to be excessively broad in scope, the defense relied on the Supreme Court decision Riley v. California. In Riley, the Supreme Court held that an adult arrestee had a constitutional privacy interest that prohibited police from performing a warrantless cell phone search (Riley v. California, 2014, p. 2485). The In re Patrick F. court distinguished Riley on the grounds a juvenile who has already been adjudicated of a crime has a significantly less expectation of privacy than an adult who arrested and questioned by police (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 7).
While the court rejected that the holding of Riley was controlling in Patrick F’s situation, the court did acknowledge that Patrick F. had a significant privacy interest in the data and information on his electronic devices (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 8). Given that Patrick F. was adjudicated for burglary in connection with his drug use, the court modified the probation conditions to the extent that the information gleaned from the electronics would be likely to produce evidence of drug use, noncompliance with probation conditions, or continuing criminal activity (In re Patrick F., 2015, p. 8).
One of the fundamental goals of the juvenile court system is to rehabilitate the juvenile offender and ensure that the juvenile offender receives appropriate treatment (Slobogin, 2013, p. 124). The greater emphasis on rehabilitation is one of the most rudimentary differences between the juvenile and adult court systems. Under the rehabilitation model, the idea is that juveniles should not be incarcerated with hardened adult criminals (Simpson, 1976, p. 985). Consistent with the rehabilitation model is the increase of pre-judicial disposition of juvenile cases (Simpson, 1976, p. 985). Handling cases in this way provides a certain amount of flexibility and amenability that is not available in a conventional court proceeding. The informal process is regarded as a marked advantage of the juvenile system because it affords greater flexibility to respond to a juvenile’s particular needs.
While specific details about Patrick F. were not included in opinion, it did not seem that Patrick F. was a career criminal or criminal mastermind. The court adopted a rehabilitative model in tailoring appropriate punishment to match the offense. While burglary is not to be taken lately, no one was injured in the incident and only a relatively small amount of money was stolen. The judge’s decision to impose probation, where Patrick F. was to remain home under parental supervision, reflects the rehabilitative model of criminal justice. While the conditions of probation were somewhat intrusive into Patrick F’s personal life, probation is a far more rehabilitative form of punishment than a juvenile detention facility, boot camp, or other confinement options. The judge considered took into consideration Patrick F’s statements to the probation officer about his motivation to commit burglary for drug money. Given that this offense was relatively minor, the judge chose to only impose probation, and the attached conditions, to afford Patrick F. the opportunity to be rehabilitated.
The due process model is supports refraining from criminalizing certain crimes that are “victimless” and based on consensual interactions (Roach, 1999, p. 680). Classic examples of “victimless crimes” under the due process model are prostitution, obscenity, and drug-related possession crimes (Roach, 1999, p. 680). In addition, the due process model is concerned with social justice and equality (Roach, 1999, p. 680). Because minorities and the poor are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, the due process model seeks to ensure fairness in the administration of justice and to protect the rights of the underprivileged (Roach, 1999, p. 680). Remnants of the due process model were at play in the In re Patrick F. decision. While burglary is certain not a victimless crime that creates little to no harm on society, the court was concerned with protecting Patrick F’s rights.
The case struck a proper balance between protecting the juvenile’s interest in keeping electronic information private and the state’s interest in ensuring proper supervision and control over the juvenile offender. The modified order was refined so that such information was only searchable if it had a relation to potential future criminal conduct. The modified order was crafted with sufficient specificity as to avoid being overly broad.
References
In re D.G., 187 Cal.App.4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).
In re Patrick F., Super. Ct. No. SJ14023322 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
People v. Lent, 15 Cal.3d 481 (Cal. 1975).
Roach, K. (1999). Four models of the criminal process. Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology 89(2): 671-716.
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).
Simpson, A.L. (1976). Rehabilitation as the justification of a separate juvenile justice
system. California Law Review 64(4): 984-1016.
Slobogin, C. (2013). Treating juveniles like juveniles: getting rid of transfer and
expanded adult court jurisdiction. Texas Tech Law Review, 103-132.
