Is knowledge just a systematic organization of facts?
The term “knowledge” relates to the one of most debatable notions in philosophy, and the subject of epistemology. Lots of theories have been developed in order to find out what knowledge means, and what one means, when one says he/she knows something. To what extent can knowledge be viewed as nothing more than systemic organization of facts? While some scientists claim that knowledge represents a system of facts, others develop far more inclusive definitions of knowledge. Studying different ways one knows and learns things in different areas of knowledge helps to prove that knowledge can be seen as including other elements, apart from systemic organization and facts.
The philosophy of history is an art, profoundly concerned with researching into the essence of historical knowledge. In literature historical knowledge is often viewed as factual knowledge (Murphey ix). A historical fact is most frequently defined as the fact about the past, which actually answers a simple question: “What happened?. These facts concern historical events, their causes and consequences, interrelations between different events and people, who participated in them. So, facts play a crucial role both in understanding history as an area of knowledge and learning it.
While it may seem that historical knowledge is comprised of nothing, but facts, organized in a system, several arguments can be developed in order to refute this position. In order to develop the first and most important argument, challenging the notion of fact in history, let me consider basic premises underlying human history. The common view of history acknowledges the existence of a real world, of which one can have true knowledge (Murphey x). The true knowledge people get about history (or what they prefer to name “true knowledge”) stems to great extent from historical accounts that were created by other people. Are the facts that are described in historical accounts true? If the one, who reads accounts, believes so, it is. On the other hand, if there are no other sources of data about the fact (e.g., historical documents, objects of material world), one can read accounts as “historical novel”, not history. So, factual nature of events, described in historical events cannot always be justified, and often depends on the one, who reads and interprets historical accounts. This thesis is supported by the fact that interpretation of historical facts may differ, dependently on the opinions of secondary sources’ authors. Therefore, it may be claimed that, apart from facts, historical knowledge also includes common beliefs and opinions of historians.
Considerable amount of common beliefs in history may stem from myths and legends that thereafter became integral part of historical accounts. Common beliefs often concern personality traits of heroes of the past.
Another argument that supports the fact that historical knowledge is more than a systemic organization of facts deals with the fact that historical accounts frequently tend to be used as the tools in political fights. Different means of propaganda have been used by governments for ages in order to create the history that would rather serve political goals, than tell what had happened in reality in the past. Apart from facts, beliefs and opinions, historical knowledge may contain artificial knowledge, created by authorities, and evaluative statements.
Last, but not least argument to be mentioned with regard to historical knowledge once more refers to basic essential premises of human history. One of them states that human action is causally explainable (Murray x). It is common in life that one event (or human action) is caused by a set of different reasons. However, in case the past is discussed, no one can single out the way each of the reasons that are described in the accounts influenced decision-making process of an individual. So, the one, who reads and interprets historical accounts, can consider the reasoning of the heroes from their own points of view,
The analysis of premises of historical knowledge and the sources of evidence shows the reader that historical knowledge can be viewed as a system, comprised not only of the facts (information about the events that actually took place), but common beliefs, opinions and evaluative statements of historians, as well as false information that can be used by authorities for their political group.
Referring to ethics as an area of knowledge, one can claim that ethical knowledge is comprised of facts as it is most often defined as the knowledge of what is right, and that is wrong, values and obligations (Kupperman 19). These facts exert significant impact on the way the life in society is being organized and serve as a basis for the formation of people’s perceptions about justice and criminal law system formation.
As for systemic nature of ethical knowledge, it is necessary to state that ethical knowledge is organized into several subsystems, dependently on the issues it concentrates on, and the field it can be applicable within (e.g., biomedical ethics, ethics of research).
However, as in the case related to historical knowledge, it is necessary to mention that ethical knowledge contains elements, different from facts. Four major sources of ethical knowledge, defined in contemporary epistemology, include reality (reason), conscience (experience), intuition and tradition (community). While existence of a particular tradition to perceive something good or bad can be considered as a fact, knowledge, which is derived from conscience or experience can be viewed as personal knowledge or one’s belief. Despite the fact that this kind of knowledge it not shared, it can be a basis for person’s actions or ethics-related decisions, as well as the one, derived from intuition. Thus ethical knowledge may be considered to contain personal knowledge perspective.
Another argument that can be used to challenge both historical and ethical knowledge being a set of systemically organized facts is that both historical and ethical knowledge is dependent on cultural perspectives. The ways people perceive history, as well as the ways they define the good and the bad can differ tremendously, dependently on their background, nationality and country of origin. Therefore, neither historical nor ethical knowledge can be viewed as universal system of facts as it also implies people’s opinions, perceptions and cultural norms.
Last argument to be mentioned relates to the dynamic nature of knowledge. If one presumes that knowledge is a systemic organization of facts, it means that new facts may be added to the system, while the ones, which already serve as its elements cannot be changed. In practice knowledge (especially related to defining what is good and what is bad, and the ways one should behave) is continuously changing due to the changes that take place in the history of the humankind. For instance, having premarital sex was considered a wrong type of behavior for a person in 19th century, while nowadays such behavior is not viewed as misbehavior. The fact of dependence of ethical knowledge on specific era of the humankind’s development testifies to the fact that ethical knowledge is to great extent comprised by beliefs that are topical only for a limited amount of time.
Importance of understanding the fact that knowledge is comprised of elements, different from facts, as well as its dependence of cultural perspectives and dynamic nature lies in the fact that this understanding promotes learners’ being critical to the knowledge they obtain and allows them to study a subject more profoundly, when challenging common beliefs and opinions with the help of their own argumentation.
The study of historical and ethical knowledge helped me prove that knowledge cannot be viewed as a systemic organization of facts as it contains lots of other elements, such as beliefs, opinions, evaluative statements and personal knowledge.
Works cited
Gnoli, C. Ontological foundations in knowledge organization. Scire 17.1 (2013): 29-34. Web.
Kupperman, J.J. Ethical knowledge., London: Routledge, 2011. Print.
Murphey, M.G. Philosophical foundations of historical knowledge. NY: State University of New York Press, 1994. Print.
Schultz, N. Historical facts. Boulder: University of Colorado, 2003. Web.
