Leadership And Governance In China: Exemplar Essay To Follow

Yes, in the Chinese current political and democratic context, I agree with Daniel Bell’s statement that it is the low levels of government, optimal space for experimentation and meritocracy that have shaped political reform in the last three decades.
Firstly, on the claim or principle that “the lower the level of government, the more democratic the political system”, Bell supports his claim by arguing that there are very good reasons why the Chinese government should promote local democratic elections. According to him, at the local community level, the level of public knowledge concerning leaders’ virtues and abilities is very high compared to the top political levels. Further, unlike at the national political levels of governance, there are clear policy issues that generate a sense of community and hence minimize the costs of mistakes. Hence, the Chinese political system would be democratic if there was insistence on local level elections for effective leadership.
Moreover, on his claim on “the optimal space for experimentation with new practices and institutions in is in between the lowest and highest levels of government”, Bell provides evidence of the Shenshen Special Economic Zone. He states that what the Chinese government has been doing is to test or experiment on social and economic reforms at the regional levels and then spread or apply the success of such attempts to other parts of the country. He also provides evidence of the recent decision by the Chinese authorities to recruit non-state actors in the protection of workers’ rights and provision of healthcare for the elderly. This, he argues, defies the common perceptions about dictatorial rule. According to him, this kind of experimentation has been enabled largely by the less rigid Constitutional system in China that disfavors absolute separation of power between governmental levels. Hence, any national level political stability means that such trials can be replicated in other parts of China and be effective. Unlike in democratic systems, in this Chinese system, at least there is an assurance that sound policies have the potential of being carried forward or improved upon by the successive governments.
Further afield, Bell has provided a plethora of evidence to support his claim that “the higher the level of government, the more meritocratic government and political system”. First, he states that the Chinese political model is founded on the principle of political meritocracy. That is, government officials in China are not democratically elected through popular vote, but are hand-picked but based on their virtues and abilities. It is a system that has its roots in the early imperial China in which leaders were subjected to rigorous exam systems aimed at testing their IQs and ideological competence. Though these tests have since been done away with, they were an effective way of selecting political leaders in the Chinese political system and culture. To move up the political leadership ladder, one had to do well at lower government levels and continue to show good performance as they go up the political command chain. According to Bell, however, this model needs to be improved through a referendum that is conducted in a free and fair process where the Chinese would get the opportunity to decide the best political and democratic process for them. For, he argues, the meritocratic model used by the Chinese can only fit in a one-party state as there is no such guarantee that good performance at the local level is likely to be replicated or even rewarded at the top national level of government in a multi-party system. However, leaders who have been selected through a meritocratic process are better than those elected through democratic elections since the latter are constantly worried about their reelection and are also vulnerable to special interest lobby groups. They are hence less likely to perform better than the former and that is why this principle has shaped the Chinese political democracy in the last three decades.
However, Bell’s arguments are challenged in a number of ways by Gilboy and Read. Firstly, while Bell sees political and democratic reforms in the Chinese society as being a matter to be decided upon by the political system, Gilboy and Read argue differently. According to them, the social and political change currently being witnessed in China is as a result of societal pressures, conflicts and interests from various groups in the society. These groups, interested in the future of the Chinese economic and political development agenda, are ready to challenge the CCP rule. Moreover, whereas Bell sees change in the Chinese society as one that ought to come from de democratic elections or referenda, Gilboy and Read see the changes in the society including wealth and diversity as being the leading factors that drive social and political reforms in China. As a result of these pressures and interests, the Chinese leadership seems to have given in and is slowly carrying out reforms in the CCP government administration, institutions, ideologies and legal system.
Further, Gilboy and Read, unlike Bell, see change in China as being a product of social and political dynamism. That is, as the Chinese society develops, new demands emerge from every sector of the society, particularly the private business sector and new stakeholders such as powerful environmental groups. The top-down model described by Bell is no longer at work as the Chinese government is compelled to respond to the needs of the rural areas.
Bell’s argument is also supported by Minxin Pei in his article “The CCP: Resilient or Fragile?” in different ways. Firstly, Bell’s argument that three factors have made democracy not inevitable in China is supported by Pei’s argument that the resilience of the authoritarian regime in China is partly due to control over economic resources. Also, Pei argues that the ability of the authoritarian rulers to remain intact is due to their capacity to conform to emerging political and social pressures. Also, Minxin, similar to Bell, argues that the resilience may be attributed to regime institutionalization, administrative and organizational capacity, and organizational adaptation. The experimentation tactic argued by Bell as being one of the principles driving change is also supported by Pei’s argument about “tried and true survival tactics. He, like Bell, also points out corruption as something that is a danger to the authoritarian regime’s future survival. For, it reduces the political capacity and legitimacy of such a regime to pursue repression and patronage against its citizens. However, Bell’s argument differs from Pei’s in that Bell does not mention the role of activists and opposition groups. He only sees the current opposition to the CCP as being too weak to mount any pressure on the Chinese political leaders.
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