Willie Mae GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.BUSCH ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, d/b/a Busch Gardens, TheOld Country, Defendant-Appellee.
Top Six (6) Facts:
Fact 1: On August 23, 1986, Willie Mae Gray and her two daughters, Ruth and Esther, went to Busch Gardens, an amusement park in Williamsburg, Virginia.
Fact 2: While at the park, Mrs. Gray bordered a small train and she had an accident in which she fell off and injured herself.
Fact 3: After the injury incident, the employees of Busch Gardens dispatched a first aid team to the site and called an ambulance.
Fact 4: Mrs. Gray’s daughter, Ruth, went with her in the ambulance, while her other daughter, Esther, went to complete some forms the park first aid station.
Fact 5: Mrs. Gray commenced a diversity action following the incidence for damages because of the injuries she obtained.
Fact 6: Mrs. Gray stepped backwards and slipped on “something” on standing to take a photograph. The "something" here is proof that the injury she suffered during the fall was not because of lack of a caution strip sign but because of her not being keen. Strip signs though eye catching with the bright yellow colour cannot prevent her from stripping thus it is fair to say, the lack of caution strip sign did not cause the appellant to fall.
Issue
Was the district court right to rule that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries?
Decision:
Affirmed
Reasoning:
• The appellant claimed that the New York law was to be applied Virginia law instead. In Virginia law, contributory negligence is a defense while New York law comparative negligence analysis is employed. Considering the location of the injury, with no special circumstances, the place at which the injury occurred determines the governing substantive law (Virgo 21). Thus, the jury’s choice of the Virginia law and not the New York law upholds. Considering the interest analysis approach of the New York law that focuses majorly on determining which jurisdiction is because Mrs Gray encountered the accident in Bosch Gardens Located in Virginia but not New York. Mrs Gray in her claim did not indicate whatsoever any “loss-allocating” which involves the appellant losing something, on which, in this case, Mrs Gray never missed anything only that she got minor injuries. The appellant did not also report any “conduct-regulating” circumstance when she sustained the injury in Bosch Garden, which might be considered unusual that, might bring about the departure from the Virginia law to New York Law.
• Mrs Gray claimed that it was error for the judge to exclude the evidence about the lack of a caution strip as irrelevant. In her claims at the trial version, Mrs Gray stated that she had slipped on something. The "something" here is proof that the injury she suffered during the fall was not because of lack of a caution strip sign but because of her not being keen. Strip signs though eye catching with the bright yellow colour cannot prevent her from stripping thus it is fair to say, the lack of caution strip sign did not cause the appellant to fall (Keller 45). Mrs Gray, the appellant, argues that presence of the warning strip sign would have highlighted the presence of debris. The appellant does not go ahead to give the evidence of the waste presence regarding nature, location whether inside the train or on the train and the exact place she stepped on to which she slipped or the colour of the debris. Without the evidence on the nature of the rubble, it could be difficult to substantiate the claim of having no caution strip. It will not be wrong to assume that the debris that made the appellant fall was present in her shoes. From the definition of debris, scattered fragments of something wrecked or destroyed, loose natural material, which may consist of Brocken rock pieces or even dirt, which is likely to have been stuck on Mrs Gray's shoe.
• The appellant claimed that it was an error admitting hearsay statements in the first aid report by her daughter Esther. Esther was not in the usual cause of business while talking to the nurse. Thus, the records of her statement were inadmissible not unless it fell in the elision of to the hearsay rule under Fed.R.Evid. 805. The admission of the first aid report was under Fed.R.Evid. 803(6) as a business record, therefore, it could not have been an error to admit the first aid report that was done under the protection of the law.
• The information sources availed, had no problem that could be substantive, with an ordinary business record. All the participants, including the observer or the members who edited the information to be recorded, acted routinely under the instructions and duty to the accuracy in line with what the employer required them to do. The regular course of operations on which the participants acted on includes observing and recording (Weinstein and Berger).
• Esther testified that she made no statement in regards to the accident; nonetheless, the portion of the report challenged was permissible as prior inconsistent statement Fed.R.Evid. 613(b). In denial by a witness for making any statement before the relevant event, the adversary might use the prior inconsistent statement to lay a preliminary foundation for impeachment for its dispense (Weinstein and Berger 15, and Virgo 21). It is clear that the report was admissible but limited to impeaching the testimony by Esther unfortunately; it was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted. No instruction was given in the case thus the belief that the point was not preserved due to the wholesale objection. However, the Committee of Advisory’s Note on Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 803, 56 F.R.D. 303, 308-09 (1973) (Dubroff and Hellwig 315). It can be observed that the business record rule does not provide a basis for which Esther's statement could be admitted.
• The plaintiff’s trial counsel objected the admission of the voir dire of concerning the first aid report and had reasons for it. Surprisingly, the district judge overruled the objection without allowing statements of reasons. There was an indication questioning the authenticity of the document in the voir dire transcript. The district judge ought to have granted the plaintiff’s trial counsel an opportunity to hear his opinion on the record since he had the first-hand information about what happened to Mrs Gray and also he had gone through the first aid report in which Esther’s statement was involved. If the document had been genuine, the plaintiff’s counsel could not have shown interest in the submission of the voir dire to the district judges. The hearsay objection has been preserved by the failure to allow a statement in this case.
Works Cited
Dubroff, Harold, and Brant J. Hellwig. The United States Tax Court: an Historical Analysis. , 2014. Internet resource.
Keller, John. J. Workplace Safety Answer Manual. Neenah: J.J. Keller & Associates, Publishing & Services, Neenah, Wisconsin: Creation, History, Progress. Neenah, Wis: J.J. Keller & Associates, 2014. Print
Virgo, Graham. The Principles of the Law of Restitution. , Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2015 Print.
Weinstein, Jack B, and Margaret A. Berger. Student Edition of Weinstein's Evidence Manual: A Guide to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Based on Weinstein's Federal Evidence. , 2015. Internet resource.
