Peter Singer's principle of preventing bad occurrences is based on the need for those that have more to give to those who are unable to come up with enough resources to maintain a basic standard of living. In this sense, those who are more affluent are obligated to provided for those that would be considered to be poor. This is based on the underlying notion that it is immoral not to provide for the well-being of others when there are no negative effects towards the self for doing so. For this reason, it is necessary for individuals to look beyond their own personal interests to a certain degree in order to help others attain a measure of happiness. It is unecesssary for those with enough to provide for themselves to hold onto their surplus wealth while there are others in the world whose basic needs cannot be maintained.
The way in which Singer argues for why these principles should leave out considerations about the proximity of the bad occurrence as well as the number of other people who are able to prevent the bad occurrence from happening is consistent with his notions of personal commitment towards a general ethical responsibility towards those in need. Such principles should be left out of considerations regarding the responsibility that people have towards one another because the amount of suffering and the proximity of that suffering to those that are able to do something about it has no effect on the specific responsibilities that people have towards one another as human beings. These responsibilities include not only the production of an empathetic relationship with those in need but also the consideration of how much of one's own wealth is actually necessary for oneself and whether holding onto it is morally right when others need it more.
Singer's strong version of the principle of preventing bad occurrences is based on the notion that people will have the power to control specific circumstances that they are exposed to. When they are, if they do have the power, they should be morally obligated to act. Singer essentially proposes that if it is in an individual's power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby causing something worse to occur, then they ought to do it (Singer, 2015, p. 241). This challenges people to take action when confronted with situations that they deem to be immoral or wrong. Furthermore, the universality of the principles are demonstrated in the inability to walk away from action when considering the actions that should be taken by the indivdiual.
The weak version of the principle of preventing bad occurrences, on the other hand, presupposes the idea that sometimes moral obligations will come into conflict with one another. This will prevent an individual from acting with such certainty. He states that if “it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything morally significant, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 2015, p. 231). In this sense, it is necessary to develop a strong moral character in order to consider the risks of acting in certain ways. The primary difference between these two forms of moral judgment is that while the strong form presupposes a black and white view of ethical considerations the weak version demonstrates the need to consider the relationship between various moral issues that might be faced in the real world.
A moral conventionalist would decide between these two versions of Singer's principle by assessing the underlying cultural values that should be used in order to base their judgment on. In this sense, the social values that they hold important would be the most important to uphold. For this reason, it is likely that these individuals would subscribe to the strong version of Singer's principle. This is due to the need to work for any moral or ethical principles that might be built into their particular social or cultural context. People are obligated to conform to the specific moral principles that are associated with the orders that they are a part of. For this reason, it is necessary to establish the conditions upon which they would need to consider the possibility of objective to specific ethical dilemmas. This would indicate a level of devotion to the moral principles that are considered within their cultural values.
A utilitarian would decide between these two versions of Singer's principle by developing an understanding of the various costs that would be associated with a specific viewpoint. Due to the fact that actions can only be considered to be morally right if they are beneficial to the majority it would be necessary for their adherence to specific principles to be dependent upon the underlying conditions by which they can promote the greatest possible good. In doing so, their obligations could be directed towards a more coherent application of power. For this reason, utilitarians would likely subscribe to weaker understandings of Singer's principles. This is due to their need to objectify moral principles in a way that allows them to relate the outcomes of various actions and to take those that have the most utility for the specific purposes that they have in mind.
A Kantian, theorizing from The Categorical Imperative would decide between these two versions of the principle by demonstrating the need for specific moral action no matter what the circumstances may indicate. Kant's moral imperative demonstrates the need to establish a more concrete examination of one's own position in order to ensure that any principles considered can be maintained no matter what the cost. For this reason, it is evident that Kant would likely subscribe to the stronger version of Singer's principle. This is due to his desire to ensure that principles can be universal in substance and relate to any objective circumstance in which moral or ethical questions need to be applied. This decision would be based in the consideration of his principles as an essential characteristic of his person and adhering to these principles is necessary in order to establish those that are the most essential.
Works Cited
Singer, P. (2015). Famine, Affluence and Morality. Oxford University Press.
