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In late 1987, the Palestinian community in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip started a mass civil disturbance designed to overthrow the “occupying” Israeli forces in their territories. The rebellion, or the Intifada, was not called for or mobilized by the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) from its Tunis base; rather, the uprising is a mobilization of the general public as well as the groups and entities that were developed during the occupation of Israel in the area.
The movement engaged a large number of the population, with a good number of them without any prior experience to fighting, including children and juveniles. The initial years of the movement saw the organizers establish “freedom schools,” mass labor disruptions, tax payment embargoes, and political disturbances and other nonviolent activities. However, as the Israeli occupation grew tighter, the organizers began to engage other more aggressive and hostile actions, such as throwing projectiles, homemade explosives, and the construction of walls to impede the advancement of Israeli military and security forces in their area.
The Israeli government established a military government in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Under this structure, Palestinians were deprived of many fundamental political, civil and legal rights given to the Israelis; these include the freedom of expression, media and political assembly. Expressions of Palestinian nationhood were considered as a criminal offense and a security threat. Actions such as displaying their flag were outlawed and other facets of Palestinian life were severely curtailed. In response to the belligerent conduct of the Palestinians against them, Israeli security forces and officials extensively engaged “collective punishment” mechanisms such as time limits, destroying the houses of its opponents, road closures, and large numbers of political dissidents have been deported to neighboring countries such as Jordan and Lebanon, hundreds of acres have been sequestered, and numerous trees and other foliage have been destroyed (Middle East Research and Information Project).
Afflictive economic conditions amalgamated with the hegemonic policies of the Israeli government of its settlements in the territories as well as the absence of any substantive initiative on the part of the international community at arriving at an equitable and just solution to the Palestinian issue, impacted the Palestinian population negatively, with many falling into a sense of ihhat, or frustration and despair. However, there were portions of the population that displayed a sense of optimism and hope: the participation of the women in the uprising afforded them a sense of recognition and integrity for their capacity to create multifaceted changes in their communities (Brecher, Childs, and Cutler, 122).
The insurrection transformed the Palestinians’ self-consciousness and prompted the Israeli political and social system as well as the global community to place the issue on the Israeli Occupied Territories squarely in the center of the political debate. Though the Intifada was ill-timed, what with the lack of support for Arafat and the détente prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United States at the time, the collective effect of the discussions on the PLO with the global community was not completely lost. The uprising proved to the Palestinians that these had the power to establish an independent, distinct, and self-governing society within the context of the Israeli occupation. Moreover, the uprising strongly evinced to the Israeli leadership that it was impossible to impose its will on a people “against its will” and lastly, it proved to the global community that the issues surrounding the Israel-Palestinian cannot just be set aside (Ragonieri).
Ben-Yehuda and Sandler (2002) aver that in spite of the cordial relations of the United States and Israel during the Reagan administration, during the time of the Intifada, American foreign policy shifted from one of complete repudiation of the call for an international summit on the issue to one of warily supporting the call. Before the Intifada, the United States did not want to have another party to split the hegemonic power with the Soviet Union in the region as well as the European powers.
However, with the “warming” foreign relations of the United States and the USSR under Mikhail Gorbachev, diplomatic pressure from the pro-Western Arab states as well as the prodding of Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres all contributed to shift Washington’s position on the issue. US Secretary of State George Shultz made a radical proposal to the PLO and the Palestinians in the Gaza and West Bank regions-accept the legal status of Israel and to disown all inclinations for violent extremism, and the United States would accede to the proffer for a dialogue with the PLO.
The leaders in the “occupied territories” recognized the impossibility of attaining the overall objectives of the PLO as well as that of the Palestinian people by engaging the Israelis to a military war; these in turn compelled PLO chair Yasser Arafat to utilize political means instead. When the United States determined that neither the 1988 PNC announcements nor Arafat’s oration to the United Nations General Assembly complied with the requirements set down by the US to initiate a dialogue with the PLO, Arafat initiated a multipronged attack. In late 1988, Arafat opened a meeting with the press and delivered a statement acquiescing to the interests and rights of the conveners to the issue.
Among these adoptions were the recognition of the right of the state to Israel to exist, the acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 of the United Nations as the basis for arbitrating the issue, and revoking all extremist policies and agendas. The Arafat statement nearly copied verbatim the conditions set down by Secretary Shultz; this acceptance of the conditions set down by the US was immediately “rewarded” by Washington with Secretary Shultz announcing that the United States was prepared for a critical and extensive discussion with the PLO.
However, towards the 1990s, the issue of the Intifada was overshadowed by the outbreak of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Throughout this period, the Intifada fell on the “backburners” of the international community. Furthermore, the Intifada was further set back in the period following the end of the First Gulf War and the 1991 Madrid Conference; Arafat and the PLO supported Hussein during the crisis, inextricably linking the interethnic crisis to the conduct of the war. With the start of the Madrid summit in October 1991, the Intifada nearly faded away, only to resume by the end of the Madrid summit as well as the resumption of a smaller version of the Intifada (Ben-Yehuda, Sandler 150).
The dissolution of the Intifada in the aftermath of the Gulf War-its change from a popular initiative composed of mass activists to one that is a more focused militant organization-significantly debilitated the Palestinian status with the international community. Though there were many reasons that can be proffered why the Intifada weakened, many attributed the extended lock down periods during the Gulf Crisis that severely beat down the Intifada. In addition, the severe economic conditions in the territories including the restriction of the Israelis on the Palestinians to return to or gain employment, as well as the absence of any self-sustaining economy within the territories derailed the attention of the Palestinians from one of asserting self-rule to one of striving to survive daily. All of these factors resulted in the “death” of the Intifada as a political institution (Ismael and Ismael 337).
Works Cited
Ben Yehuda, Hemda, Sandler, Shmuel, The Arab Israeli conflict transformed: fifty years of interstate and ethnic crises. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002
Brecher, Jeremy, Childs, John Brown, and Cutler, Jill, Global visions: beyond the new world order. Brooklyn: South End Press, 1993
Ismael, Tareq Y., Ismael, Jacqueline S., The Gulf War and the new world order: international relations of the Middle East. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1994
Middle East Research and Information Project, “Primer on Palestine, Israel, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” <http://www.merip.org/primer-palestine-israel-arab-israeli-conflict-new#TheFirstIntifada
Ragonieri, Rodolfo, “The peace process in the Middle East: Israelis and Palestinians” <http://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol2_2/ragionieri.htm
