While American leaders have authorized and made use of intelligence and counterintelligence services since before the founding of the nation; the establishment of a formal, independent intelligence community, only occurred less than 60 years ago with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (FAS, 1996). In essence, the National Security Act implemented findings of the Eberstadt Report (FAS, 1996). According to the study, the problem of the nation’s intelligence efforts was that while many government departments, including Defense, State, and Justice, had established intelligence units, there was a significant lack of coordination, communication, and integration. The National Security Act rectified this through the creation of the National Security Council (NSC), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to unify and centralize intelligence efforts, establish the responsibilities of intelligence units, and determine where domestic and international, civil and military intelligence boundaries lie. It is important to note, unlike other areas of government development, one of the legacies of the effort to establish the United States intelligence community was that change in or to the community, does not normally occur as a result of congressional or executive volition. Instead, change to the intelligence community generally occurs after a problem occurs, a review and analysis of the intelligence community’s efforts is completed, and the review’s findings and recommendations are made available through the publication of a report. To be sure, since the publication of the Eberstadt Report in 1945, there have been “14 significant official studies that have surveyed the American intelligence system (Warner & McDonald, 2005). Within those 14 studies none has been more significant or had the most influence in changing the intelligence community, especially in terms of counterintelligence activities, than the Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission Report).
As the name of the report implies, the impetus of the 9/11 Commission Report were the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in New York City, Washington, D.C., and the skies over Pennsylvania that left over 3,000 dead, many more injured and an unknowable about of damage. It was the most significant attack against on the American homeland since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Unlike that attack, however, the 9/11 attackers were not a nation-state but rather members of a transnational terrorist organization with a leader in hiding, no clear home base, and whose members could literally be anyone. In short, they were a type of enemy that the U.S. had not confronted before, at least on this scale. Consequently, the three of the primary questions on the minds of the public and government leaders alike where: how could the attacks have occurred; why weren’t government authorities, especially those in the intelligence community, more prepared; and what could be done to ensure that another similar attack would never occur again (9-11 Commission, 2004). The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States was created by Congress and the president not only to answer these questions but also make recommendations for ways that the nation could implement its findings.
The 9/11 Commission Report, as mentioned, covered a wide range of issues and concerns; a significant portion of which was focused on what the commission determined were the failures of the intelligence community. According the report, the intelligence community’s problems included lack of focus on and analysis of transnational threats, bureaucratic rivalries, too many priorities, outmoded structure and flat budgets (9-11 Commission, 2004). Most, significantly, however, the report found that while there was intelligence being obtained about Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda by a number of intelligence services, most notably the CIA; there was little if any communication and coordination between services on the information that they were able to obtain. Indeed, there was no comprehensive analysis or review what the intelligence community knew (Best, 2010). In essence, there was a failure to connect the dots.
As a result of its findings, the 9/11 Commission Report recommended a unification of the intelligence community so that its different strengths can be better integrated to produce, comprehensive tactical, strategic and actionable intelligence and analysis for the relevant information consumers. While the National Security Act of 1947 was originally supposed to have accomplished this with the establishment of the CIA and its Director of Intelligence (DI), the issue was, according to the report that the responsibilities of running the CIA necessarily adversely impacted the DI’s ability to initiate CIA activities, on the one hand, and coordinate intelligence community activities on the other hand. Consequently, the report recommended the establishment of a National Intelligence Director who would have no department of his own but simply have authority over the other intelligence services (Best, 2010). In addition, the report recommended increased “information sharing” among the different services.
Although the 9/11 Commission Report touched on areas of reform across the government, in terms of its recommendation on reform of the intelligence community, almost all of its proposals were accepted and enacted, and signed into law by Congress and the president via the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) (Best, 2010). One of the main provision of the IRTPA is focused on the reform of the intelligence community as recommended by the 9/11 Commission Report. For instance, IRTPA established the position of Director of National Intelligence with administrative and budgetary powers over the whole intelligence community. IRTPA also established counterterrorism centers were different intelligence community actors can coordinate and integrate services when implementing a counterterrorist action. Additionally, the act mandates intelligence community stakeholders to share information (Best, 2010). As mentioned, since the establishment of the U.S. intelligence community in 1947, the question of increased coordination and information sharing has been consistent. The 9/11 attacks simply reemphasized those concerns. Accordingly, it was not hard to convince Congress, the president and the public that the 9/11 Commission’s intelligence community reforms were reasonable and needed. Nonetheless, the 9/11 Commission Report led to some of the most important changes in the intelligence community since 1947. While the effectiveness of the changes are still being analysis; today’s intelligence community is much more integrated, communicative, and connected in its counterterrorism efforts, than at any time in the history of the nation’s intelligence activity.
References
Best, R.A. (2010, Jun. 22). Intelligence reform after five years: The role of the director of national intelligence. Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R41295.pdf
Federation of American Scientists (FAS). (1996, Feb. 23). The evolution of the U.S. intelligence community – An historical overview. Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/int022.html
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission). (2004).Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States: Executive summary. Retrieved from http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_exec.pdf
Warner, M. & McDonald, J.K. (2005, Apr.). US intelligence community reform studies since 1947. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/US%20Intelligence%20Community%20Reform%20Studies%20Since%201947.pdf
