The concept of the overall purpose and philosophy of man has been addressed and considered by many philosophers over the course of time; do we act merely for the pursuit of our own happiness, or do we focus on an essential concept of justice and reciprocity? In "Two Concepts of Rules," John Rawls demonstrates his desire to "show the importance of the distinction between justifying a practice and justifying a particular action falling under it," as well as the ease by which the significance of this distinction can be made (Rawls, p. 3). He does this through showing two different concepts of rules that discuss the same subject (justice and punishment), and how they can view this through two separate lenses.
Though he mentions the problematic aspect of the justification of punishment, he notes the two justifications often found for them. One is known as "retributive"; here, wrongdoing is said to deserve a punishment, usually in proportion to the wrongdoing itself (p. 4). In the utilitarian view, however, punishment is only justifiable if it will actually prevent future wrongdoing; punishing someone for what they have done in the past are irrelevant (p. 5). According to utilitarianism, unless the punishment is in service to the rest of society going forward, it is irrelevant and unjustifiable. With these two concepts, Rawls creates an interesting discussion: do we punish people because they did things in the past, or do we punish in order to prevent them (and others) from doing bad things in the future? The conflict, according to Rawls, is that both of these arguments are compelling yet contradictory, and the issue is finding a way to reconcile them. This means, then, that justification of punishment must come as a set of rules that apply to certain actions (p. 5).
Rawls states that an institution must be created and elucidated upon in order to mete out punishments in a utilitarian way; people would essentially only be punished when said punishment would effectively help the society prevent further wrongdoings. Even then, Rawls feels that the institution would be problematic if applied to utilitarian principles, as it lacks the features that would make it palatable (real objective oversight of cases, the acceptability of the penal system by the people, its ability to actually deter wrongdoing) (p. 12). In the end, Rawls argues that the system would be much more preferable than one focused on retribution, as it would focus much more on particular cases; however, the logistics of actually implementing such an institution are so complex as to be nearly impossible to pull off.
John Rawls has had somewhat of a problematic relationship with utilitarianism and justice. In his book A Theory of Justice, counters Mills' ideas of utilitarianism with ideas of overall justice and liberty, which often counter the facets of Mill's theories. Rawls believes that there are too many tenuous and problematic connections to liberalism for utilitarianism to work, providing an arguably more clear-cut and equitable philosophy. Rawls argues that the philosophy favors the will and desires of the majority over the minority. In essence, by finding and doing the things that cause the greatest number of people happiness, you by definition exclude the minority from achieving that happiness. People can make many sacrifices without reaping any real rewards from it, which is why Rawls argues for his theory of justice. In essence, his 'original position' states that most people have a veil of ignorance, where "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status" (Rawls 11). His principle argues for a social contract in which individuals mutually agree to work together for the overall rights and privileges of as much of the society as possible.
This done in one of two ways - first, there is the rule of maximizing expected utility, in which people choose the best option amongst all available outcomes of a particular action. The other is the maximin rule, wherein all of the worst outcomes are determined, and the least negative one is chosen. These principles do not rely upon the "strains of commitment" that utilitarianism forces upon its followers, as those who would not benefit from utilitarianism (the minority) would still have to work toward the greater good without reaping the advantages. With Rawls' principles, at least these lesser parties would know that the rest of society is working in their best interests as much as they possibly can, through their examination of actions through the maximum expected utility and the maximin rule. In essence, he believes that the parties who benefit from an original position would much prefer the principles of Rawls to classic utilitarianism. According to Rawls, in a perfect system the foundation of morals would amount to more than just happiness for happiness’ sake, no matter how dressed up it may be in intellectualism and altruism. Ignoring our baser instincts can provide us with a significantly decreased level of happiness, ignoring those who claim that people who prefer those baser pleasures cannot properly judge what is just and good for mankind. With the theory of justice provided by Rawls, there is a bit more equity involved, as both the ideal scenario (maximum expected utility) and lesser of x evils (maximin) are considered. This gives the majority the chance to help the minority with whatever issues they may have. Unlike the majority-friendly sense of utilitarianism, Rawls' interest in providing equal rights and opportunities in a just state makes his argument toward the philosophy of society much more appealing and convincing.
In conclusion, Rawls is very much concerned with equality and justice, but only so far as it pertains to a future society. The greatest happiness principle is very much in effect with his treatment of justice and punishment; retributive punishment only serves to get back at someone who may not even commit that same crime again anyway. To that end, the only moral or helpful kind of punishment is the kind that is nearly impossible to distinguish: the punishment that successfully prevents others from doing wrong in the future, and helps society as a whole.
References
Rawls, J. (1999). A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rawls, J. (1955). Two concepts of rules. The Philosophical Review 64(1): 3-32.
