[Class Title]
Literature Review
It is quite obvious that the relationship between Turkey and Russia as well as their national interest in Syria came into the limelight when both countries went on a serious crisis after the downing of a Russian plane by Turkey on November 24, 2015 (Özlük 1). But prior to this incident, scholars have already been studying the national interest of Turkey and Russia towards Syria and how this national interest impacts the bilateral relationship between the two nations. In order to provide a deeper understanding of the national interest of Russia and Turkey in Syria, some researchers relied on Russia and Turkey’s historical background. According to Torbakov, a Fellow of the German Council on Foreign Relations, “the evolving relations between Ankara and Moscow can only be properly understood in a broad historical context” (Torbakov 2). The consensus among scholars that Russia and Turkey’s relationship is cloudy at best, for instance, is brought about by studying the two countries’ relationship as far back as post-Soviet era. Fatih Özbay, a university professor of humanities and social sciences in Istanbul, mentioned that the troubled relationship between the two countries “span over 500 years” and is characterized by “periodic instances of conflict and cooperation” (Ozbay 69). Similarly, Christopher Philips, a university lecturer and researcher for the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, for instance, looked into Turkey’s relationship with Syria in a historical perspective and describe the two nation’s relationship as poor (Phillips 2). According to Philips, this bad relationship can be traced as far back as World War 1 when Turkey and Syria find themselves backing opposite sides (Phillips 2). During the Cold War, Turkey and Syria were also politically in conflict with each other as Turkey sided with NATO while Syria becomes a close ally of the Soviet Union (Phillips 2). The two countries, however, regained their diplomatic and economic relationship during the presidency of Vladimir Putin and the election of the AK Party in Turkey (Ozbay 71). However, with the start of the Syrian civil war, this relationship is, once again, threatened to be ripped apart (Özlük 5). Aside from the historical relationship, one of the most common lines of analysis is based on religion. As observed by Dr. Thomas Pierret, a Lecturer in Contemporary Islam at the University of Edinburgh, “Religion is also key to understanding the Syrian conflict to the extent that the issue of religious—or, more precisely, sectarian—identity has been at the heart of Syria’s domestic tensions for decades” (Pierret 1). An analysis based on religion touches on Turkey’s role as an Islamic power in the region. The war in Syria, for instance, is seen by some scholars as a conflict between Muslim factions, which inevitably draws neighboring Islamic countries to participate in the conflict. Such analysis, however, excludes Russia and its role in the regional conflict.
Some scholars, however, choose to analyze Russia, Turkey and Syria’s relationship based on the countries’ current political and economic interests. Some scholars, for instance, place little emphasis on historical and religious analysis; arguing that religion, plays a small part in the relationship between the two nations as compared to political and economic interests (Taspinar 133). As observed by Omer Taspinar, a professor in National War College and a Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution, the forces that drive Turkish foreign policy, specifically towards Syria “are nationalism and self-interest, not Islam or the West” (Taspinar 133). Turkey is trying to establish itself as a regional superpower. Influenced by its Ottoman legacy, Turkey, according to Taspinar, “favors an ambitious regional policy in the Middle East and beyond” and Syria is no exception (Taspinar 130). Ekaterina Stepanova of the Russian Academy of Sciences laid out an interesting perspective on Russia’s foreign policy that can be used to analyze its relationship towards Syria and even Turkey. According to Stepanova, Russia’s foreign policy is based on three major drivers. First, as a regional power, Russia is expected to “promptly react to dynamic transnational processes and developments of global significance” even if the country has limited benefit or influence over the issue (Stepanova 1). Second, Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by its genuine national interest as a nation, state and society (Stepanova 2). Lastly, Russia’s foreign policy is influenced by a few ruling classes; the bourgeois society that owns the means of producing the wealth of the country (Stepanova 2). These individuals also wield considerable power in Russia’s politics. Most scholars, for instance, believe that the relationship between Turkey, Russia and Syria is founded on their economic interests, specifically in their common interest in the energy sector (Balcer 81; Bourgeot 4). As observed, by Bourgeot, the head of strategy and economic research for a private company in Paris, “there is a difficult balance between the two countries as they try to negotiate a compromise on the basis of several lines of economic interest” (Bourgeot 4). Russia, for instance, is protecting its interests in Europe and the Middle East as one of its major supplier of oil and natural gas while Turkey is also trying to establish itself as an “energy hub between Europe, the Caucasus and the Middle East” (Bourgeot 4). It is believed that Turkey’s primary interest in Syria is to use it as a “gateway to the Arab world” both politically and economically (Phillips 2). Similarly, Russia’s interest in Syria is also based on its political and economic interests. According to Casula, in a Russian perspective, the Syrian conflict is another grand scheme of the Western powers to topple a regime (Casula 6). Turkey is seen as a key ally of the western powers in their bid to topple Assad’s regime. It is, for instance, a common knowledge that Turkey have been working with the U.S. and the NATO for a regime change in Syria. One of Turkey’s participation would be to “establish safe havens for the opposition along its border with Syria” (Cartalucci & Bowie, 59). It should be noted that Syria has been a long-time ally of Russia and is also a trade partner. Despite the prevailing “indifference and suspicion” of Russians towards Islam, Russia and Syria has maintained a strong political and economic relationship with each other (Lo 139).
The conflict of Russia and Turkey in Syria causes a big strain in their relationship. According to scholars, Turkey is the most affected country because of the Syrian crisis (Demir & Rijnoveanu 60). Aside from the failed political and economic policy, Turkey is not happy with Russia for backing Assad’s regime primarily because they are forced to accommodate a growing number of Syrian refugees (Katz 2). Being one of the closest country in Syria, Turkey is pressured by the international community to accept refugees, which the country reluctantly does so. Among the major concerns is that the exponential increase of Syrian refugees would create many domestic issues, specifically economic and security issues in Turkey. Some scholars, for instance, observed that the refugee problem can negatively impact Turkey’s employment and welfare services as well as well increase the country’s security risk of Islamic extremism, especially in its Kurdish region (Berti 46; Asseburg 19). But despite the tension between Turkey and Russia, most scholars believe that it will have little impact on the two countries’ bilateral relationship. Turkey, for instance, is highly dependent on Russia for its energy needs. As observed by scholars, 58% of Turkey’s gas is imported from Russia (Bourgeot 5). Russia is also Turkey’s major trade partner with trade volume reaching an all time high of 38 billion dollars in 2008 (Ozbay 73). In a Russian perspective, Turkey is considered as “the second largest outlet for natural gas and one of the major outlets for oil” (Balcer 81). Turkey is also near Europe and Turkey is a potential gateway for increasing Russia’s European trade. This dynamic trade relationship could hypothetically mean that Turkey and Russia’s have so much at stake, economically, so that both countries will evade conflict as much as possible in order to maintain their trading relationship. There is also no indication that Russia will back down from supporting Assad’s regime. As observed, “Assad is Russia’s last remaining ally in the Middle East, a major consumer of Russian arms, and host to Russia’s only warm-water naval base although of modest strategic utility” (Jenkins 7).
Works Cited
Asseburg, M. (2013). Syria’s Civil War: Geopolitical Implications and Scenarios. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.iemed.org/observatori-es/arees-danalisi/arxius-adjunts/anuari/iemed-2013/Asseburg%20Syria%20Geopolitical%20Implications%20EN.pdf
Balcer, A. (n.d.). The Future of Turkish-Russian Relations: A Strategic Perspective. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.demoseuropa.eu/upload/editor/demos/File/AdamBalcer_turkishpolicy.pdf
Berti, B. (n.d.). The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Berti.pdf
Bourgeot, R. (2013). Russia - Turkey: A Relationship Shaped by Energy. Retrieved March 2016, from https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ifriremibourgeotrussiaturkeyengmarch2013.pdf
Cartalucci, T., & Bowie, N. (2012). War on Syria: Gateway to WWIII. Retrieved March 2016, from http://educate-yourself.org/cn/War%20On%20Syria%20_Cartalucci_Bowie2.pdf
Casula, P. (2013). Civil War, Revolution or Counter-Insurgency? The Syrian Conflict through Russian Eyes. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/rad/pdf/RAD-128.pdf
Demir, S., & Rijnoveanu, C. (2013). The Impact of the Syria Crisis on the Global and Regional Political Dynamics. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.egeweb.ege.edu.tr/tdid/files/dergi_13/09.pdf
Jenkins, B. (2014). The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE115/RAND_PE115.pdf
Katz, M. (2013). The Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Russian Relations with Other Middle Eastern Countries. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/rad/pdf/RAD-128.pdf
Lo, B. (2002). Russian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.e-reading.club/bookreader.php/135956/lo_-_russian_foreign_policy_in_the_post-soviet_era_-_reality,_illusion_and_mythmaking.pdf
Ozbay, F. (2011). The Relations between Turkey and Russia in the 2000s. Retrieved March 2016, from http://sam.gov.tr/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/FatihOzbay.pdf
Özlük, E. (2015). The Warplane Crisis Between Turkey and Russia and the Issue of ‘Apology’. ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs, 1 - 12.
Phillips, C. (2012). Into the Quagmire: Turkey’s Frustrated Syria Policy. Retrieved March 2016, from https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Middle%20East/1212bp_phillips.pdf
Pierret, T. (2014). The Syrian Baath Party and Sunni Islam: Conflicts and Connivance. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/meb/MEB77.pdf
Smyth, P. (2015). The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects. Retrieved March 2016, from https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus138_Smyth-2.pdf
Stepanova, E. (2012). The Syria Crisis and the Making of Russia’s Foreign Policy. Retrieved March 2016, from https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/ponars/pepm199.pdf
Taspinar, O. (2012). Turkey’s Strategic Vision and Syria. Retrieved March 2016, from http://csis.org/files/publication/twq12SummerTaspinar.pdf
Torbakov, I. (n.d.). Turkey and Russia: Making Sense of the “Intriguing Relationship”. Retrieved March 2016, from http://www.uu.se/digitalAssets/92/92189_3igortorbakovturkeyandrussiaucrslecture.pdf
