Edward Luttwak, the Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third
At its peak, the Roman Empire was based on the following key components; security, stability, and prosperity for all. This is the reason why Luttwak believes that the Roman Empire’s grand strategy is by far the most superior in history and years of advancement in technology, strategy and as well as human behaviour will not get even close to unsettling the aforementioned fact. Before getting into the author’s argument, it is important to understand why Luttwak chose this subject matter. Luttwak is a career military and political strategist who applies science and history and getting the job done. This is demonstrated in most of his works whereby he relies on the both the two fields to get his point across. Below is his argument in the book.
As earlier mentioned, Luttwak believes that the Roman’s grand strategy is by far the most superior in history. This regardless of the advancement that had been by the time he published the book in terms of technology, strategy and evolvement of human behaviour and that shall ever be made later on in the future. He argues by postulating the following reasons among others. First and foremost, the superiority of the Roman’s was neither attributed to their battle field tactical strategy, their military stewardship nor their advanced weaponry but to politics and diplomacy, infrastructural networks and a professional army. The aforementioned core components of the Roman’s grand strategy were reinforced and secure by their resilience to prevail against adversity. To this effect, the Roman grand strategy had a three-pronged approach representing each of its three components; exponential expansion, empire security and imperial survival in the face of adversity.
According to Luttwak the objective of the Roman Empire were security, stability, and prosperity for all to be achieved. For this to be possible, security and resource superiority had to be cardinal. The dilemma that the Roman strategists of the day face therefore was to ensure the three core objectives of the realm were met without compromising economic development and the evolution of a stable and sound class. Therefore, the legendary success of the Roman Empire demonstrates an extraordinary resilience coupled with the extent with which the Roman rulers went to balance competing demands and objectives. He argues that these demands are core parts of humanity and have not and will not change over time or technological advancement. This is why he further postulates that the lessons learnt from the Roman grand strategy will remain relevant for thousands of years to come.
How the Luttwak's argument fits into the wider issues of how we interpret ancient Roman history and why
Many historians agree with Luttwak on the Roman Empire’s grand strategy. It is unanimously agreed that the Romans’ success was neither because of their tactical battlefield superiority, extraordinary military leadership nor was it because of their advance military technology. Far from it, Roman strategies are best described as being doctrinally sound and well executed but not unique to the Romans. Roman soldiers were also nothing to fancy. An ideal Roman soldier did not depict a hero-like mentality and the need to prove his manhood. Contrary to this, Roman soldiers were ordinary people in an extraordinary profession but with the same goals as all professionals; to secure a handsome severance package from the Roman government upon retirement and not a hero’s death.
Roman weaponry on the other hand is best described by most historians as being inferior compared to what their opponents had. In addition to this, this ordinary Roman army that had inferior arsenal was not led by extraordinary military heads. Instead, their army was led by capable soldier, some outstanding and most of them comprising of ordinary personalities. Therefore, the success of the Roman army in its exploits was not based on extraordinary individual attributes and talents but on well laid down methodologies that had withstood the test of time and proved effective and sound. In other words, the Roman rulers understood that the army was a limited, outrageously expensive and very fragile tool of power. This is the reason why more often than not tactical military strategies and useless victories in the battlefield were deemed as being inferior to political and diplomatic objectives.
In addition, the Romans preferred deterrence to confrontation. This is because the Roman leaders believed and were absolutely justified to do so that psychological power was superior to physical power. This is demonstrated in several aspects of the Roman military doctrine. To begin with, Roman armies won their wars gradually. This is the reason why they were hard to defeat. This was part of the wider strategy to expand, secure their territory and prosper while securing as much force as possible. It was a rare occurrence for a Roman army general to reckless lead his men into a mass slaughter. Instead, Roman armies preferred to advance with caution pushing the enemy into fortified positions while building infrastructure behind them to ensure steady flow of supplies. In fact the reason why the Roman generals were the most worshipped of men and gods was because they were similarly the most cautious and paranoid.
Finally, the Roman Empire understood the art of devious diplomacy, using resource and military power (large forces ready to fight but withheld from battlefield confrontation) to subdue their enemies. The Roman rulers used the aforementioned three strategies to sow seeds of disharmony among their enemies, to deter anti-Roman sentiments and conquer and rule new and old territories via coercion and manipulation. This strategy of intimidation and manipulation was learnt from the many battles the Romans engaged in with their enemies especially the Carthaginians whom the Romans battled with a record three times and the Helenians. Generally, the Roman grand strategy was based on the notion that tactical superiority was in the form of converting military power to economic and political power which are by the greater forms of power compared to the latter.
Conclusions
The Roman grand strategy is by far the most tactically superior in history and shall clearly withstand the test of time and technological advancement, as postulated by Luttwak and supported by accurate historical accounts of the same. This is because Romans based their superiority on tact and not force. The Roman grand strategy was largely based on political and economic power rather than the conventional power. The Roman leaders shrewdly combined diplomacy, politics, and infrastructure to expand and secure the empire. Below are some of the notable aspects of the Roman grand strategy as postulated by Luttwak and collaborated by an extensive factual historical perspective.
The Romans had learnt from experience that most wars are often won outside the battlefield. All their military strategies were aimed at defeating the external component of war; resources, infrastructure, and organized political leadership. With this regards the Romans preferred the use of political, diplomatic, and economic forces as compared to military force that only had physical rather than psychological impact which is by more effective. Even on the battlefield, Roman soldier exercised as much restraint as possible and always proceeded gradually and with caution in long and brutal encounters that often resulted in victories for the Roman Empire. To this respect, the Roman politicians and powerbrokers had the entire empire working like a well-oiled machine to safeguard the interest of the few residing in the realm’s capital. In conclusion, the Roman grand strategy was a combination of manipulation and coercion powered by a cunning political class, deep economic and resource coffers, and a military strategy that served to deter and expand the realm’s infrastructural network.
Reference
Luttwak,E. (1979). The grand strategy of the Roman Empire: From the first century A.D. to the third. Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
