In his 1994 book The Massacre at El Mozote, Mark Danner offers a clear description of the the massacre of hundreds of men, women and children by the El Salvadoran army, who were trained by American consultants and military advisors. He also provides excellent background and analysis of the political background that encouraged the massacre. At the time, the story of the massacre was covered-up, ignored or minimized by the right-wing anti-communist El Salvadoran and U.S. governments for political reasons. There were also practical diplomatic, communication and journalistic obstacles and mistakes which made the story ambiguous, opaque and hard to decipher. Most importantly, the El Salvadoran military elite was corrupt, out of control and homicidal; they were willing to kill anyone to maintain power and fight the spread of communism, which threatened the system that had created them and made them rich. For these reason, it is very hard to determine the culpability of the U.S. government. At the very least they were responsible for training, equipping and financing psychopaths. However, there is an argument to be made that it was impossible to determine exactly who was responsible for the atrocity. Furthermore, there were solid and pragmatic Cold War reasons for their support of the El Salvadoran military. Their response to the massacre may have also been clouded by the haze of Cold War ideology. The structure of the El Salvadoran military made it corrupt, violent and almost impossible to control, so the U.S. was in bed with bad company.
During the Salvadoran Civil War death squads and the deliberate terror campaigns and murder of civilians were common. Both the military-led government of El Salvador and the left-wing communist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), were responsible for atrocities. The United States supported the military of El Salvador with cash, equipment and training. They were interested in deterring development of communist governments in Central America. (Danner 5).
El Mozote was a small village of about 300 people near the Honduran border. During the war, El Mozote had a reputation for neutrality. Villages that supported the FMLN were Roman Catholic. El Mozote was largely Protestant. They had a “delicate coexistence” with the guerrillas and were not ideologically supportive of their cause. It was "a place where the guerrillas had learned not to look for recruits"(Danner 6)). In the days leading up to the massacre, the townspeople had been warned there would be a counterinsurgency operation, but believed they would be safe if they stayed in their homes. In fact, they did not flee because they did not want to be mistaken for FMLN sympathizers (Danner 7). These were innocent people, with no political or economic stake in the civil war.
Today, the facts of the massacre are undisputed. On December 10-11th, 1981, the elite Atlacatl Batallion of the Salvadoran military executed almost every man, woman and child in El Mozote and some neighboring villages. Men were decapitated, young girls were raped, children had their throats slit and then were hung from trees. Bodies were burned to make identification difficult. Almost everyone was killed, or had escaped, making identification even more difficult. The massacre was part of “Operacion Rescate”, which was created to eliminate the guerrillas throughout remote regions of El Salvador (Danner 11). According to Danner, while shocking, this was nothing new. The El Salvador military had a culture that supported corruption and systematic murder of civilians. The officers who made up the elite part of the El Salvadoran military had their own training and reward system that had nothing to do with merit or competence. They were loyal to their military class, their tanda. The culture inside the rich and politically connected right-wing military corps protected each other at all costs. (Danner 13). They all graduated from the same military academy together and formed the powerful ruling elite of the military; some would be selected to become president. U.S. diplomats described the El Salvadoran military as out of control, corrupt and extremely violent, with a “kill the seed” mentality (Danner 14). The military saw the guerrillas as a communist “cancer”. They would kill entire communities if they believed they were communists or sympathized with the FMLN. One diplomat said “if you're a guerrilla they don't just kill you, they kill your cousin, you know, everybody in the family, to make sure the cancer is cut out" (Danner15). They also explained that this tendency to kill everyone suspected of being involved with the FMLN was nothing new, it was a part of El Salvadoran military tradition. The U.S. supported this group not because they agreed with their methods, but they had a common enemy in left-wing communist groups that threatened the established order in El Salvador. The U.S. was afraid communism would spread and wanted to maintain pro-American regimes, and discourage pro-Soviet or Cuban associated groups from taking power.
The training, money and equipment provided by the U.S. to the El Salvador military elite battalions is one of the primary reasons the U.S. has been accused of being partially responsible for the Massacre. Danner describes their ruthlessness, aggressiveness, and their willingness to "do the job" The normal El Salvadoran army are described as disorganized, inefficient and badly trained. They were sent “into the field virtually untrained, soldiers rarely left the barracks after five o'clock in the afternoon, and officers rarely left the barracks at all” (Danner 17). Therefore, it could be argued that the elite squads that performed the massacre were a product of U.S. involvement. Their aggressiveness may have been encouraged – or even created - by American military advisors However, this argument is weakened by Danner's description of the history and structure of the El Salvadoran military system. The U.S. may have provided money and equipment, but the killing of civilians seems to be a unique part of the El Salvadoran military ethos.
Danner explains that there was already a general feeling in U.S. diplomatic community at the U.S. Embassy that El Salvador military were brutal and out of control. They were unable to exert pressure on the regime because the El Salvadoran military understood that American had much to lose, and needed their support in their fight again communism (Danner 27). Because of their corrupt entrenched military government system, the El Salvadorans were not easily pressured, scared or intimidated.
The immediate response to the massacre is hard to measure because it happened so slowly and was twisted by political ideology and bias. The original reports made by the military and diplomats were slow, confused, vague and mostly incorrect. U.S. A few days after the massacre, a U.S. military advisor sent a telegram to the Ambassador, asking "confirmation or otherwise" of "reliable reports received here [that] indicate that between December 10 and 13 joint military and security forces operation took place in Morazán Department which resulted in over 900 civilian deaths." (Danner 38). He also contacted Amnesty International and the New York Times. Not much happened. The El Salvadoran media was controlled by the military regime and dismissed the reports are propaganda. In the U.S., it was Christmas time, and a particularly nasty massacre, which highlighted all of the problems associated with the “Dirty War” was not properly investigated by the media, the government or other organizations. This was pre-internet, and communication was slow, particularly in Central America, but the proverbial ball was dropped by everyone involved. In hindsight, Danner highlights that political dealings, incorrect reporting, lack of adequate communication and outright cover-ups and lies by the El Salvadoran government made it difficult for the U.S. government to properly assess the situation. Despite their doubts, the U.S. government may have believed their El Salvadoran allies because politically they wanted to believe it. Moreover, they wanted to win the war against communism more than they wanted to investigate human rights violations or admit association with a regime that murdered innocent civilians.
Even in El Salvador, the news too a long time to gain traction. News of the massacre spread slowly and in late January protests began. The Salvadoran government “categorically denied that a massacre had taken place and did not conduct any judicial investigations of the events” (Danner 66).
On the other hand, the press in the United States did cover the story, focusing on a survivor named Rufina Amaya, a witness who had escaped and hid in a tree. (Danner 79). The army had killed her husband and four children and burned the bodies. Her story helped to legitimize the story and added a human face to the atrocity Her descriptions of her children's death is horrific. As a result of the growing media coverage, a congressional investigation was also initiated but the conservative Reagan administration denied there was any “credible evidence” that verified a massacre had taken place. For their part, the Democrats attacked the reported military abuses of the Salvadoran government. The Reagan Administration promised that there were no human rights abuses taking place. Ultimately, not much was done and nothing changed. The aid kept flowing to El Salvador. Congress did not want to get blamed for losing the war in El Salvador. The right wing controlled U.S. government protected the right wing El Salvadoran government to protect their Cold War interests. The U.S. government had only one goal – to keep El Salvador from becoming a communist country. Humanitarian abuses were not important. No one was ever convicted for the massacre (Danner 85).
It could be argued that that the U.S. government may have covered up the massacre at El Mozote. However, the officials involved claim it was extremely difficult to get accurate information about the massacres because the war had become so politicized. There were also journalistic mistakes that may have convoluted the decision making process in Washington. For example, many were hung up on the fact that there were 800 reported deaths, when the population of El Mozote was only 300. The total count of 800 included other villages. Both sides would accuse the other of exaggerating or covering up, depending on their political ideology or affiliation. The massacre was politicized from the beginning, occurring “at the very moment when members of Congress were bitterly debating whether they should cut off aid to a Salvadoran regime so desperate that it had apparently resorted to the most savage methods of war. “ (Danner 5). Afterwards, there was a great deal of confusion, ambiguity mixed with a lot over covering up and lies about this incident. The truth about the U.S. role in the massacre may be somewhere in the middle; in between the government covering up and the government being completely in the dark.
The atrocities of the "dirty war" were clearly organized and directed by Salvadoran Army officers. However, Danner believes that the American Embassy in El Salvador was “well aware” there were mass killing of civilians. (Danner 83). He cites a public affairs officer who told him that everyone at the embassy knew who was doing the killing, and it was not the FMLN: "I mean, you formed that view within forty-eight hours after arriving in the country, and there was no secret at all about it -- except, maybe, in the White House." (Danner 95). The identity of the killers was usually attributed as independent vigilantes. Danner quotes U.S. diplomatic cables that describe the military situation in the countryside as not good, and "Many feel there are 'liberated' areas where they dare not operate due to the concentration of leftist-terrorist strength." (Danner 95). This indicates that the U.S. were aware the El Salvadorans were desperate, lost control of remote areas and therefore were interested in getting them back, by any means necessary.
Furthermore, there was very little actual evidence at the time. The reports on the massacre were vague military briefings and inferences made by lower level diplomats. Danner interviewed some of the diplomats in El Salvador at the time. Over ten years later, they recognized what happened, but they kept repeating phrases such as "It was just an impression” or “there was no direct corroborating evidence" (Danner 103). Danner says that to understand the U.S. government’s role in the massacre, “one begins to understand the complicated political web and pressures that the Embassy had to deal with, which he called “the effect that the great game of politics being played in Washington” (Danner 112). The diplomats involved believed at the time the Embassy was concerned that the “the guerrillas were making a major propaganda ploy over a massacre that might or might not have occurred in El Mozote, and were doing so for the purpose of derailing U.S. policy” (Danner 112). This could be construed as selective interpretation; that the U.S. government and the El Salvadoran military and news media simply pretended the story was propaganda, created by communists, to make them look bad. However, the diplomats at the Embassy had “clear impressions” and conviction that “something horrible happened” and there was probably some kind of massacre, there was no official evidence, and the extent of the atrocity were not known at the time to representatives of the U.S. government (Danner 119).
So what role did the U.S. play in the massacre at El Mozote? They supported the enemy of their enemy, despite knowing that they were not the most humane of military regimes – if such a thing exits. Danner does an excellent job of not necessarily assigning blame, but illustrating the complicated political Cold War landscape that the U.S. was navigating. The massacre at El Mozote remains a dark chapter in what is remembered as a “dirty war”. Realistically, at the time it was extremely difficult to establish conclusively what happened at Mozote, and right wing politicians simply decided to ignore or dismiss eyewitness reports as propaganda. It was not politically expedient to investigate. It seems they conveniently required official verification that the massacre took place, according to authorized sources. No such sources existed. The village was in a remote part of the country. Survivors like Rufino Amaya were not “credible” according to U.S. government standards. In the political polarized and brutal world of wartime El Salvador, the media or Amnesty International were not going to be capable of conducting investigations. Ultimately, the U.S. spent hundreds of millions, or more, to train and then later attempt to reform the corrupt and violent Salvadoran military. However, as Danner points out, the regime had a power structure that resisted American interference. It sounded like they took money, equipment and technical training, and they did what they felt was appropriate, which was to kill communists or anyone who could be a communist sympathizer.
Danner presents the facts against a historical backdrop that explains the motivations and agendas behind the massacre and the reaction to it afterwards. The truth is hard to detect, but the village people of El Mozote were innocent civilians, and the massacre was a war crime. There were no investigations, and little real research for many years. There seems to be a great deal of plausible deniability of the part of the United States. Politics aside, this was an enormous humanitarian blunder on the part of the U.S., for which the people involved are still embarrassed and ashamed to talk about. This is probably the strongest evidence that the U.S. was in bad company, and should have done more to prevent the mentality that allowed it to happen, or at least bring the perpetrators to justice. However, the U.S. had one agenda, to stop the spread of communism, which they tenaciously pursued to victory.
Work Cited
Danner, Mark. The Massacre at El Mozote: A Parable of the Cold War. New York: Vintage, 1994. Print.
