For most of human history the standard attitude towards animals was that they were there to be used as humans saw fit and could even be exterminated or hunted to extinction. In modern times, of course, this has increasingly come to be seen as a highly conservative position, even by those who do not share the animal liberationist position at the opposite extreme—that all sentient beings have equal rights. Human law and custom do grant some rights and protections to animals, such as avoiding needless or gratuitous cruelty, even if they do not extend all of the same rights to animals that even the most ‘marginal’ humans enjoy.
In his review of Evelyn Pluhar’s book Beyond Prejudice, Colin McGinn agrees fully with her central thesis that animals should have the same rights as human beings. He completely supports her logic and reasoning in making this case, and calls the book “exceptionally thorough, expertly reasoned, and entirely convincing” (McGinn, 1997, p. 219). McGinn and Pluhar both denounce “homocentrism” which is the view that “you are morally responsible if and only if you are a member of the human species” (McGinn, p. 220). They regard this as a form of prejudice akin to racism or sexism that has no place in the modern world. To deny that animals have rights simply because they are not conscious, rational beings would also mean denying rights to infants, the senile elderly or they mentally ill and mentally retarded, yet this is not the normal practice in Western democratic nations. If even these ‘marginal’ humans have rights, then so should gorillas, chimpanzees and dolphins, and it would be a double standard to grant rights to the one group while denying them to the other. McGinn and Pluhar also reject the argument that since the “typical” or normal members of the human species possess reason and morality, then that gives humanity as a whole certain rights, even if some of the individual members of the species are physically or mentally defective (McGinn, p. 220). Here again, though, custom and law in the Western world do not deny all individual rights to the marginal or defective, except of course for regimes like Nazi Germany. Since some animals are at least as smart as some humans, using them for strictly utilitarian ends to benefit the human species is as unethical as it would be to kill or experiment upon infants or the mentally ill.
McGinn also states that both humans and animals have the capacity for conation, meaning that they act consciously or unconsciously toward a goal. This might be a weakness in the argument, however, since if animals have an actual plan or goal beyond sheer instinct, then it does not result in the construction of cities, governments and nations or the development of science and technology. No animals seem to have that level of sophistication or intellectual ability, but here again this line of argument falls short because of the same retort that ‘marginal’ humans also lack these capacities. Any possible argument against animal rights keeps falling short unless society is also prepared to deny basic human rights to senile, retarded and mentally ill humans, whose capacities are very often as limited as animals. Once again, unless society wishes to go down the road of the old eugenics movement or the Third Reich, which is definitely not a moral or desirable goal, then the central argument of the animal rights theorists still stands. If all the animals were ‘liberated’ tomorrow, they are not going to start building schools, laboratories and governments, but neither would many of the patients in nursing homes and mental institutions.
In my opinion, life (or existence) in and of itself has no moral status and no one seriously believes that the life of a mouse, rabbit or amoeba is equivalent to that of a human being. Rocks, cars and other inanimate objects can never have any moral significance, nor do they feel pain like mammals. Animals do have more moral significance than mere objects and things, though, and cruelty towards them is generally considered immoral, just as cruelty toward physically and mentally handicapped humans. Most scientists seem to come down somewhere in between the two extremes of this debate, while insisting that the humane use of animals in experiments is essential. Some theorists come very close to an absolutist or laissez faire position that such experiments were an unqualified benefit to humanity, which could use lower animals as it saw fit for its own benefit. Human needs take priority, and animals lacked free will or a moral sense, and therefore had no rights, but moral considerations do grant certain protections to animals, even if not the full equality insisted upon by animal liberation activists. From an ethical point of view, animals should not be used at all if adequate substitutes are available, and then only if the benefits outweigh the costs. Their suffering must be minimized, and animals should not be captured from the wild for this purpose. They should be accorded similar rights to mentally and physically handicapped humans, and in the case of great apes and dolphins, should perhaps be considered intelligent beings capable of voluntary consent. Although scientists insist that animal experimentation can never be fully replaced by computer and mathematical models or in vitro methods, moral and legal standards for this type of research are far stricter now than they were thirty or forty years ago, and properly so.
Scientists today still insist that they cannot find replacements and substitutes for all animal research, although computer and mathematical models, stem cells, cadavers and in vitro methods do permit reduced use of animal test subjects compared to the past. Given the fact that medical science and biology cannot eliminate animal testing, and that it offers obvious benefits to humans and animals, the best approach would be one that makes human life and welfare primary alongside appropriate protections and safeguards for animals used in research. Full equality between mammals and humans is impossible in reality, but a two-tiered approach that makes distinctions between higher and lower mammals seems appropriate, According to the latest scientific research, for example, great apes and dolphins may well have a degree or consciousness, intelligence and even personhood, and should not be used as involuntary test subjects. They might well be treated with at least the same moral consideration as physically and mentally handicapped humans, who under modern medical ethics cannot be experimented upon without their consent. In fact, only Nazi doctors and others with a similar mentality could find ‘scientific’, ‘legal’ and ‘moral’ reasons to experiment upon and exterminate those they regarded as inferiors, but they received their answer at Nuremberg. On the other hand, mice, rats and rabbits would not be entitled to the same level of protections, and these are the most commonly used animals in research in any case. Such experiments on animals should only be conducted under appropriate legal and moral standards, when no substitutes are available, and when the benefits outweigh the costs and the suffering of the animal is minimized.
REFERENCES
McGinn, C. (1997). Minds and Bodies: Philosophers and their Ideas. Oxford University Press.
