Aristotle observes that there are only two right ways in which people can be morally virtuous. This is through being either intellectual or moral. In order to be able to understand what is morally virtuous, you must gauge between the extremes of deficiency and excess.
Through looking at the acts of virtue, states of characters, and mean actions we can define the core logic of virtues.
There are three rules that state whether a person is doing a virtuous act: the first is that people believe that they are right, the second being that a person must choose to do the right act, and the third being that their behavior is stable. As a state, virtues are neither one side or the other. They are a neutral space between the extremities. This is why this is a state of character. Looking to the behavior, we must understand where the neutrality of the virtue resides. This is what is relative or mean to us. Aristotle brings us to a higher understanding of what virtue is and how we define virtuous acts.
Aristotle refines virtue more in Book Two Chapter 9 (Aristotle, 2006) through expressing how difficult it is for a person to be good. This is explained by mentioning the variables that people must do in at the mean for something to be truly virtuous. This means it must be done for the right person, the right reason, the right way, the right motive, and the right time. Aristotle logically states that this is rare in that people do all of the right things at the right time. Thus for people that attempt to be virtuous and stray not too far from the mean, then they are considered good. For those that travel further then the mean, they are held less virtuous.
We are presented the concept of virtue through the eyes of Aristotle. To be morally virtuous, one must act on the beliefs of goodness. In addition to that, people should be prepared understand the extremities of what could happen. To be truly virtuous, one should have belief in themselves and be as good as possible.
Works Cited:
Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. by David Ross. New York: Oxford University Press. 2009. ISBN 0-19-9213610.
