Mandatory minimum sentencing laws are inflexible sentence that courts are forced to hand on a convicted individual. These laws do not factor in culpability and other mitigating elements surrounding the crime committed (Bjerk, 2005). These laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. These laws apply mainly in common law jurisdictions as in civil law each crime is prescribed minimum and maximum sentences (Gilpin, 2011). In scenarios where the mandatory minimum sentencing laws prevail, judges have only the core duty to determine whether an individual is guilty or innocent.
The laws were formerly introduced in two countries, the United States, and Australia. In the former, the laws were first introduced in 1952 as the Boggs Act. The New York state in 1973 introduced 15 year mandatory minimum sentences for more than 112 grams (4 oz.) hard drugs (Bjerk, 2005). In Australia, the laws were first effected in 1997 as the three strikes and out policy aimed at taming habitual offenders (Tonry & Hatlestad, 1997). The Australian legislature also introduced two similar laws in 2011 and 2014; mandatory life sentences for murder of a law enforcement officer (The Crimes Amendment 2011) and assault and intoxication crimes (Crime and Other Legislation Amendment 2014). All these laws were crafted with the intent of arriving at swift justice while at the same time ensuring safe societies prevail. This paper will therefore to highlight out the effectiveness, challenges and elements of the mandatory minimum sentencing laws.
There are several reasons for crafting these laws. The first reason is that they keep serious offenders behind bars for a long time. The three strikes law, for instance, ensure that persistent or habitual offenders receive harsher sentences translating too much safer communities (Gilpin, 2011). The second reason for establishing the mandatory minimums is to deter potential offenders from crimes. With the inflexible sentences, many potential offenders are dissuaded from engaging in crimes. The third reason for the implementation of the laws is the need to create a safety net against unchecked judicial sentencing decisions (Mauer, 2010). It is prudent to note some judicial decisions may be motivated by prejudice or bias hence leading to harsher or much leaner sentences. The effecting of the laws has also led to the attainment of uniformity when it comes to sentencing where certain crimes carry certain punishment, and habitual offenders receive heightened punishment (Mauer, 2010). This uniformity ultimately enables the judiciary to achieve a just approach to cases. These laws further bring about collateral benefits to law enforcement agencies. The lower level offenders offer cooperation that is critical to investigators and prosecutors in isolating key players in a criminal organization (Mauer, 2010). Many cases against high-ranking members of criminal organizations in the past have been apprehended due to this cooperation.
These laws, however, have come under fire in recent times due to various reasons. The lack of judicial discretion compromises integrity in many cases. Pundits argue that in many instances this discretion is transferred to the prosecutor who may push an offender to plead guilty through overcharging (Bjerk, 2005). This compromises the full course of law. It is also prudent to understand that the prosecutor is part of the executive and thus this translates to dilution of the separation of powers doctrines as the judicial system has no participation in formulating sentences. A judge’s sobriety and wisdom are key particularly when particular facts of a case are evident (Luna & Cassel, 2010). A judge is most suitable in determining these sentences for fairness to be achieved. The minimum sentencing has been criticized for fanning racial and gender inequalities. In the US, for instance, the number of black offenders incarcerated in relation to the minimum sentencing has risen over the years (Bjerk, 2005). The presence of too many black male individuals is tied down to societal issues such as absentee fathers and poverty. In Florida, the three-stroke policies was rarely used on female offenders however when the offenders of African American descent they were bound often than not to be sentenced under the habitual offender laws (Luna & Cassel, 2010).
The prosecution discretion associated with the minimum sentencing laws enables prosecutors to wield great influence on case outcomes. It has been established that many prosecutors find mandatory minimum sentencing laws too rigid for their liking. This notably makes them take measures or steps to avoid what they perceive unduly harsh and ultimately unjust sentences (Bjerk, 2005). They avoid application of these sentencing laws by easily filing charges for different, but comparable offenses that are not covered with the mandatory sentences. This is a new concept, in fact; it is said to be the reason the congress in 1970 repealed almost all mandatory federal drug sentences. Bjerk, (2005) in the Journal of Law and Economics through studies concluded that many prosecutors extended fewer charges to three-strikes arrestees when their arrest charge leads to sentencing under a three strikes mandatory sentencing law. Due to the judicial discretion enjoyed by the prosecution, the prosecutors can easily drop prior strikes for defendants who are arrested for lesser offenses and have more remote and less tainted criminal records (Bjerk, 2005). This is aimed at mitigating the impact of the three-strike law. The prosecution may also influence the case outcomes through observation of the judicial and jury behavior regarding a case. The jury and the judge may react for instance to three-strike law by becoming less likely to carry out convictions for all the defendants.
The enactment of the 1994 three-strike law in California came at a time when violence had escalated. The act managed to bring down the crime rate due to its intricate nature. The minimum sentence in the Californian context was set at a minimum of 25 years to life (Mauer, 2010). This was dependent on whether the first felonies were perceived to be either violent or serious. A third strike was not necessary for an offender to qualify for a life sentence. The two strike offenses could easily be extended this heightened sentence for a minor third strike law-breaking.
As noted earlier, prosecution discretion at times comes to the aid of offenders whose acts in the real sense do not warrant harsh sentences. An example is an offender who kicks a kid off a bicycle and steals it (Tonry & Hatlestad, 1997). This offender’s crimes, under the minimum sentencing laws, may fall in the category of violent crimes that warrant a life sentence. Using the natural justice perspective, the punishment is rather harsh and too inconsiderate. A rational prosecutor may use his prosecution discretion to change the case details to misdemeanor that may warrant less punitive sentence (Bjerk, 2005).
In conclusion, , mandatory minimum law sentences were laws that made much sense ten years ago due to their effectiveness. The laws mostly for non-violent crimes were essentially important in deterring crimes and nabbing habitual offenders (Gilpin, 2011). This currently is not the case. There is much public outcry regarding the rising populations behind bars brought about by an influx of non-violent offenders subjected to the mandatory minimum sentences. There has been much lobbying for the congress to review the minimum sentencing laws for drug cases. There has been notably a rise in the number of drug offenders. Studies say the number of incarcerated drug offenders has increased twenty 21 times since 1981 (Gilpin, 2011). This populace has translated into more costs being incurred by the federal government raising questions on the relevance of the laws in this decade. The drug-related minimum laws have been greatly faulted for being ineffective in that they do not nab the kingpins but rather the low-offenders (Gilpin, 2011). The low-offenders can easily be replaced but putting a drug-lord behind bars would be much instrumental in the fight against drug operations.
References
Bjerk, D. (2005). Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing. Journal of Law & Economics, 48(2), 590-625.
Gilpin, A. (2011). The Impact Of Mandatory Minimum And Truth-In Sentencing Laws And Their Relation To English Sentencing Policies. Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law, 29(1), 92-135.
Luna, E., & Cassel, P. G. (2010). Mandatory Minimalism. CARDOZO LAW REVIEW, 32(1), 1-83.
Mauer, M. (2010). The impact of mandatory minimum penalties in federal sentencing. Judicature, 94(1), 36-40.
Sheehy, E. (n.d.). Mandatory Minimum Sentences:Law and Policy. OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL, 39(2), 268-272.
Tonry, M. H., & Hatlestad, K. (1997). Sentencing reform in overcrowded times: A comparative perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
