On Why Admissions In United States’ Colleges And Universities Should Not Consider Race Essay Samples

Present day education systems of the United States of America are subject to racially diversified college classrooms that are significantly different from the classes that existed by the second half of the twentieth century. The notable change is the outcome of “affirmative action” that became law under the Executive Order 11246 courtesy of President Lyndon Johnson in 1965. As per the terms of the executive order, publicly funded companies could not discriminate based on any traits including skin color, gender, and religion. In the end, the action sought to serve two purposes: make efforts to allocate equal opportunity for all persons and give preferences to minority groups (Background Notes par. 6-7). Naturally, public universities were part of the same. The direct course of action by college admissions personnel was the use of quotas to achieve diversity and credibility. For example, out of the one hundred percent of the entire student body, the universities would ensure that at least fifteen percent of the same were persons of African descent and other minority racial groups. Still, educational and societal norms continue to evolve and as a result, present day students, teachers, and leaders continue to debate the merits of using race as a determinant factor in college admissions. On one hand, the proposing forces argue that such actions help ensure that school populations are diverse, and the needy students receive a chance to gain a proper education. Apparently, the different cultures and mannerisms witnessed among people of various backgrounds will go a long way in helping students learn the right attitudes for life after school. On the other, the opposing side asserts that when universities ground admissions on race, there are chances that they pass up students who might be more qualified for a position in the institution merely because they seek to meet a quota goal. The argument has valid concerns from both sides and for that reason, this paper covers the arguments made by both sides before explaining why the consideration of race as a plus factor in colleges and universities should not be made legal.
The Supreme Court, in 1978, reviewed the University of California’s prejudiced admissions program in the case of the Board of Regents of the University of “California v. Bakke”, a white male student (Background Notes). Apparently, the school endorsed two systems of entries as eighty-four out of one hundred seats relied on fillings based on the merit of the applicants while the remaining sixteen percent was subject to the preferred minorities. In a twofold decision, the Supreme Court ruled against the University’s use of a quota system and ordered Bakke’s admission but still allowed schools to implement racial preferences that would aid in “achieving the educational benefits of diversity” (Background Notes par.10). Unfortunately, the presiding Judge in the mentioned case, Lewis Powell paved the way for the use of racial preferences in learning institutions. Still, the Supreme Court faced yet more cases of racial preferences in college admissions in 2003. The case was against the University of Michigan’s admissions into its undergraduate law school program. In the given instance, the “Grutter v. Bollinger” proceedings challenged the law school’s use of racial quotas, deemed illegal in Bakke’s case, and termed it as unconstitutional. However, the school maintained its stand in the utilization of the mentioned methods to ensure that the “critical mass of underrepresented minority students” had an equal opportunity at the University (Grutter v. Bollinger par.36). Available data on admissions revealed separate criteria for admissions based on race and the number of preferred minorities admitted in proportion to the total number of applicants. The presiding judge, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, ruled the case for Michigan University while stating the relevance of a diverse student body in “educational mission[s]” (Grutter v. Bollinger par.9). Apparently, the institution’s antics were a permissible race-based allocation of admissions. Still, Justice Clarence Thomas opposed O’Connor’s ideologies in his dissent. According to the judge, the minute the government allows the use of race as a relevant factor in the issuing of benefits or burdens it would be in violation of the “Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution” (Race as a Plus Factor par.3). Closer to the present time, the Supreme Court was central to the 2012 “Fisher v. [The] University of Texas” at Austin. According to the case details, Abigail Fisher did not gain admission into the university because her being white made her ineligible as she did not graduate in the top ten percent of her high school class. Outside the automatic ten percent, the remaining slots were subject to “race and ethnicity” and did not use quotas (Background Notes par.17). The case is still ongoing after a series of decisions for the University of Texas and investigations into the school’s admissions programs.
With the given cases and the resulting court rulings in mind, one question emerges: should it be legal in the United States for colleges and universities to consider race as a plus factor in making admissions decisions? Notably, there is no uniformity in the Supreme Court’s decisions towards cases of using race as a plus factor in college admissions. While in 1978 the action was dubbed unconstitutional and Bakke gained admittance into college, in 2003 two presiding judges differed on the right course of action and in 2012, a case with similar premises lacked merit. By that logic, it is clear that affirmative action in educational institutions will soon become legal but as the next segments argue; such a move will have more cons that pros. To that end, for one to understand the arguments that support and refute the implementation of racial groups as a determinant feature in admissions, and even other processes that require the screening of individuals, there is a need to analyze specific articles based on three claims.
Claim1: The first assertion holds that colleges and universities should admit only the most qualified students. In turn, though left unsaid, such an arrangement would overlook the applications of individuals who fail to meet the set criteria for acceptance to pursue a particular program. Consequently, as Cohen writes in Race Preference is Morally Wrong the situation would be acceptable to all because a preference that targets a distinct people while overlooking others is “unfair unless the advantages given are justifiable” (23). For instance, adults can vote while babies cannot as they are incapable of self-sustenance. Thus, a benefit enjoyed by an adult only is justifiable in the context of the age difference and experience he or she possesses, and the baby lacks. However, when it is just adults and divisions that include gender and ethnicity come into play, then the situation promptly changes in nature and becomes unjust. In concurrence with Cohen’s views, Terrence Pell reckons that when institutions use “separate admission procedures” they cause more harm than good (310). Therefore, when it is only the qualified students that gain admittance, it would mean that there was no favoritism, and every person is within his or her rights to be a student at the educational institute of his or her choice. Now, as Roger Wilkins’ Racism Has Its Privileges reports, there is one major problem with the given arguments: American societies are not meritocratic (6). In other words, equality becomes a mere myth when hard work does not guarantee an individual’s proper access to available opportunities in light of the racial traits that play a bigger role. Thus, rigid standards would only stand to benefit a definite populace and overlook others just because they do not consider plausible disadvantages suffered by the ignored faction. Likewise, in what appears to be an echo of Wilkins’ observations, a report by the General Motors Corporation terms any efforts made towards admitting students with diverse experiences as “valid academic goal[s]” (8). Hence, there ought to be no strict rules to govern college and university admissions.
Claim 2: Next is the claim that the existence of a racially diverse student body in colleges and universities is imperative to student learning and future employers. So far, it is evident that those that seek to have diversifications in education institutions consider the results and not necessarily the means through which they bring about diversification. Hence, Wilkins insists that if colleges and universities were to remain devoid of methods to ensure that minorities have a chance at better education, then African Americans will inevitably suffer. Accordingly, the man sheds more light to his discussion by pointing out that the standard excuse given by white employers who fail to hire persons of color. In the words of the man, Caucasians often give the excuse of not finding “anyone qualified” before going on to hire the white people they most likely wanted to hire “in the first place” (Wilkins 2). Therefore, when schools make sure to diversify their student populations, they directly influence the life of black persons by giving them a chance to compete for lucrative jobs. General Motors Corporation provides a similar sentiment albeit from a different approach. Apparently, a “diverse academic environment” trains future workers and prepares them for various working atmospheres (12). When Caucasians, blacks, Hispanics, and other racial groups coexist, they benefit each other by providing grooming exercises that are very relevant in gaining the “cross-cultural competence” that is essential in successful business (General Motors 13).
Now, Cohen and Pell do not oppose the role of diversification in social cohesion. On the contrary, the two authors applaud the concept and encourage it among not only the learning institutions but also work environments and communities. However, they give entirely different arguments on the matter. First, Pell points out that there is indeed an absolute benefit available in diversified classes; although, it not the same as the one hinted on by the previous articles. Correspondingly, while quoting a study done on the subject, the author argues that multi-cultural colleges and universities gave trends of white students being “intellectually more self-confident” than their counterparts (Pell 316). Black slavery and segregation operated on similar grounds as through the inferiority of the African American race, white supremacy reigned. On a related note, Cohen cites the need for administrators to portray a picture of a diversified student body as the reason why the racial divisions that shook most of American history persist in colleges and universities. In other words, and to mention a few, religion and lifestyle are dimensions on which student variety can stand; however, educational institutes overlook them yet they have the potential to “enrich their intellectual” abilities (Cohen 38). For that reason, while claims of the importance of diversity are acceptable, the types of differences and the causes behind them need revisiting.
Claim 3: Finally, yet importantly, the third argument that advocates the use of race as a plus factor in admissions to achieve diversity and promote equal opportunity also has supporters and those opposing the same. As mentioned above, aside from race, there are possible divisions of religion and lifestyles; hence, calls for the use of one’s skin color to determine his or her eligibility for a benefit are baseless in the quest for variations (Cohen 38). Extensively, the minute racial affiliations come into focus, the concept of equality is impossible to maintain only because skin color does not qualify as foundations on which institutions can ground their goals. According to Cohen, the idea of egalitarianism where racism is evident is a mere illusion because any given advantages “must be paid for by disadvantages born” (34). In slavery, the advantage of free and hard labor stemmed from the life bondage of black people. Today, when institutions consider skin color to fill in a certain percentage of available vacancies, they have to take them from others, which in this case are most likely white. At the same time, Pell writes that “stable and unchanging rules” are the surest way of preventing racial segregation and ensuring that there is a healthy diversification in any populace (316). That is why white supremacists were never constant with their discrimination laws as they changed them whenever they saw fit to make sure that African Americans had no access to any benefits. The existence of fixed rules promotes equality while changes to them give one group an advantage that is unavailable to the other[s]. Conversely, the General Motors Corporation still supports race and ethnicity as the worthwhile contributions to higher learning. Apparently, racial diversity enhances education quality and “the many enterprises” that students undertake after they graduate because the different ethnic groups are necessary for the ability to deal with people from diverse backgrounds (General Motors 22). Wilkins does not want just the learning institutions using race as a plus factor rather a man insists that “hiring decisions and loan approvals” ought to implement the same strategies as well (1). After all, after years of being discriminated against, blacks need a chance also to benefit from their skin color.
In summation, the given claims belong to both the proponents and those in the opposition; now here is why it should not be legal in the United States for colleges and universities to recognize race as a plus factor in making admissions decisions. Formal equality calls for the availability of advantages to every possible applicant without any traces of bias. Thus, if universities are to meet the set criteria, they cannot favor people because they just happen to possess the color that the administration is looking for; fair methods had to be in place and exercised to prevent any traces of prejudice. If the universities wish to ensure the equal representation of racial groups in the institutions then targeting students after their high school years is a wrong tactic. In other words, would it not have a fairer impact if the higher education institutions worked with potential candidates from an earlier point to ensure they all gain the necessary and proper education? Such a tactic would conform to substantive equality and would indeed protect the rights of every person involved. Thus, when the proponents of the given motion insist that it is a matter of fairness, they ought to realize the benefits accorded to colored pupils come from the whites, and such a situation solves nothing.
As per the understanding of affirmative action within the boundaries of the United States Constitution, and the Bakke decision, a university can pursue education diversity as long as every student receives an adequate education regardless of their national and racial backgrounds. However, when such distinctions only make whites “intellectually more self-confident” and leave black people behind, the use of race as a plus factor becomes illegal (Pell 316). On a similar note, if the proponents of the given motion were to argue that there is an exclusive benefit for African Americans in an education institute in which administrators employ racial diversifying tactics, they would also lose. After all, Bakke calls for a better education for each person without consideration to his or her ethnic background. In the Grutter decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the University of Michigan merely considered race as a “plus” in its admission guidelines; hence, the policies did not put minorities on a separate entry track. Now, how did the university derive its “plus” factor? As mentioned above, Cohen asserts that advantages “must be paid for by disadvantages born” and in turn, highlighted the fact that any positive claimed for one race takes it from the other[s] because nobody can pick opportunities and benefits from thin air (34). Thus, the legalization of race as a “plus” factor will render the equal protection clause in the fourteenth amendment baseless.
Yes, the given arguments are strong enough because they revolve around actual historical events. Racial prejudices warranted the enslavement of black persons and the Jewish Holocaust was subject to the same factors. Race considerations ought to remain separated from public and private institutions that seek to elevate living conditions by providing education and work opportunities.
In summary, it should not be legal in the United States for colleges and universities to recognize race as a plus factor in making admissions decisions because such a maneuver not only leaves a particular group at a disadvantage but also hinders true equality between the different racial groups. In other words, for the consideration of race a plus factor to work, the Caucasian students will be at a disadvantage because they make up the majority group. Notably, some whites also need the same consideration given to groups such as the African Americans and the Native Americans because of poor socio-economic conditions. At the same time, not all persons from the minority groups need special aid because some even come from well off families with enough resources to cement their education from the roots. Subsequently, providing any form of special treatment based on race is something akin to racism. An application of the moral theory of absolutism leaves no loopholes through which skin color considerations can be anything but discriminatory in nature. To that end, the racial history of the United States comes into play in this debate and any legal action that supports race as a determinant factor in decision-making processes condones bigotry.