For this comparative research, we selected Spain and Germany, two countries of the European Union with similar political parliamentarian systems. Personification is a distinctive feature of presidentialism and it seems reasonable to examine to what extent this trend occurs in European parliamentary systems today.
The position of political leaders in parliamentary systems is different from the position occupied by them in the presidential republics. Lijphart identifies three characteristics that distinguish essentially presidentialism and parliamentarianism (Lijphart, 2000). Firstly, in a presidential system the executive chief is elected directly by the electors by popular vote and therefore without legislative intervention, so he is not responsible before the parliaments. In a parliamentary system, the executive emanates from the legislature and is formally responsible to it. Secondly, in a presidential system, the elected president has a fixed term period so that he cannot be resigned except for very exceptional circumstances. The survival of the government in a parliamentary system, however, depends on the support, which it gets in parliament, since it has been this institution, which has elected it. Thirdly, presidentialism is characterized by individual responsibility of the executive. However, in a parliamentary system, the executive is collegial nature of its actions and responds jointly according to the model of collective responsibility, which blurs the role of prime minister. The three differences are related to the executive chief and, by extension, affect candidates for office.
Out of these aspects, the most relevant to this article is the one that affects the elections: in a presidentialism, citizens directly elect the president, whereas in parliamentary democracies, the voters are involved in the appointment of the executive chief only indirectly and thus determine the composition of the legislature. Despite being different, the electoral systems in Germany and Spain share similar traits. Elections are held every four years. Last years, the personalization of politics in media has become extremely common in the two countries. Spain has a pseudo-proportional system with closed and blocked lists, and a system of allocation of seats according to the D'Hont Act.
German personalized double voting or proportional electoral system is a mixed system, in which at least 299 seats (half or nearly half of the Bundestag) are elected by a proportional system with closed and blocked lists. Both in Spain and Germany, the parties arrange nominations for the posts of parliamentary representation. Therefore, both countries have strong and well-organized parties. Therefore, they comply with the pointed by Müller (2013) in the sense that "European democracies are not only parliamentary democracies but also democracies of party ". Spain and Germany have, with due nuances, systems with similar parties, characterized by having two major formations with clear options of forming a government (CDU-CSU and SPD in the German case, and PP and PSOE, in Spanish) and several minority parties with parliamentary representation. In Germany, some of these parties can act as a hinge party (FDP or the Greens) and in Spain determine the formation and action of the Government (IU and nationalists).Likewise, the territorial system is different, since Germany is a federal state while Spain is an autonomous state even though they share clear similarities. It is worth emphasizing the importance and influence of the press of the Länder (lands) in Germany and the Autonomous Communities in Spain.
Despite the mentioned similarities, there is an obvious difference in the media system. Regarding political systems, each country develops its own media system. According to the typology, given by Hallin and Mancini (2004), Spain has a polarized pluralist system; while Germany has its own corporatist system of northern and central Europe. The main features of the polarized Mediterranean or pluralist system is press-oriented elites with short runs, the late development of the industry of private media, the strong parallel between the discourse of the media and the related policy, and a major confrontation between the two resulting blocks. The latter turns the system of Spanish media into "journalism trenches" (López-Escobar, 2008), which leads to the creation of two warring communities, what in turn are vying for the establishment of the terms of debate and definition of each topic through the public discussion.
POLITICAL CULTURE
In Spain, the economic crisis has widened the political and institutional crisis and has increased the gap with other democracies such as Germany. In addition, it has increased the way, in which the power is exercised. Rajoy shows his admiration for Merkel, the German right is a model for the leading PP, but the exercise of power with the absence of consensus, no accountability, lack of hearings and public explanations moves him away from his German female colleague (Coller, 2004).
In Spain, the presidents are required to appear only after the European summits in short sessions with limited time. It is not even mandatory to convene the annual debate on the state of the nation. In the Bureau and the Board of Spokesmen of the Congress there is a system of weighted vote, so that the majority’s party can put a veto on requests of the opposition. For example, Rajoy has only performed twice in line with his obligations by law. Once, he appeared August 1 2013 for the case Barcenas after repeatedly rejected requests from the opposition. It occurred only when the international press got interested. Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero appeared seven times dramatically in the last legislature. With no absolute majority, the other parties forced him to an appearance by quarter to discuss the crisis. In recent weeks, the entire opposition has faced the absolute majority of the PP and failed to submit an interpellation to Rajoy. Their requests have been rejected and finally answered by another minister. An example of contrast was a year ago, when Rajoy had to appear to give an account for the rescue of the European financial system, while Merkel went to the German parliament to explain that aid to Spanish banks.
In 2013, the opposition in Spain clashed against the wall of the lack of a mechanism to request responsibilities of the president for alleged lies in the Barcenas case. It is possible to reprove ministers, but not the president, and it only has a testimonial and political value. Thus, the veto votes of PSOE and IU are to denounce alleged lies of Rajoy, because, according to the PP, the only mechanism is the vote of censure, which requires an alternative candidate.
Various German chancellors have resorted to confidence votes for support for their decisions. Angela Merkel's predecessor, Gerhard Schröder, won the first elections in 2001 but lost the second in 2005. The Social Democrat Helmut Schmidt also had to leave the government due to a vote of censure in 1982. Spain has experienced two votes of censure and both were rejected: against Adolfo Suarez and Felipe Gonzalez. Politically it meant a cost for those who initiated the vote. Therefore, Rajoy did not date to initiate vote of censure against Zapatero just like Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba does not do anything against Rajoy now.
ELECTORAL LAW
The ballots in Germany have two fields. In the first one, there is elected a candidate for a constituency. There are 299 electoral districts. In the second field, one votes for a closed party list. Votes can go to different parties. The German parliamentary system leaves out of the chambers the parties that do not reach 5% of the vote. It is a reaction to the extreme parliamentary fragmentation of the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), when 17 parties sit in the Reichstag. The parties that obtain representation should have three terms or more by direct vote in individual constituencies. This was the case of ex-communist PDS in 1994, which garnered only 4.39% of the vote but won in four constituencies and won 30 seats in the federal Bundestag. There are also exceptions for parties, representing "national minorities": Danish, Serbs or Frisians. Immigrant minorities such as the Turks, do not count this exception. The party of the Danish minority in Schleswig-Holstein, the SSW received 4.6% of the votes in the 2012 regional elections, in which it participated for the first time, and is now in a coalition government with Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens.
The correction in favor of stability gives in the Spanish case priority to the two major parties: PP and PSOE against the rest, and an access of small parties to Congress is limited less. The limitation is that it is necessary to obtain 3% in each constituency and not in the set, so the nationalist parties have more representation than IU or UPyD with less votes. There are 17 parties in Congress, but they are subject to an absolute majority in their decisions. For example, penalizing Amaiur, the PP prevented it from forming its own group and has made almost inoperative the Joint Group with 18 parties. That "roll" of the absolute majority limits their ability to present initiatives, creating a lack of space for minority parties (Coller, 2004).
STABILITY
Stability is a principle, rooted in Germany as almost an ideology since the World War II. The notion that a minority government is weak is associated with the upheavals that led to Nazi’s authoritarianism. The electoral system makes it difficult to obtain an absolute majority. The great influence of the regions, governed by parties that do not have to match those of the Executive, requires constant negotiations between government and opposition. In this period, the German political forces, especially Merkel’s party, are seeking for consensus rather than confrontation. Merkel's first government (2005-2009) was a grand coalition between her Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats. There was a precedent between 1966 and 1969. The coalition of Merkel left a pleasant memory among Germans, who support it several times.
Political agreements between Spanish parties are unusual and interviews between the leaders of power and opposition have been always extraordinary. All heads of executive end up restricting them. There are reserved telephone contacts on matters of state, for example related to the King, or very extraordinary foreign policy issues. Only in this legislature, there have been attempts to limit evictions, but all of them failed. The only pacts have been associated with renewal of institutions, that is, to place representatives of the two major parties ahead of the Ombudsman, the Court of Auditors and the Constitutional Court. Now, they negotiate the General Council of the Judiciary.
The discipline of parliamentary vote is unconstitutional in Germany. The Basic Law stipulates in Article 38 that the deputies are "representatives of all German people, not bound by orders or instructions and are subject only to their consciences". Those who know the functioning of the Bundestag speak about complex operations of persuasion of the leaders. In Spain, the votes have always expected results, because by voting there are penalties for disobedience.
TRANSPARENCY
Three times a week, spokespersons of Ministries and the German Chancellery do not summon the media, but they come to the main federal Press Conference. They are open to all the questions from the press until the journalists terminate the meeting. Personal appearances by the chancellor and ministers are scarce. In Spain, the only regular appearance before the press is the performance of the spokesman of the Government after the Council of Ministers on Friday. Zapatero established a new press conference set without time limits every six months, and Rajoy followed the custom until he was eliminated by his extraordinary appearance in Congress. In addition, the authorities’ representatives appear after meetings with international leaders, but they only respond to two Spanish questions. Their interviews in the press have different formats, and Rajoy gives them rarer than his predecessors. Following that formula, Zapatero tried to communicate with citizens in the television program Tengo una pregunta para Usted (“I have a question for you”), but it has been not supported. Rajoy takes months without giving interviews in Spain and prefer to do it to foreign media.
RESIGNATION
The culture of resignation is deeply rooted in Germany. Any scandal that begins to harm the Chancellor can cost him / her or a minister the job. In the recent legislative practice, there were three ministers resigned. Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung left after the poor investigation of a bombing, which killed dozens of Afghan civilians. His successor, Karl-Theoder zu Guttenberg resigned, when he knew he had plagiarized his doctoral thesis. Minister of Education, Annette Schavan also resigned amid accusations of plagiarism. Environment Minister Norbert Röttgen had to leave after his resounding electoral defeat in North Rhine-Westphalia, in 2012. He used Merkel's European policy as a campaign argument. In this case, it was a dismissal by the model, implemented by Merkel in a very short press conference. Resignation mode depends on who appointed the person to the Chancellery, but not head of government. Four days after the elections, the German Social Democrats have held a convention with 200 delegates, in which their leader has resigned, and activists discussed the policy of alliances (Dalton and Dalton, 1993). Very different is the situation in Spain, where the speed of accountability and internal debate is unthinkable.
There is no habit of resignations in the Spanish Government. At the last stage of Gonzalez’s reign, in the early 90s, there were some precedents: Narcís Serra, Vicente Albero, Antoni Asuncion, Julián García Vargas, Julian Garcia Valverde and José Luis Corcuera resigned for different cases. The criminal investigation when there is any indication of crime (there was none in any of these cases), is in the hands of prosecutors.
In 2012, an investigation by the Office of Hamburg cost the position to the then federal president Christian Wulf. A democrat like Merkel, he resigned as soon as he knew that Hannover had asked him to lift the immunity to investigate a case of corruption and comparatively mild influences. The case remains open. Prosecutors and judges are officials, so they do not lose their jobs. Their careers benefit from the discovery of these scandals. A charge of destruction of evidence or messages of support to a prison would have consequences in Germany, while in Spain they are not even explained. Institutions of prior checking and office competition regulation (Bundeskartellamt) operate independently and are recognized effective.
In Spain, there are much more frequent investigations into corruption cases and the complaints do not lead necessarily to the resignation. For example, Francisco Camps was candidate of the PP in Valencia being accused and thus expanded its absolute majority. The institutions such as the CNMV, the Ombudsman, the Court of Auditors and the Constitutional Court are targeted by militants or ex-militants of the main party. These days, a legal reform, voted only by the PP, will be applied for the first time to limit the functions of the General Council of the Judiciary and allow only partially renewing its votes in the Senate. In Germany, this draft reform of an institution is always done with the agreement of the main parties (MEUR and BERG-SCHLOSSER, 1994).
CORRUPTION
27% of Spaniards have been questioned in late 2012 by the Institute for Market Research. The corruption is considered as one of the two main problems of the country. In contrast, only 1% of the Germans expressed themselves this way. We cannot say that it does not exist, as demonstrated in Bayern in 2013, where a lot of parliamentarians hired relatives for assistance tasks, but the point is that the citizens have more confidence that the cases are resolved. It is not uncommon that racing German politicians open their way to positions very well paid in the private sector, but usually there is only one exit door. Former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder works for the Russian giant Gazprom, for example. Two Spanish presidents, Gonzalez and Aznar, make compatible their annuities with remuneration of boards of private companies (Coller, 2004). In theory, all former members of the Government have banned for two years to work for companies.
INFLUENCE OF POLITICAL CULTURE ON THE POLITICS
In our essay, we highlighted how political culture of two countries, which are both old European democracies, defines difference in their contemporary politics. Transparency, resignation and anti-corruption strategies, stability of the political discourse and its heredity are those elements of political culture that are well-developed in Germany, but missing in Spain. We examined how they have been established throughout the history in the post-war Germany as well as the reasons why they were not formed in Spain. As a result, we have not got in Spain such a level of transparency and politicians’ responsibility for their actions, which might led them to being resigned, as it is in Germany. Therefore, political culture does shape the current state of politics in both of the countries, and its examination was extremely helpful in this situation.
Bibliography
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MEUR, G. and BERG-SCHLOSSER, D. (1994). Comparing political systems: Establishing similarities and dissimilarities. European Journal of Political Research, 26(2), pp.193-219.
