In Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis, James Hansen argues that Moscow’s central tenet has always been “to prevent an adversary from discovering Russian intentions by deceiving him about the nature, scope, and timing of an operation,” conceding the idea that there exists a pattern of covert political or militaristic tactics at work in the world. The clandestine affairs nature of world affairs, politics, and strategic military moves between superpowers has always raised curiosity of how individuals act, plan, and engage behaviors that intertwine uncertain outcomes. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, according to the article penned by Hansen, Russian generals during the season of their Soviet USSR federation, appear to have believed missile deployment amid secrecy from the shores of Cuba could have successfully ensued. A key caveat to the whole affair from the outset, involved from “its inception, the Soviet missile operation [which] entailed elaborate denial and deception (D&D) efforts.” Ubiquitous to any human situation of plotting and calculation of this sort are the aspects of cognitive shortfalls, associated with individuals, group perceptions, as well as components of memory, analysis, or biases. This essay attempts to cogently examine, and respond, to the ‘Learning from the Past’ article by James Hansen, and apply imaginative approaches to understanding and deciphering it all.
The journey begins with a panoramic view of the times, during the early 1960’s. The United States defined its presidential authority under the auspices of John Fitzgerald Kennedy as the drama involved a 13-day standoff, or confrontation. According to Hansen’s article, the code name for the operation from the Soviet Generals’ side was termed ‘Anadyr.’ This designation derived from a river tributary which flowed into the Bering Sea, and deliberately chosen because the Russians – true to the concept of D&D – had designed it to “mislead Soviets as well as foreigners about the destination of the equipment.” It is important at this juncture to emphasize that all the Generals were not in cognitive agreement regarding the tactics. In other words, they were not all on the same page in terms of being in agreement that the approach was the smartest move. This flair for deceipt that the Russians seemed to have a penchant for, was referred to as maskirovka, and as an art conceived by Moskow was created to cause adversaries to remain in the dark regarding planned operations, and their timings.
Two specific instances where US political, or military personnel mistakenly perceived the build-up to the crisis, the Soviet’s ability to successfully place nuclear weapons in Cuba, and the Soviet’s response to the crisis. US political forces mistakenly discerned the USSR would have completed the nuclear threat, pulling the trigger and dropping the bomb. Second, US military leaders failed to recognize how divided Soviet officials were over the decision to invade. Soviet response was planned, implemented, but sloppy in some ways. Their perception was believed to be correct, since the Soviets were the only other superpower with nuclear capability, of tremendous force at the time. Its impact forced Kennedy’s hand. Obviously, memory of the various players will highlight certain aspects in greater or lesser details, depending upon perspective or biases involved. Nevertheless, ground forces dispatched to Cuba with the intention of setting up nuclear missile sites under the guise of concealments of so-called specialists in agricultural, irrigation, or machine operators went forth. Amazingly enough, their covers would have been embarrassingly blown, if they had been stopped or probed, as “they had been assigned to occupations about which they knew nothing,” confirming the notion that the intelligence analysis may have been bound to go awry. Keeping secrets between two, three, or four people may be risky business. However, in a proposed deadly military campaign, the Soviet Union needed to keep secrets along the trail both in Moscow, and in Cuba. Perhaps for this reason, in the case of ‘loose-lips’ prevailing, Soviet troops and crew members were banned from phone calls, letters, or telegrams at the time.
Two specific instances where the US political military machine allowed a cognitive bias to influence judgment, in relating to the crisis build-up, can be described as follows. First, the cognitive posture was in the making, culminating to a crescendo with Ronald Reagan, who Fisher stated, was “the American Presiden we most remember as an anti-Soviet hard-liner,” They believed the Soviet’s had the power, and would carry out a nuclear attack. Its impact drove Kennedy’s advisors towards timidity, and thus oppose his boldness in calling Khrushchev’s bluff. The two missed indicators which may have allowed the US to prevent Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba’s hinterland were: (a) being overly confident, and (b) panic and confusion in considering the risky magnitude of a nuclear war. The indicators were missed because the bias of ‘group-think’ was not strategically, or methodically considered, and better intelligence detection might have prevented the entire situation in the first place.
It is important to remember that an operation of this sort would have never unfolded today, as it did back in the early 1960’s. Instant electronic, digital access to real-time information and computer hackers’ capabilities would certainly have squelched the process altogether. Therefore, the stealth nature inside the context of the times, must continually be taken into consideration. Meanwhile, Soviet captains were kept in the dark regarding the destinations of their cargo deliveries. While it is true that not all analysts will agree to the precise extent to occurrences, according to Chapter V in Dangerous Liaisons – The Actual Unfolding of the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was stated that “the Cuban Missile Crisis remains an important object of study for other reasons,” largely because “no conflict has come closer to nuclear war than the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The core scenario in the United States occurred on President Kennedy’s watch, on an October Tuesday morning in 1962. According to Schmalberger, Kennedy called a meeting in the White House to report that the intelligence community had become aware of Cuba housing Russian nuclear missile placements.
Given the blatant and brazen military posture of the whole situation, at the end of the day communications would need to involve policy actors, which Schmalberger characterized as a historically reconstructed model “cast in terms of interactions sequences between state actors,” which connects how threatening political relationships coincide, or mingle with one another. The presence of the Russian missiles in Cuba was not based upon conjecture or suspicion, since “Cuban refugees had reported their locations,” while President Kennedy acted quickly with his advisors to decide upon what to do. Meanwhile, the secretive spy brigade of the Soviets known as the KGB, had been speculated on in terms of measuring its role and level of threat during this entire Cold War drama.
So, at this point, the question rises as to the KGB role in the situation. Oddly enough, Hansen maintained that Soviet commanders had led Russian troops to open envelopes, along certain geographic coordinates “in the Atlantic Ocean” and upon reaching the “designated point, an officer from the KGB’s Special Department joined them for the opening of the envelope,” thus continuing to embark at the Cuban port so destined. If you really think about it, the whole cat-and-mouse escapade may seem ridiculous today in terms of the technological advancements in communications (even available to the ordinary citizen), however the seriousness of nuclear destruction can never be underestimated. Remember Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, Fursenko and Naftali argued that the Soviet intelligence was to blame for the outcome in 1962, and blamed its failure “to provide the Kremlin with sufficient warning of President John F. Kennedy’s intentions toward Cuba in the months preceding October 1962.” But a perceived dilution of the KGB’s potency at this point, according to some scholars, indicated that its infiltration of undercover powers were not as influential as many believed. The KGB’s role in the ‘hand-off’ of envelopes at various points during the cargo shipments to Cuba, merely from this perspective, relegated it to an administrative role of sorts.
A plethora of scholarly articles, books, and nowadays YouTube video documentaries on the Cuban Missile Crisis, presents various opportunities to peruse viewpoints, analyses, and opinions. Although Soviet, Cuban, and United States opinions and assessments may differ, the ultimate catalyst of President Kennedy’s decision-making at the height of the conflict made the difference. Along the way, however, and leading up to that crucial point Soviet intelligence gathered from American shores undoubtedly was in the works. Fursenko and Naftali explained how a reclusive Feklisov ran a key KGB node from Washington D.C.
While according to Fursenko and Naftali, Feklisov had been unable to penetrate the most powerful Washington circles, he relied “to a large extent,” on gossip, press contacts, journalistic circles-sources, and interactions with foreign correspondents.
Once again, in thinking about contemporary world affairs and international relations, the apparent cloak-and-dagger mystique and complexity may be somewhat foreign to today’s younger audiences. Furthermore, in terms of any political bias, it was noted that President Kennedy’s reaction had been characterized as “against the participation of US troops in military operations” against Cuba, in fear of retribution from China and the USSR joining in an attack on West Germany and Southeast Asia, dragging the United States into another World War. Additionally, besides the fact that the Soviet Generals were not all in agreement that secretly moving nuclear missiles into Cuba was a sound idea, Russian diplomats, as suggested by Fursenko and Naftali, hinted that President Kennedy’s father Joseph’s strong anti-Communist sentiments would cloud his decision-making.
Clearly, cognizant influences and shortfalls, as well as biases and perceptions may be identified in the Cuban Missile Crisis situation, as it unfolded and ultimately ended. One of the most interesting points uncovered during the course of this research, reflected an assumed perspective of John F. Kennedy’s attitude, in terms of whether he would be willing to go to war if pushed – or if he would be afraid to man-up. In Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, it was asserted that “Remarkably, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in April 1961 seemed to confirm for Moscow that Kenneday was no hawk,” but as history’s fate would declare, Kennedy did not ‘punk-out’ in the face of Khrushchev’s baiting, proving his courage in the face of difficulty – even against the behest of his advisors. Today international relationships may be just as serious, complex, and spurious at times. But nowadays, these relationships seems to pivot around seeking win-win outcomes in economics, ecological sustainability, and a rush to control key commodified resources. As the global socio-political and world economy continues to merge, secrets and ill intentions will infect negotiations, but ultimately the survival of all Earth’s inhabitants is at stake.
Bibliography
Fisher, Max. “The Cuban missile crisis almost ended the world. Was it Kennedy’s fault?” The Washington Post, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/11/22/the-cuban-missile-crisis-almost-ended-the-world-was-it-kennedys-fault/?utm_term=.7cb5a7d52e18
Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. “Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Belfercenter.org, 1998, http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/CMC50/SovietIntelligenceAndTheCubanMissileCrisis.pdf (accessed January 15, 2017).
Hansen, James H. Soviet Deception in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2007.
Schmalberger, Thomas. “Dangerous Liaisons – A Theory of Threat Relationships in International Politics: Chapter V, The Actual Unfolding of the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Usc.edu, 1998, http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cews/html_pages/Dangerous_Liaisons/Papers/chap-v.pdf (accessed January 15, 2017).
