strains?”
Researches on viruses have been carried out since time immemorial. Several vaccines, therapeutics, and targeted drug delivery systems have been developed only through extensive research on virulent strains. However, genetic engineering and molecular biology techniques have enabled scientists to manipulate, and develop new recombinant strains that may not occur in nature spontaneously. Proper containment of these engineered strains is essential as they might have properties that are entirely different from their parent strains. In September 2011 a researcher from Erasmus Medical Center, Rotterdam revealed how he had engineered avian influenza strain H5N1, and made it “more receptive to mammals” (Yang). The original flu virus infects only birds, is not airborne, and does not affect mammals or humans. The engineered H5N1 strain on the other hand is transmissible through air, and can affect mammals. Several studies on virulent flu strains are being conducted throughout the world to completely understand the infection mechanism, and develop appropriate cure or vaccines. But, there is much concern over engineering virulent flu strains, as they spread rapidly once they are air borne, and their infectious properties are not completely understood. Engineered viruses could be active aids for bioterrorism too.
1. Reasons for Studying and Engineering Virulent Flu Strains
Several Influenza outbreaks have become serious epidemics or pandemics, and humans are very vulnerable to the disease. Flu viruses have a unique antigenic variability characteristic, which makes them difficult to understand (Casadevall and Imperiale, 1). So there is a strong necessity to research study flu viruses. For pathogens with pandemic potential (PPP) such as H5N1, gain of function (GOF) experiments have been used to better understand the potential of the viruses to harm humans through a “species jump” (Casadevall and Imperiale, 1). As the name suggests, GOF is a technique of adding a property to the viral strain, and in case of H5N1 it is mammalian transmissibility. The function gained need not necessarily be adverse.
There are several benefits of GOF experiments. Non-native host passage can lead to development of attenuated vaccines (Casadevall and Imperiale, 2). For instance, passing poliovirus through monkey cells helped in development of polio vaccine. This non-native host passage leads to reduced replication efficiency in human cells. Further, engineering viral flu strains can help in gaining insight into viral pathogenesis (Casadevall and Imperiale, 2). In case of H5N1, only few amino acid changes could make the virus transmissible to mammals, and this could occur spontaneously in nature. But, only through GOF experimentation this can be studied in laboratory, and suitable defenses for an outbreak can be developed (Casadevall and Imperiale, 2). Engineering virulent flu strains greatly helps in identifying new antiviral targets, and in preparation of more vaccine stock if need arises (Casadevall and Imperiale, 2). Overall the concern is not just about GOF experiments, but the possibility of a deliberate or accidental release of the engineered strain i.e. about biosafety and biosecurity (Casadevall and Imperiale, 2).
2. Biosafety and Ethical Concerns
Initially when the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) took up H5N1-GOF research papers for evaluation, it understood that there is no data available on deliberate release of viruses to calculate the potential harm. So, they shifted their focus from biosecurity or intentional release issues to accidental release or biosafety for which, plenty of historical data is available for analysis (Casadevall and Imperiale, 3). For instance the influenza strain H1N1 that disappeared in 1950, was reintroduced in human population after a laboratory accident in 1977. Even advanced CDC labs are vulnerable to biosafety breaches and there were instances of Yersinia pestis infection, and Brusella sp. release (Casadevall and Imperiale, 3). Hence, existing biosafety standards have to be improved to ensure containment of engineered virulent strains. Otherwise the consequences would be too devastating just as stated in the New York Times article titled “An Engineered Doomsday”. Proponents as well as opponents of engineered virus studies agree that there is a need for virologists to engage in a public discussion, and carryout a risk-benefit analysis. Governments, regulatory authorities and funders should participate in a conference similar to that took place in Asilomar in 1970, to debate about recombinant DNA (rDNA) technology (Wain-Hobson, 411).
3. The crunch – “Should scientists be allowed to engineer virulent flu strains?”
Scientists should be allowed to conduct and publish research on engineered virulent flu strains. Curbing flu viral engineering research completely, is not a logical decision because one cannot judge the consequences of incremental results obtained from GOF studies, while the larger picture is yet to be formed. Even with rDNA technology, there was much initial fear and resistance, but the benefits we reap today from genetic engineering and molecular biology are enormous. Viruses can evolve in innumerable ways and “Nature is a greater bioterrorist” (Yang). Whether naturally derived viruses or laboratory-derived viruses are more harmful is a very difficult question to answer (Casadevall and Imperiale, 4). Further, in case of H5N1-GOF experiment design, the engineered viruses were transmissible to ferrets. But, ferret transmissibility is not equivalent to human transmissibility. There could be attenuation of the viral strain too. Virulence of a virus is an unpredictable property, and transmissibility is not proportional to virulence (Casadevall and Imperiale, 4). Highly transmissible viral stains can be less virulent too.
Conclusion
Engineered viruses can be used for the greater good or misused as bioterrorism aids. The studies are only intended to better equip mankind to withstand a pandemic outbreak of viral infection, and improve defenses. Thus, scientists should study engineered viruses with enhanced biosafety levels, and experimental designs should be evaluated based on risk-benefit calculations.
Works Cited
Casadevall, A., and M. J. Imperiale. "Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Experiments
with Pathogens of Pandemic Potential, Such as Influenza Virus: A Call for a Science-Based Discussion." MBio 5.4 (2014): 1-5. Web. 25 Mar. 2016. <http://mbio.asm.org/
content/5/4/e01730-14.full.pdf>.
"An Engineered Doomsday." The New York Times. 7 Jan. 2012. Web. 25 Mar. 2016.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/an-engineered doomsday.
html>.
Wain-Hobson, Simon. "H5N1 Viral-engineering Dangers Will Not Go Away." Nature
495.7442 (2013): 411. Web. <http://www.nature.com/news/h5n1-viral-engineering-dangers-will-not-go-away-1.12677>.
Yang, Jennifer. "Mutant Virus Sparks Bioethics Debate | Toronto Star." Thestar.com. 10 Feb.
2013. Web. 25 Mar. 2016. <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/02/10/mutant
_virus_sparks_bioethics_debate.html>.
