In his book “the Origins Of The Second World War In Europe” AJP Taylor makes the argument that the underlying causes of World War II, in contrast to popular sentiment, was the general complexity of political will and international relations at the time, rather than Hitler's dominating influence alongside Fascism and Nazi ideologies. Instead, the various powers, with their individual desires and relational struggles, embarked on the same path which nobody, not even Hitler, had wanted to pursue. Despite the devastation of the Second World War, it is difficult to pin its inception on any one individual. While Hitler did have horrendous human rights policies, his international interests seemed to be in the expansion of a greater German state rather than all out war. In looking at the research and history alongside Taylor's argument it is evident that there were a variety of factors related to the inception of the Second World War. These include international aggression, interstate rivalry and alliances, and the dissolution of historic forms of political stability.
Taylor's argument was considered a shocking historical revision that even today, in the 21st century, still seems controversial to some. Hitler's expansionist policies are generally regarded by most to be the primary driver of World War II. The desire of the German state to consolidate its power and dominate Europe demonstrates an underlying power motive that should be considered as well, according to Taylor. While admitting that Hitler was, in fact, an opportunist that promoted his own well being by pushing the boundaries of international policy, Taylor also considers the behavior of allied nations such as France and Britain following the defeat of Germany during the First World War decades before. Taylor argues that, believing that Hitler's Germany would be easy to defeat or hold out against, these nations instigated resistances in the areas that Hitler was attempting to avoid (Taylor). However, Hitler quickly overtook these areas and gained an advantage that would take years for them to overcome.
Given what research demonstrates about why states and people commit to war it seems that blame cannot be placed entirely on the Germans, at least for the initial outbreak of full-blown war. Various historians present arguments that challenge the traditional view and corroborate the conditions set forth by Taylor.
Jeffrey L. Hughes discusses two basic views regarding the causes that historians generally attribute to the outbreak of war. While the more simple explanation is that Hitler's aggressive policies and warlike political ideologies were the primary causes, it is also indicated that a variety of circumstances, including the inability for international leaders to steer away from war, were the primary causes. Instead, fundamental changes in the underlying power dynamics that had existed between states were beginning to be dramatically altered. The combination of these elements greatly altered the political landscape to the extent that the policies of the past, which may have been harmless, were beginning to have much greater consequences. The responses of France and England to the aggression of Hitler's motives were based on maintaining the status quo throughout Europe and the implications of their perceived military superiority. While Hitler was indeed perceived as a threat, it seems that they greatly underestimated the level to which they were threatened by his advancements. The actions of Hitler's Germany caused the need for these nations to make a decision about their roles in the region. If they were to do nothing, then it would mean that Germany would maintain the legitimacy of its actions. In acting against Germany, and ultimately fanning the flames of war, they were led into starting the war alongside Hitler. The changing balance of power caused the need for them to reassess their deterrence strategies against the Germans. Their actions and miscalculations can be seen to be a primary factor leading to the onset of all out war among the European nations. “Brittain's otherwise reasonable grand strategy for dealing with the changing international balance of power was vitiated by its deterrence strategies” (Hughes 285).
John A. Vasquez in “The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation” attempts to summarize how complex international states become embroiled in these large-scale conflicts. While issues such as territorial disputes, military buildup, and alliances are all listed as factors related to the onset of international war, issues such as the inclusion of more states and rivals in the conflict and the breakdown of political order are listed as being causes of the war's escalation. Furthermore, the polarization of ideologies into hostile blocks is presented as an essential element that was necessary in order for the conflict to take place. In this way, it is not only the initial territorial disputes, such as those brought by Hitler's expansionist policies, that resulted in the war, but also the way in which these policies were handled by others in the international community. Attempting to adopt international practices that were grounded in their concerns of real-world challenges, Britain and France essentially acted to alienate Germany and its allies through their campaign, which only served to build-up the differing sides of the conflict. This conflagration can be seen to be an underlying factor in the onset of the war, which was the result of policies that were being implemented from all different sides. After the war broke out, the inclusion of more and more political actors within the conflict due to alliances or interests served to expand the war beyond the borders of only specific regions. The claims made by Germany resulted in long-standing territorial disputes to be brought to light once more, instigating past tensions among the countries that then became involved in the greater conflict. The response of Britain and France was not due to their fear of territorial possession, but rather having political rivals that would dramatically alter the face of international politics in the region. “The repeated crises themselves reflected a deeper set of processes that increased hostility and the perception of threat within the context of an enduring rivalry” (Vasquez 166). This hostility is itself a primary factor related to the onset of the war which, when considered in relation to the arguments made in historic texts can be viewed as the implications by which the war was started.
Given historic research regarding WWII it is evident that these perspectives challenge the traditional view of the conflict as being primarily caused by Hitler and Germany's continued advancement of territory.
In his book “Mein Kampf”, Adolf Hitler outlines his struggles in becoming the leader of Germany as well as the values that he believed were inherited by Germany's loss during the First World War. This loss, Hitler demonstrates profoundly influenced feelings of being marginalized for many Germans. This marginalization was the result of their country being declared the liable party for the instigation of that war. For this reason, they had been severely economically and politically repressed by the victors, namely, France and Britain. As this catastrophe struck, Hitler indicates that society was faced with a variety of burdens and challenges that tested his people and their strength. The collapse of Germany during this period is highlighted by not only the defeat of the German people, but also the total eradication of their identities and way of life. This resulted in a great deal of despair, poverty, and a large number of soldiers that were unable to find work or take care of their families. This, Hitler assesses, brought the victory of the national socialists and their ideologies to the forefront of German political thought. The need for a strong central force to maintain a certain standard of living became and important prospect for the people of Germany. “Never was the time riper, never did it cry out more imperiously for such a solution then in the moment when, on the one hand, naked treason shamelessly revealed itself, while on the other hand, a people was economically delivered to slow starvation” (Hitler 141). In relation to this, it is evident that there are a variety of challenges that were faced by Germany following the First World War. These challenges can be seen to be the primary factors leading to the Second. After the German people were economically and politically decimated, they were given the opportunity to expand their nation and their pride once more, driving the force of international aggression.
Given AJP Taylor's argument, it seems evident that these sources provide helpful insight into the underlying principles that he was attempting to express. Rather than Germany being the sole contributer through aggressive action, the passively aggressive actions of France, Britain, and other European nations provided a framework upon which the issues that the German people were facing were made even worse. This suggests that what ultimately caused Europe to be engulfed in a World War starting in 1939 were the aggressive international policies of other countries, which held their own interests in mind over the dangers of instigating international rivalries. Furthermore, the exposure of trench warfare and successes in aviation made these countries sure that they could face any challenges that might be brought from German conflict. However, they ultimately found that the German aggression had power behind it. This aggression, however, was not the only factor leading to war. Instead, the complexity of the interconnections of European power politics as well as the desire for specific nations to remain dominant were the primary factors.
Works Cited
Hitler, Adolf. Mein Kampf. The Right to Emergency Defense. Print.
Hughes, Jefferey L. The Origins of World War II in Europe. The MIT Press. 1988. Print.
Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. Hamish. 1961. Print.
Vasquez, John A. The Causes of the Second World War in Europe: A New Scientific Explanation.International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol. 17, No. 2, Crisis, Conflict and War. Crise, conflit et guerre. 1996. 161-178. Print.
