Brief summary of the article: Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senator’s use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary by Lauren Cohen Bell.
Over the years, legislators have employed delay as tactical measure to prevent the passage and enactment of unsatisfactory laws. The same tool is employed by the Senatorial Judiciary Committee to delay the confirmation of judges who have been nominated by the President to serve as federal judges in various capacities in the judiciary docket; a trend that has affected efficiency and performance of the judiciary in executing its responsibilities. In the analysis, the author articulates that there is a variance in the nomination and confirmation of nominees under a divided government and unified government, but both nominee-specific situations and political factors tend to create this variance and influence confirmation delays (Bell 596). Bell affirmed that the high number of seats occupied by the majority party senators tend to facilitate and reduce the confirmation delays, especially under a unified government. Although this is the case, the author noted that the high number of senators from the majority party has insignificant influence confirmation and nomination delays under a divided regime. Bell established that an increase in the numbers of senators who oppose the ruling government increases the delays in the nomination and confirmation of nominees. The author affirmed that the presence of a champion senator (means a home-state senatorial representative) tends to reduce the length of time a nominee is nominated and confirmed both under a divided and unified government. Additionally, Bell established that nearing or the presence of a presidential election has no influence on confirmation delays during a unified regime, but the influence of this variable is evident under the divided regime (Bell 595).
Based on the research findings and the analysis on table 1, it is surprising to establish that there is a casual link between the high number of seats occupied by the senators of the majority party and the delay in confirmation of nominees under a unified government, but the influence is not evident under a divided government. In my personal view, I hold the view that the high numbers of seats occupied by the majority party senators should be used by the executive arm of the government to oppress the influence of the opposition party members and reduce confirmation delays.
Work cited
Bell, Lauren Cohen. "Senatorial Discourtesy: The Senate's use of Delay to Shape the Federal Judiciary." Political Research Quarterly Vol. 55.issue 3 (2002): 589-607. Print.
