The issue of gene patenting is an interesting one, bringing up concerns about the extent to which we ‘own’ our cells, and what rights we have with them. While some believe that, for instance, organ donors do not have the right to tissue that they have donated, others think that there must be some sense of bodily ownership that must be accounted for in issues like these. To that end, the work of Schleiter (2009), Caplan (2010), Satel (2008), and Rubin (2010) will be examined in order to see the ways in which organ and tissue donation intersect with issues of ownership, reproductive rights, and social equality. Judging from this matrix of opinions and perspectives, the morality and ethics of organ and tissue donation and ‘patenting’ relies chiefly upon the participant’s informed consent, and the regulation of the organ market to become more ethical and equitable from gender and other standpoints. While gene patenting to provide more ownership of one’s tissues and organs would inevitably hinder genetic research, it offers people a greater degree of control over their bodily materials.
Central to this issue is the idea of bodily autonomy, or the capacity for an individual to determine and govern itself (Schleiter 301). Schleiter, for instance, examines the issue through the case of legal precedent, noting that, from a legal standpoint, donated organs and tissue do not fall under the purview of bodily autonomy. Looking through three unique cases, Schleiter notes that “while individuals have the right to donate bodily tissues for research purposes, the right to own and control use of donated tissues vanishes once those tissues leave the body,” according to these precedents (Schleiter 305). To that end, the legal definition of bodily autonomy extends only to the parts of one’s body that are still attached to them; as soon as they are removed for whatever reason, including donation, they cease to have any sense of ownership to them.
The way in which organs and tissues are donated and trafficked is also of central concern to bioethicists. Caplan, for instance, argues that organ trafficking creates a business in which unscrupulous methods are often used for acquiring organs – such as taking from cadavers or otherwise coercing people into giving up their organs (308). To that end, the way in which organs and tissue are donated is patently wrong: “It is clearly unethical to exploit the living by treating them as nothing more than mobile parts farms – or the dead as a free-fire zone form which those who deal with the bodies of the deceased can make money by pirating pieces and selling them” (Caplan 308). Based on this perspective, bodily autonomy is all but gone in the light of practices that heavily incentivize people giving up these freedoms.
Not only is organ trafficking in its current form unethical, but prey on the poor and unsuspecting people who are desperate enough to sell their organs or tissue for cash. While that may seem like a choice, Caplan argues that choice “requires information, options, and some degree of freedom,” which these individuals in these situations do not necessarily have (Caplan 309). Furthermore, Rubin argues that many of this manipulations happen along gender lines: sperm and egg donations “are targeted through different types of advertisements,” often reinforcing gender norms and encouraging certain stereotypes about men and women (314). The culture surrounding organ trafficking often frames men seeking money for tissue donations as ‘accepting compensation,’ while women are ‘seeking income,’ making the latter seem more desperate and inherently inferior. For these reasons and more, organ trafficking is clearly an illegal and unethical market as it is currently run.
However, rather than abolishing the organ market altogether, there are some significant arguments for its usefulness and purpose. Satel, for instance, argues that many people who donate their organs for significant sums of money do so voluntarily, and it is a perfectly amicable arrangement provided they are appropriately informed (311). While Satel acknowledges the same problems as Caplan, he counters by stating that the system itself could be revamped and overhauled to make the transaction more ethical. By “not catering to desperate people,” and creating a system that would “establish a months-long period of medical screening and education,” and creating more reputable financial incentives, a system could be created that offers people sufficient compensation without framing it in such a way that their decisions would be rash and easily manipulated (312). Furthermore, a greater examination of the ways in which men and women are marketed and approached for tissue donations would have the side effect of encouraging greater gender parity, offering more honest encouragement to donate without preying on fears or desperation – which often results in women being shamed for the very idea of donating their tissues and gametes.
Discussing these options in the context of gene patenting naturally brings up some potential issues with regards to the ability of medical researchers and others to successfully perform research and development on important issues like disease and cancer. If laws were to change to become more ethical, and allow for people to patent their genes to the point where they could decide what people could do with them, it would at the very least create additional red tape for professionals and scientists to go through in order to obtain organs and tissue from people. This would inevitably hinder research and add more infrastructure and bureaucracy to an already bloated system. As it currently stands, medical research has the potential to treat all manner of issues, from offering organ transplants to people who need them to allowing individuals to preserve their reproductive material for more efficient use.
That being said, the additional hassle of obtaining informed consent and permission from individuals for their patented gene would help to circumvent a lot of the ethical issues inherent in the existing organ and tissue donation/trafficking industries. With gene patenting, medical researchers would have to obtain their works much more ethically, and passing those bureaucratic checks and balances would ensure that patients and subjects would have greater control and knowledge over their organic material. Furthermore, greater ethics in advertisement and approach could solve the aforementioned issues of gender stratification and cultural norms when it comes to marketing organ donation to men and women.
In short, the effects of gene patenting on medical research and genetic bioethics would be great, but are a necessary part of the process. Currently, the organ and tissue donation process is far too flawed and permissive, with bodily autonomy largely overlooked in favor of allowing organizations and researchers to manipulate the poor and desperate into giving up their organs without any true sense of control in the transaction. The organ trafficking market is certainly needed, but unethically run in its current form, and women are often unfairly discriminated against when it comes to their place in the entire scenario. As such, gene patenting is necessary for a means to achieve greater solidarity and bodily autonomy; ethical researchers would need to deal with the additional regulations in order to receive the materials they need for their work.
Works Cited
Caplan, Arthur. “The Trouble With Organ Trafficking.” Free Inquiry 29.6 (October 2009).
Rubin, Caroline. “The Gendered Language of Gamete ‘Donation’” MIT Program in Women’s
and Gender Studies, 2008.
Satel, Sally. “Why We Need a Market for Human Organs.” The Wall Street Journal. May 16,
2008, p. A11.
Schleiter, Kristen E. “Donors Have No Rights to Donated Tissue.” American Medical
Association Journal of Ethics 11.8 (Aug 2009): 621-625.
