DISCUSSION PAPER
1. The 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG) describes an Army that is “globally responsive and regionally engaged — one building toward a regionally aligned, mission tailored force that can Prevent, Shape and Win now and in the future.” To guide this approach, the Army lists four imperatives that form the basis of the Army Campaign Plan:
develop leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st century;
adapt the Army to more effectively provide land power; and
enhance the all-volunteer Army.
Which imperative is the most important and why? Give an example of something that the Army could do to enhance capabilities in that domain.
All the four imperatives of the Army Campaign Plan as defined by the 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance are crucial. However, providing a modernized, ready, and tailored land force capabilities to meet commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations is the most important imperative. This is because unlike the other imperatives, it cannot exist independently and must take into account aspects of the other imperatives. The imperative therefore encompasses all aspects of the Army Campaign Plan.
The focus of modernization in the Army has shifted beyond materials and equipment into one in which a comprehensive strategy is the primary objective. This is especially the case in the face of thinning fiscal resources for the Department of Defense.The core of the comprehensive strategy is developing the soldier and the squad. The long-term objectives of the imperative are developing is to develop a plan for mission-tailored packages and ensuring seamless integration with other critical systems that a soldier requires while in combat. While such objectives fall under one imperative, they ultimately necessitate the success of the other imperatives. It is therefore the case that providing a modernized and tailored land force also encompasses elements of the other three imperatives of the Army Campaign Plan.
The 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance defines mission tailored forces as those Army units that are assigned one or more specific mission. Such versatility is important in the face of the changing nature of war into more unconventional means. It therefore requires that Army forces become adapted to provide land power effectively. This can only take place in an environment in which leadership development is appropriate. Therefore, while the pother imperatives can exist independently, providing a modernized and tailored land force requires the success of the other imperatives hence its high importance.
2. In the JCIDS process, what is the role of concepts in developing capabilities? As part of your answer, provide an example of how a concept drove an actual capability in one of the DOTMLPF domains.
The primary role of the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) is to provide an environment that is conducive for development of concepts. Concepts encompass an element of ideas which in the era of knowledge and information based approach to war can have a bigger impact in the war field when compared to any weapon system however superior. Concepts and ideas have the ability to effect complete change within the organization and the Army Corporation. This is because concepts and ideas form the foundation for developing capabilities of the army and other forces of the U.S military to enable it to respond appropriately to modern day challenges.
A Capabilities-Based Approach (CBA) that results out of the JCIDS process is important in determining the capability requirements of the joint force both in the current and future periods.Such requirements can either be in the form of manpower or materiel. Developing capabilities is integral in ensuring that the joint forces achieve their mandate. This is because unlike a threat based approach, it is more responsive to the combat environment.
As such, developing capabilities as the foundation of the JCIDS process helps to initiate policies that can help the military achieve its mandate both in the near term and long term. Strategies developed as a result of the CBA include the National Military Strategy (NMS). An environment in which developing capabilities is encouraged helps to build the research capabilities of an organization which make the Research, Development, and Acquisition (RDA) process seamless, which helps improve the capacity of joint warfighting and development process of materiel. Imperatives of the Army Campaign Plan have also been developed due to the need for developing capabilities. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) program is an example of a concept that drove actual capability with the intent of improving communication and information processing for combat forces.
3. Explain which of the six PPBE principles appear NOT to be followed in the reading, “General Odierno, AUSA Winter Symposium.”
The primary objective of the Army Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process is to ensure that the Army has the requisite resources in terms of manpower and finances to enable it achieve its mandate.The success of these objectives is dependent on the application of the six principles of the PPBE process effectively. This is because the implementation of the principles is interdependent and ineffective application of any of the principles has adverse implications on the end process. It is for this reason that General Odierno addressed the various aspects of Total Army Analysis (TAA) and the PPBE process during the AUSA winter symposium. However, the address fell short on one of the six key principles of the PPBE process.
Providing essential focus on departmental policy and priorities for Army functional activities during all phases of PPBE appears to be the principle not adhered to by General Odierno. The TAA process as addressed by the General focuses on thinning out the Army’s personnel numbers in order to ensure optimal mobilization of the available resources and in relation to developing the Army’s capabilities to respond to current and future combat needs. The process involves a collapsing of Brigade Combat Teams progressively which would boost the capacity of the Army by adding a third maneuver force and more engineers.However, by integrating most of the engineers in the Brigade Combat Teams that would remain active, the new war fighting formations may lack essential focus which is an important element of the PPBE principles.
Furthermore, the cost savings to be realized will have to be channeled towards creating a third maneuver force and integrating engineers into Brigade Combat Teams hence a zero sum game. Therefore, failure by the general to address essential focus on departmental policy in relation to emerging issues pointed above could have adverse effects on the Army’s PPBE.
4.All official Army acquisition (Materiel Development) programs require an acquisition program baseline (APB). What are the primary APB components and what assessment tools, systems, or laws do decision makers use to measure a program's progress (or lack thereof)?
The Department of Defense mandates that any acquisition program must first establish an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) before the process can continue. The APB sets the guidelines that provide a minimum threshold that any acquisition program must attain before it proceeds to the end users. The APB is therefore an essential element for the Program Manager (PM). The APB has a number of components that are mentioned below.
Defense Acquisition is an essential component of APB. The process is guided by the DODI 5000.02 manual. The defense acquisition may involve either single step development or evolutionary development. The former necessitates that a program must follow an incremental process that must be reflected in the APB. The latter does not necessarily have all the end state requirements known, and each incremental stage is developed as an end on its own.
Performance is also an important component of the APB. Any defense acquisition program must have specific metrics against which performance is evaluated. Such metrics are defined by key performance indicators that are evaluated by the PM. A schedule is also a component of the APB. The parameters often take the form of milestones that are evaluated by the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA). A program’s cost is also a component of the APB. All costs must be determined by the APB apriori while taking into account factors such as inflation.
Numerous means to determine a program’s progress have been put in place. The DODI 5000.02 manual provides the basic guidelines that must be adhered to during the defense acquisition process. Other tools used are the parameters put in place by the MDA. A PM can only proceed to the next level of the acquisition process only if the MDA has given the nod. The parameters are often in the form of milestones. Management reviews are also a means through which progress can be evaluated.
5. Do the prioritizations outlined in the 2013 Manning Guidance agree with the imperatives of the 2013 ASPG? Why or why not?
The 2013 Army Strategic Planning Guidance contains four imperatives that make up the Army’s campaign plan. The imperatives include modernizing and tailoring land force capabilities, developing leaders, adapting the Army to be effective in providing land power and promoting the all-volunteer Army.The imperatives are in line with the 2013 Manning Guidance.
The 2013 Manning Guidance lays emphasis on developing the right soldier at the right place and time.Such an outlook therefore gives focus on aspects of human resource management. These aspects include sustaining, deploying, and developing the manpower of the Army as defined by the Army’s Organization Life Cycle model. Human resource development includes aspects of leadership development and imparting of skills to enable appropriate response to emerging challenges at all times. It is these same aspects the imperatives set out by the 203 ASPG seek to address. The 2013 ASPG involves developing leaders to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Leadership development is also an important aspect of human resource management according Manning’s guidance.
Providing a modernized and ready, tailored land force capabilities is an imperative of the Army Campaign plan. The imperative blends in well with the Manning guidance that focuses on placing the soldier at the right place depending on Total Army Analysis (TAA). Army personnel undertake training based on such analyses so as to ensure that such personnel can be deployed for specific missions with ease and high rates of success. Enhancing the all-volunteer army helps to instill professionalism which is a key aspect in the Army’s Organization Life Cycle model that is central to the 2013 Manning Guidance.
6. How will the end of continuous operations, proposed budget cuts, and a planned reduction in Army end-strength impact the Force Generation model/process described in the F106 lesson readings? Specifically, what major changes does the Army need to make to the existing process in order to adapt to the changing environment?
The aim of the Army Equipping Strategy is to ensure that there is a proper evaluation of the needs of soldiers in terms of equipment and materials so as to enable them to perform effectively in their missions. However, lack of adequate resources implies that both rotational and non-rotational have to share the limited resources that are available. The problem of inadequate will further be compounded as a result of proposed budget cuts in line with a growing deficit for the overall U.S economy and planned reductions in the Army’s end strength. Such changes are bound to have an impact on the operational capacity and efficiency of the force. There is therefore need to ensure that policies and strategies are put in place to ensure that the Army can adapt to the changing environment without affecting operational efficiency.
The Army can adapt to the new environment by adopting strategies that lay an emphasis on having a highly tailored force that can respond to numerous specific missions that are in line with the Total Army Analysis (TAA). The tailoring of the force should be on a rotational basis so as to ensure that there is a sufficient pool of well-trained manpower that the Army can rely upon during combat operations as provided for in General Ordieno’s winter symposium address.
7. Describe three ways using contractors in operations will differ from using military service members, and for each way, how a commander would overcome that difference.
In many of the Army’s operations, operational contract support is an essential element. The Army can leverage on operational contract support to multiply its underlying force capabilities. However, there is an inherent difference between employing military personnel in combat operations and employing contractors in similar operations. A commander should therefore employ targeted strategies in order to narrow the differences so as to ensure success in combat operations.
One of the primary differences encountered by commanders when Operational Contract Support (OCS) is employed in the military service is that the latter may not be fully conversant with task planning, force development, and operational assessment. This is because such aspects of combat operations are long-term in nature and can only rely on progressive development which may not be inherently possible for contractors to achieve.
Secondly, there may be an element of a lack of a centralized structure for contractors which may make the tasks of risk identification, monitoring, and evaluation difficult especially while in an actual combat operation.The Army as a corporation is a going concern and as such combat expertise is often passed on from one generation to another. OCS may lack the progressive expertise which might hamper its effectiveness in an operational environment.
A commander can narrow the gap between military personnel and OCS by engaging in strategic planning together with the contractor through the joint force commander approach.If the operational support required is civilian, the commander can achieve favorable OCS effects by directly engaging the local populace.
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