Integral to humans is a constant pursuit of distinction. This pursuit can assume positive, constructive or negative, damaging forms. On a positive side, hard work can be a springboard for distinction regardless of professional, social, economic and cultural barriers. On a negative side, distinction can be achieved at someone else's expense. In one most damaging form, distinction can be sought based on race. By emphasizing – mistakenly – one's superior race because of physical attributes, particularly skin color, distinction, if any, becomes damaging at multiple levels. This concept of (false) distinction informs Cohen's argument on race and culture.
In his argument, Cohen rejects distinction between humans based on biological and physical characteristics. For him, current public perception is at best mistaken in assuming differences between humans based on race instead of culture. The distinctions between humans based on biological and physical differences are, according to Cohen, well established and, paradoxically, shows minimal differences between humans. In supporting his view, Cohen gives insightful examples on how biological, more specifically genetic, differences play a minimal role in marking groups as similar or different. Notably, dark skin color across different geographies account for only 4-10 gene pairs, hardly a substantial percentage in human 50,000-100,000 gene pairs. Indeed, "black" and "white" Americans, geneticists show, are 99.9 % similar. Moreover, skin color cannot be a reliable indicator to establish kinship relations since, when considering genetic makeup of dark skinned persons in Africa, Australia and South India, analysis show each group is not related to one another. The example of skin color extends far beyond one physical attribute. Indeed, skin color, considered alone, cannot be said to be a reliable indicator of similarity or difference. Indeed, if other genetic characteristics such as nose shape and hair color are used in addition to skin color to decide on a person's genetic kinship to another, skin color is shown to be at best an infinitesimal variable.
If anything, Cohen's argument is largely reasonable. The case for race vs. culture has, indeed, been established. Specifically, race has come to be an analytical variable of little value when distinction between humans are sought to be identified. So far, most recent research points out to minimal differences between humans based on genetic makeup alone. Even more interesting, differences are often shown to be more between persons apparently sharing similar physical attributes. Therefore, on a broad, analytical level, culture, instead of race, can be adopted to draw distinctions between individuals or groups. Yet, Cohen's argument can still be countered based on his very basic assumption.
Fundamentally, Cohen dismisses race altogether as an erroneous analytical tool for identifying distinctions between humans. But, human genetic makeup remains a project in progress. If anything, an unidentified number of genetic characteristics is yet to be discovered in order to decide, in more confidence, whether genetic differences are decisive or not in human differences across races. There is not, of course, a guarantee of when or how genetic differences can be explained away for much more confidence. Time can only tell. For now, Cohen's argument remains largely unchallenged not only because of a lack of counter evidence but also, more importantly, because culture has long been dismissed as an important variable to identify distinctions between humans beyond conventional physical attributes. Indeed, culture, compared to race, is a more recent concept used, if any, by analysts to draw boundaries between human behaviors based on more nuanced differences.
More broadly, Cohen's argument, if adopted in different political, economic and social settings, can introduce major paradigms shifts.
In politics, adopting culture as an analytical tool can change public perceptions not only among politicians but also among average persons at large. This change in perception can initiate, most importantly, major policy changes which should correct, hopefully, historical grievances made against specific racial groups particularly African Americans and Hispanics.
In economy, adopting culture as an analytical tool can, again, change perceptions about income (in)equalities. Specifically, by adapting economic policies to new "cultural realities", economic distribution can be managed in completely different ways compared to conventional ones. Needless to emphasize, current plans in New York City for more affordable housing aims, ultimately, to actually diversify NYC's cultural makeup. In lieu of current gentrification and ghettoization of neighborhoods, a pattern which isolates residents and prevents from a genuine cultural diversity in one of world's most diverse cities, more affordable house empower historically underprivileged ethnic minorities.
In social sphere, a change in perception toward race should, hopefully, be interpreted into more progressive programs in public programs, particularly in education universities. Indeed, given increasing diversity on campus, failing to respond effectively to on ground realities could deliver a negative message for not only existing and prospective international students but also for local students of color. There is no lack of evidence in recent years of underrepresentation of ethnic minorities both in faculty and student ranks. Therefore, only by culture, at least until counter evidence emerges, can Cohen's argument make a difference in public perceptions.
