Rawlsian and Dworkinian accounts of distributive justice
The term ‘justice’ has often been synonymous to the term ‘equality’. In society, the issue of justice remains a vague concept as each social class differs in the services and rights they can acquire despite the clear definitions provided by law on what should be received by each person no matter what social class. Experts like John Rawls (1921-2002) and Ronald Dworkin (1931-2013) had tried to provide an acceptable and clear definition on how just distribution (distributive justice) of resources and burdens can be attained. While both theories accept the fact that there is a need to have just treatment between classes, both theories vary on how society can determine “distributive justice” that may cause further conflict and disruption. However, Dworkin’s “equality of welfare and resources” theory lean towards a more favorable account of distributive justice as compared to Rawls’ “justice is fairness” theory as Dworkin offers a neutral party that can determine how resources and burdens be divided without causing people to grow weary for being undermined by such arrangement.
Distributive justice, according to Keren-Paz (2007) and Fleischacker (2005), pertains to the equal distribution of both benefits and burdens amongst members of society in proportion to their needs, status, and social class. Distributive justice could be broken down into three parts: the participants (the members of society), the burden or benefit to be distributed, and the criteria on how just distribution is attained. Given that there are instances of limited resources and the presence of high burdens due to social inequality, there is a necessity to determine who should get the most resources or who should handle the menial jobs . As modern theorists continue to argue on how “distributive justice” can be attained, two notable theorists that provided their own interpretations on how distributive justice can be attained: John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin.
Rawls, according to his book “A Theory of Justice” (2008), and to the analysis of Arnold (2009), stated that the problem of distributive justice as a problem in determining the just distribution of both benefits and burdens of members of society. His theory, named “justice as fairness”, stated that equality corresponds to the nature of the social contract. In this position, the social contract is formulated through a situation wherein it would determine the essence of “justice”. The principles, are devised under the “veil of ignorance”, wherein individuals would be classified equally given that the nature of principles that would be determined by natural chance. As a result, no one can influence the principles that would determine a fair agreement or bargain . Rawls had also added that justice as fairness begins with an individuals’ choice on devising the first principle of a concept for justice, which deals with the regulation of criticism and reform.
Once “justice” is conceptualized, individuals would now choose a constitution to enact the laws as stated by the concept of justice they have devised. Rawls also argues that assuming the original position does refer a set of principles, it will be true that each time a social institution satisfies the principles for just distribution, cooperation is attained that would ensure fairness. This arrangement would allow the public to accept the public to accept the principles of justice. However, no society can coexist in full cooperation especially when men prefer their status, declining voluntary action if possible. Regardless, a society that satisfies the principles of justice as fairness comes close into a society that is open for voluntarism and would allow fair or just distribution. With this in mind, members also become autonomous and they accept their obligations without being told. According to Catlett and Firestone (2009), Rawls’ theory also shows that “justice as fairness” works when parties in the initial situation are rational and disinterested actors. Under the Rawlsian theory, each individual would feel a certain fear over their capacity unless there is a way for both to share their resources with the “talented” if they share their extra wealth to the other . Corradetti (2011) highlighted two principles from Rawls’ theory which can summarize the entire theory on distributive justice: equality in the assignment of rights and duties, and inequalities. In the end of his book, Rawls had stated that his principle of distributive justice comes into reality when (1) a person has equal rights to all possible liberties given to all and (2) if inequalities are organized in the extent that it would benefit the poorest of poor and all social departments that will have the same capacity as the others .
In contradiction to Rawls is the theory done by Ronald Dworkin, who sees Rawls’ theory to be lacking several important aspects on how distributive justice is attained. Like Rawls, as noted by Miklos (2013), Parker and Sim (1997) and Roemer (1998), Dworkin also believes in egalitarian justice as it would foster an equal distribution of resources. However, unlike Rawls, Dworkin’s theory argues that the requirements for justice is defined by markets that enables transactions between members of society without undermining their capacity and talents. Dworkin begins his theory by asking “how treatment should be measured: by resource or by welfare”. In his first essay, Dworkin (1981) argued that equality of welfare is “ethically unattractive”, noting that there is a need to change this perception of equality to become a more “appealing” concept. Two problems must be solved to make “equality of welfare” acceptable: “cheap tastes” or the problems involuntarily cultivated and “expensive tastes” or problems voluntarily cultivated. If then, Dworkin stated, people are held responsible for their taste, distributing resources to preach equality of welfare would not be appealing . In his second essay (1981), Dworkin had conceptualized means to enable equality in resources and if this is attained, distributive justice is plausible.
Dworkin’s theory is also considerably different with Rawls also because he concentrates on the idea of personal responsibility. While there is a presence of markets, goods should still be valued in a means that would take into account the difference of a person’s life. In this end, valuing goods and allocating them must take into consideration the actual cost of that resource for others under a market . An auction, as noted by Shapiro (1992) would enable distribution of goods as it would allow people to have the same amount of money to bid for any resource they wish to attain. Sacrifices, would then be done by individuals, to get a much higher good valued by all by letting go of the initial good he has attained. Dworkin also argues that justice requires compensating individuals for their situations that they do not deserve in the first place as it just hampers individuals on how they can achieve change and value. Dworkin also argues that individuals themselves determine their preferences as it enables them to identify themselves with these choices . In the case of Rawls, individuals remain in fear that they may be classed as the “least advantaged” despite their part in society . While Rawls had stated in his second principle that it would benefit the worst-off economic class, Dworkin’s theory is sensitive to the position of those with natural handicaps considering that they cannot be counted as a worst-off group economically .
Considering both theories, both Rawls and Dworkin had presented viable arguments on how distributive justice can be attained. Rawls’ argument of formulating a fair measure to determine how individuals would perceive how distributive justice should be would enable the discussion of equality between social classes, especially how rights would be opened to each person. However, there is still the fact that individuals who would not interest themselves in the interest of others and there is also the fact some would not give out of their resources especially if they are sharing it with the “less-fortunate”. On the other hand, Dworkin’s theory on how distributive justice is attained, while similar to Rawls in the extent of stating that all should be given equal amount of resources and responsibilities, argues that there should be a neutral party, or the “markets”, that would determine who should get who and how resources should be equally distributed. Considering the nature of societies at present, having a market to determine an individual’s just share is crucial as it would benchmark what can be attained by an individual given his capacity and status, and foster talks to just distribution.
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