The notion of religious freedom is a bedrock right in American society. The nation was founded on the idea that citizens should be free to worship however and whatever they choose and the government is proscribed from establishing a religion. The First Amendment of the Constitution provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof” (United States Constitution, amend. I). While the right to free exercise of religion is enshrined in the Constitution, many minority believers and non-mainstream faiths are discriminated against. To combat religious discrimination, Congress has made religion a protected class in a variety of federal laws. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are prohibited from discriminating employers on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2). Thus, an employee was discriminated against because of his or her religion can sue the employer under Title VII.
An employee who seeks to bring an action under Title VII against an employer based on religious discrimination must be able to establish 1) the employee has a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with the employment requirement, 2) the employee informed the employee about this religious belief, and 3) the employee was fired for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement (Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory 1037). If the employee is able to establish a prima facie religious discrimination case by showing these three elements, the employer must then provide a non discriminatory, neutral reason for taking adverse action against the employee (Shapolla v. Los Alamos National Laboratory 1038). The employee will then have the burden to demonstrate that the reason offered is simply a pretext and that the discrimination was actually religiously motivated.
A number of religious individuals seek to express their religious beliefs through dress. In the employment context, religious observers often face religious discrimination when employers disallow religious apparel or clothing at work. In the case of Webb v. City of Philadelphia, a practicing Muslim female police officer sought to wear a headscarf while on duty (Webb v. City of Philadelphia 258). When the Police Department the request, the employee brought suit under Title VII for religious discrimination (Webb v. City of Philadelphia 258). Although the employee was able to establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination, the Police Department gave a nondiscriminatory reason for denying the officer’s request to wear a headscarf (Webb v. City of Philadelphia 261). The court found that the Department’s non discriminatory reason, that it would constitute undue hardship to permit the officer’s religious request, was valid and legitimate (Webb v. City of Philadelphia 262). Therefore, the officer’s religious discrimination claim under Title VII was rejected.
Laws often burden certain religions in such a way as to infringe upon free exercise. In Sherbert v. Verner, the plaintiff was discharged from her employment because she was a Sabbath Day observer and refused to work on Saturdays (Sherbert v. Verner 399). After being discharged, the plaintiff then applied for unemployment benefits, but was denied benefits because she failed to accept suitable work without “good cause” (Sherbert v. Verner 400-401). The plaintiff then brought suit, alleging that the denial of unemployment benefits because of plaintiff’s religious beliefs violated her free exercise of religion (Sherbert v. Verner 401). The Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether the government had a compelling interest justifying the infringement of the plaintiff’s right to free exercise (Sherbert v. Verner 406). The Court found that the government failed to establish a compelling interest and that the denial of plaintiff’s unemployment benefits violated her right to free exercise of religion (Sherbert v. Verner 409).
Opinion Statement
For many Americans, religion is a sense of self and is a large part of what defines a person. When allegations of religious discrimination arise in the workplace context, it creates a difficult analysis. Reviewing courts cannot question the sincerity or validity of particular religious beliefs. Although some religious practices or beliefs may seem odd or peculiar, courts are not in the business of saying what is protected religious exercise and what is not. Even some religious practices that may seem barbaric, such as ritual animal sacrifice, are protected forms of religious exercise and laws cannot prohibit such exercise (Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah).
In many religious, the way a person dresses is central to practicing that religion. Many religious observers wear distinctive religious garb. Whether this form dress is necessitated by the particular religion is not a question for the court to probe. But what frequently comes up in the employment context is religious dress. Oftentimes, employers want employees to look a certain way. Wearing distinctive religious dress may interfere with the “look” an employee desires for all of its employees. In the Webb case mentioned above, the Police Department has a justifiably compelling interest in wanting all police officers of the city to look and dress the same. Although it is easy to see in the police setting why it might be important for all officers to wear the same uniform with no deviations, it will not always be a clear line between the a legitimate interest in uniformity and religious discrimination.
Works Cited
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520. Supreme Court of the
US (1993). Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
Shapolia v. Los Alamos National Laboratory, 992 F.2d 1033. United States Court of
Appeals (10th Cir. 1993). Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398. Supreme Court of the US (1963). Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
United States Code, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 1964. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
United States Constitution, amend. I. Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Cir.
2009). Web. 1 Mar. 2016.
