Introduction 2
Abstract 3
Introduction 4
Operation Just Cause- Panama 5
Failure of October Coup 5
Level of Concentration from Soldiers 6
Role of the NCO in Operation Just Cause 8
Operation Iraqi Freedom 8
Safety 9
Time 10
Conclusion 12
References: 13
OUTLINE TITLE
Introduction
Operation Just Cause and Operation Iraqi Freedom are two important battles in the 20th century for America.
The goal was to liberate people from their oppressors
Each had a common ground which was to promote freedom
Both difficulty because of combat readiness
Both of the operations end were successful
- Operation Just Cause cleared out Noriega
Operation Iraqi Freedom liberated country from Hussein followers.
Operation Just Cause- Panama had rough combat readiness
- Failure of October Coup
- This failure made them not all the way ready for Operation Just Cause
The U.S. military’s readiness was flawed
Level of Concentration from Soldiers
- Uncertain about the welfare of their families
Distracted which kept them from performing their best
Operation Iraqi Freedom
- safety of the soldiers
- Putting the obligation of safety on the entire Soldier supports the battle buddy arrangement
There was not enough soldiers taking responsibility for their partners and it became a problem.
The Role of NCO
- In Iraq responsible for scheduling and tracking training requests whenever it was needed for AGR Soldiers
In Panama organize the full force of the American military.
Abstract
Disparities in combat readiness in both Operation Just Cause- Panama and Operation Iraqi Freedom had both undermined the U.S. military’s ability to protect U.S. interests. For the reason that some extents of combat readiness lack natural constituencies, readiness could suffer uneven and significant harm in the progressively fierce competition for budgetary resources. Congress has a responsibility to learn from history instead of repeat past mistakes of permitting military readiness to drop to a point that puts the lives of service members and U.S. national interests at risk.
Americas First Battles: Operation Just Cause- Panama and Operation Iraqi Freedom
Introduction
Operation Just Cause and Operation Iraqi Freedom are two important battles in the 20th century for America. In each of these battles, the goal was to liberate people from their oppressors although there are many that argue that it was more for political reasons. Even though both operations were something like twenty years apart, they each had a common ground which was to promote freedom. Operation Just Cause was the last result of a two year exertion to eliminate General Manuel Noriega, who was at the time the Chief of the Panama Defense Force (CDF) and de-facto monarch, from control after his accusation in the United States on drug-trafficking charges (Tuck, 2007). The military attack was an irresistible triumph. Operational, strategic, and tactical commanders successfully applied numerous operational ideas, most particularly trick, fire power, security, and logistics. On the other hand, Operation Iraqi Freedom was measured to be a long-drawn-out military conflict in Iraq that went all the way back in 2003 with an occurrence by an alliance of militaries led by the United States and that brought about the upheaval of Saddam Hussein's government. Nevertheless, in both circumstances there were some origin factors that were distressing the United States military’s readiness to achieve its primary function throughout the initial stages of the battles that were up under investigation.
Operation Just Cause- Panama
Before Christmas some 26,000 U.S. troops invaded Panama in ‘‘Operation Just Cause’’ on December 20 of 1989, in order to expel and seize the nations' strong man, the prior general Manuel Antonio Noriega and abolish his services. No candid Panamanian, no individual can be uncaring to the dismay of war, one can defend the thousands of dead blameless inhabitants. ‘‘Forget Barred’’ as numerous Panamanians mention these days, the world's most prevailing nation United States of North America, military and economic power was the right throw unjustified. However, even though this was a success for United States, it was not an easy one because they had to endure some readiness issues.
Failure of October Coup
However, when it comes identifying the root factors affecting the U.S. military’s readiness to perform its primary function during the initial stages of operation, and one of those was the failure of the October coup. This failure made them not all the way ready for Operation Just Cause and actually put them way behind in December during the actual invasion. The U.S. military’s readiness was flawed because they did not have the speed that was needed to be implanted into Panama. The speed did not go according to plan so it was not effective. When it got around to the fall of 1989 the staff and command at XVIII and SOUTHCOM the Airborne Corps made the realization that the situation was quickly whirling out of control (Guzman, 2008). If it turned out to be essential to use U.S. military force, the response would have to be even more rapid and conclusive to guarantee sufficient security for Americans and the Canal Zone and to diminish Panamanian fatalities and evade unnecessary damage to the nation's organization. Nevertheless, U.S. battle herds were unprepared for much of the non-battle disorder they encountered in addition to the many stability operations they were called on to accomplish all through the first days of Operation Just Cause.
Initial planning was not the single feature of the U.S. Army's arrangements when it came to Operation Just Cause. Simply a small amount of senior chief officer and staff officers were conscious of a likely military interference, but this did not stop taking suitable procedures in anticipation of applying the developing plans. Even as the first amendments of BLUE SPOON were launching, units at military connections in Panama and United States changed their training schedules and tempo of activities to arrange for an unknown likelihood operation. However having to do this at the last minute really hindered them more than it helped.
Level of Concentration from Soldiers
One of the other factors that affected the U.S. military’s readiness to achieve its main purpose during the initial stages of operation was the level of concentration from the soldiers. During that time, a lot of them had been distracted which kept them from performing their best (Ender, 2005). The vital level of concentration can be reduced, on the other hand, if individual soldiers are uncertain about the welfare of their families. Institutions for example the Congress approve the application of recompense levels and support services to deliver family security. Organizations for example the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army make the support settings within which family support services easier to help soldiers (Boone, 2009).
Training for Urban Environments during Operation Liberty
A second important problem related to force readiness with respect to Operation Just Cause was that training for operations in urban environments because the troops had not been trained that well for it. Also, the invasion was sort of called at the last minute do they did not have enough time to become as equipped as they could have been. Also, it did not help none that military dictator-drug dealer (Manuel Noriega) had turned out to be an embarrassment to the sitting political administration in Washington.
The developing operation, Just Cause, proved to be an exceptionally fruitful operation for the United States. Just Cause achievement can be credited to clear route from the National Command Authority, a united command organization, joint synergy and the skill of the superiors at the operational, strategic, and tactical levels of war to apply corresponding operational theories. On the other hand, one factor the follow-on operation, Promote Liberty, was not as positive for the opposite reasons; the purposes were not as obviously definite, the planning was restricted and rather insufficient, the command structure was fragmented, and the general environment was uncooperative and mixed up to the military.
One of the root factors affecting the U.S. military’s readiness of Operation Just Cause was that it involved the immediate striking of 27 targets intended to quickly paralyze the Panamanian Defense Forces and capture Noriega with minimal causalities (Ender, 2005). As soon as the PDF was counteracted, the refurbishment of a authentic government in Panama began under operation Promote Liberty. However, it did not go as smoothly because of the urban environment. With that said, Promote Liberty proved to be a key challenge for the military, which were charged with the formation of new democratic government, a job it was neither well suited for, nor well ready to achieve.
Role of the NCO in Operation Just Cause
During the course of the history of the Army, the NCO has been there, guiding soldiers in battle and training them in harmony, commanding by example and constantly, at all times - out front (Marion, 2012). N.C.O. means noncommissioned officer, and they established themselves all through Panama. The NCO of Operation Just Cause were discovered trying to lead troops into peacekeeping missions in order to help construct associations over a long period of time instead of traditional combat assignments. For the first time, during the Operation Just Cause era, the NCO education was run similar to the officer schooling system with levels of classes that were required by the NCO which would take just previous to or upon progression to their next rank. During Operation Just Cause the NCO was acknowledged as the “Army’s company memory at the level of the platoon, squad, and business.” This corporate memory served the Army well. All through operations in Panama, the United States did not organize the full force of the American military. As an alternative, individual units were sent to fight these battles. Once more, the decentralized nature of these conflicts positioned an emphasis on the minor unit leaders, the Non-Commissioned Officers, to see that assignments were finished.
Operation Iraqi Freedom
There were many other events that led up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, but what push the boundary for the United States were the events that happened on September 11. 2001. Baghdad time a Marauder was lost while flying a reconnaissance assignment, making it the second to be lost in a few weeks’ time the first was shoot down (Ender, 2005). Equally on this day eight hours later the first plane destroyed the towers. When this took place it questioned if the military was ready to take out Iraq and have them freed. However before and After Operation Iraqi Freedom, the relationship between the U.S. and Iraq did not get that much better but the military proved that there were some areas that they lacked readiness at. It proved that the destroying of Saddam’s regime and the capture and execution of Saddam would not go that easy and this was due to the military not being ready.
Safety
One important problem related to force readiness with respect to Operation Iraqi Freedom was safety of the soldiers. United States Army Combat Readiness Center Leader Brig. Gen. William Forester Jr. made the point every Soldier’s capability to be a safety officer during the operation made the following point. "The way I am looking at it is you all have one security captain in this development. In this war, that is nowhere near enough to make sure that everyone is reminded about what is supposed to be really important," he said (Boone, 2009). Putting the obligation of safety on the entire Soldier supports the battle buddy arrangement - a system that the Army has been stressing for years "Start taking ownership of not just the actions of you, but of the actions of even the teammate. The power is in you soldiers to protect your own, because if you don't, then you're going to be operating with less than which you came with," said Forrester. This was the issue that was going on during the operation (Boone, 2009). There was not enough soldiers taking responsibility for their partners and it became a problem. Beside with keeping the buddy system at the front of the Soldiers minds, Forrester also went on to redefine what was known as the "fallen comrade." Which was going on during the operation”? The research does shows that a fallen comrade may not just be someone whose just in a hot landing zone, however someone who has had a lot of things to drink, a soldier that might be tired, someone that may be sick, or it could even be a person that has been sexually assaulted," he said to the Soldiers (Boone, 2009).
Time
Time during Operation Iraqi Freedom was a major factor in all of the different extents of readiness. Training and recruiting personnel, maintaining and acquiring equipment, and training groups from minor units to joint task forces all require time unfortunately they did not get a chance to do it thoroughly. As a result, the readiness status that an organization upholds should was not determined by when its competences might be required.
The military was not able to provide strategic defense and deterrence, or any kind of direct response to terrorist threats and attacks, and other capabilities that were required on a moment’s notice because obviously they were not able to uphold high levels of personnel and equipment fill and training (Marion, 2012). The U.S military during this operation had to figure out that the units whose capabilities are not as time sensitive and do not need to be positioned immediately can be kept maintained at lower states of readiness, and of course this depends on the time available to bring them up to full readiness before they are required (Guzman, 2008). In Operation Iraqi Freedom this became a key factor in figuring out which missions would need to should be allocated to active-duty forces and which ones could have been assigned to the Reserve components. In Operation Iraqi Freedom Reserve forces had less time available to train; as a result, they usually had to require some additional time to train during mobilization (Tuck, 2007)
The Role of NCO in Operation Iraqi Freedom
During Operation Iraqi Freedom the NCO was responsible for scheduling and tracking training requests whenever it was needed for AGR Soldiers. They also did things such as assigning the soldiers to Recruiting and Retention Battalion. When there was some free time in Iraq that was able to do things like maintains digital and hard copies of all training records for the Battalion (Ender, 2005). Whne there was time they were out managing the ATTRS and DTMS training systems which would involve disseminating fragmentary and operation orders which were received from G3. The Role of NCO was also to develop secondary unit tasking which was based on unit assets and capabilities. The research shows that in Iraq, the Role of NCO
Was to track and oversee battalion training requests. Because at time there was chaos and disorder, when they had the chance the NCO would provide once-a-month training and security clearance updates to the Battalion Commander.
Training
Training during Operation Iraqi Freedom was a major factor in all of the different extents of readiness. Supporters for trying realistic training frequently quote Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, that mentioned, “The greatest form of welfare for the troops is training that is first-class, for this saves needless fatalities.” (Ender, 2005). How well military groups are trained for the entire range of their dispensed missions is a key determining factor of accomplishment in combat but it did not always work for U.S forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom.
In the past, one reason that the United States armed forces have been world-class is that they were able to train more and better than any other country’s services. Organizations for instance the Navy’s Top Gun program, the Navy’s Top Gun program the Air Force’s Red Flag Army’s National Training Center, have all been able to set remarkably high ethics for truthful, difficult training that integrates virtually all of the conditions and functions of actual battle. However in Iraq it became a missing factor because major large-scale joint exercises were lacking the strength. Operation Iraqi Freedom failed to include elements of all of the services. Operation Iraqi Freedom also lacked the exercises with U.S. allies that involved developing and refreshing the critical abilities to sustain and deploy forces and train forces to operate together successfully.
Conclusion
It is far better to learn the lessons of history than to repeat them when it comes to Operation Just Cause- Panama and Operation Iraqi Freedom. A decade of war, an antiquated and tired defense achievement system, and now a national budget crisis are by now putting combat readiness at risk even after both operations. It is clear by learning through Operation Just Cause- Panama and Operation Iraqi Freedom Operation Just Cause- Panama and Operation Iraqi Freedom, we need statesmen of vision and bravery to appreciate the readiness challenges and to make available the leadership to astound them before some unexpected crisis once again makes them all too deceptive. Attempting to “repair” broken readiness after the fact in both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Just Cause puts both the lives of service associates and U.S. national welfares at risk.
References:
Boone, L. W. (2009). Broadcasting operation iraqi freedom: The people behind cable news ethics, decisions, and gender differences. Journal of Business Ethics, 78(9), 115-134.
Ender, M. G. (2005). G.I. phone home: The use of telecommunications by the soldiers of operation just cause. Armed Forces and Society, 21(3), 435.
Guzman, H. M. (2008). Historical decline in coral reef growth after the panama canal. Ambio, 37(5), 342-6.
Marion, F. L. (2012). FIRST FIGHT: THE U.S. AIR FORCE'S SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP IN PANAMA, DECEMBER 1989. Air Power History, 59(4), 29-37.
Tuck, B. F. (2007). The iraqi perspectives report: Saddam's senior leadership on operation iraqi freedom from the official U.S. joint forces command Report/On point: The united states army in operation iraqi freedom. The Journal of Military History, 71(3), 985-986.
