I. Introduction
There are many sects of Islam, most of which are not violent and do not condone violence against non-believers. However, within Islam, there are also certain sects that do condone an extremist point of view, and these sects can sometimes also condone violence against those who do not hold the same worldview. In certain extreme cases, these violent, extremist sects even advocate violence against other Muslims that do not conform to their particular worldview.
The Islamic extremist group named Abu Sayyaf is one of the few Islamic splinter groups that does condone violence against those outside their particular set of beliefs. The group is somewhat unique in that it is one of the few Islamic extremist groups that is based out of the southern Philippines; it is, at its core, a separatist group, repeatedly requesting that the government of the Philippines provide the group with a separate province or state that would be governed by Islamic law (Abuza, 2005). The group mainly finds solace in the southern part of the Philippines, where there has been separatist violence and insurgencies in the Philippines for a number of years (Abuza, 2005). However, Abu Sayyaf is one of the longest-running and most successful groups.
II. History
The southern part of the Philippines has long been home to a number of Islamic separatist groups with varying levels of extremist philosophy (Abuza, 2005). In the 1970s, the southern Philippines was home to one Islamic separatist sect in particular, named the Moro National Liberation Front (otherwise known as the M.N.L.F.); the leaders of this group were known to interact with the leadership of al Qaeda, notably Osama bin Laden (Elegant, 2004). According to Elegant (2004), Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, the brother of Khadaffy Janjalani, another militant Islamist, went to study abroad in the Middle East. It was during this time that he allegedly met Osama bin Laden and received funding to militarize and radicalize the Islamic groups in the Philippines, on the condition that the groups remain sympathetic to the ideals and struggles of al Qaeda (Elegant, 2004).
When Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani returned from his studies in the Middle East in 1990, the situation in the Philippines had changed significantly. Notably, the Moro National Liberation Front had become more moderate, and the separatist sentiment had cooled overall in the area (Elegant, 2004). Janjalani returned, full of vigor and mobilized old members of the Moro National Liberation Front, forming Abu Sayyaf as a new separatist movement (Elegant, 2004). He remained the leader of the group until he was killed in 1994 during a shootout with Philippine police (Elegant, 2004). After his death, his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani assumed leadership of the group, maintaining control until his death (FBI, 2013). United States government sources claim that Khadaffy Janjalani was killed during a battle with police or military forces sometime in 2006 (FBI, 2013). After Khadaffy Janjalani's death, the group continued its attempts to retain control of the territory in the southern part of the Philippines, using guerrilla tactics and terroristic violence (FBI, 2013).
III. Ideology and Motivation
Abu Sayyaf is, at its core, a separatist group. The group defines itself by its struggle to create a separate Islamic state in the Philippines, a state which would be governed entirely by Sharia law (Elegant, 2004). Ideologically, the group stands alongside al Qaeda; they have often expressed anti-American sentiment, and wish to create a world in which Sharia law is the only rule of law (Banlaoi, 2006). According to Shay, “Abu Sayyaf has always said it is fighting for an independent Islamic nation in the southern Philippines, but during the late 1990s, the movement began to show cracks, and members started behaving more like a gang of well-armed bandits driven by greed, not creed. Since about 2002, however, the extremist group has been reverting to its original separatist goals, and its bombings and assassination attempts have increased accordingly” (Shay, 2009). Although the group claims to be focused on forming an Islamic state within the confines of the Philippines, most of their tactics are similar to those used by al Qaeda within existing Islamic states. According to Shay (2009), Abu Sayyaf are known to utilize kidnappings, bombings, rape, child sexual assault, gun violence, extortion and drug trafficking to finance and support their operation.
Violence in the Philippines between Abu Sayyaf and other, outside entities has only gotten worse since the death of Khadaffy Janjalani, according to most researchers (Shay, 2009). After the death of Khadaffy Janjalani and the subsequent power vacuum, the United States began to station United States military personnel in the southern parts of the Philippines (Shay, 2009). As a result of this and the growing anti-American sentiment in the region, violence between the separatists and others began to escalate-- including but not limited to violence between the American troops and the members of Abu Sayyaf, as well as other foreign travelers and members of the separatist group (Shay, 2009).
According to Shay (2009) and Frake (2008), in the time since the death of Khadaffy Janjalani, progress from the government of the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf group has slowed, although the United States continues to donate money towards the disbandment of the group. This is because the ideological ideas of the group still hold sway over the Muslims in the area, and many of the people living in the southern part of the Philippines feel disenfranchised by the Philippine government in some way. Similarly, these people feel as though they are victimized by the fact that there are American troops passing through the area regularly, training a moderately-corrupt police force (Banlaoi, 2006). Banlaoi (2006) notes that the group has a tendency to oscillate in extremes, sometimes laying dormant for a significant amount of time before finally resurfacing (Banlaoi, 2006). When the group is lying dormant, it does not disband; instead, Banlaoi (2006) indicates that it becomes more moderate in its beliefs for a short time before some outside event changes the tide of its ideology (Banlaoi, 2006).
IV. Notable Attacks
The group Abu Sayyaf uses a number of different tactics to inspire fear in the citizenry in its territory, but it is particularly well-known for kidnappings, bombings, executions, drive-by shootings, and rape (Filler, 2004). Filler (2004) suggests that the group takes part in most activities that are endemic to guerrilla groups, including extortion, human trafficking, child sexual assault, and drug trafficking. It is because of these guerrilla tactics, as well as the classification of the group as a terrorist group by the United States government that disbanding the group has become so important to diplomatic ties between the Philippines and the United States. According to Shay (2009), “the army launched a major offensive against the organization in August 2006 And once again, Abu Sayyaf is back to kidnapping for ransom money as a means of funding its operations. In January, the group held three Red Cross workers hostage, and analysts suspect they were released only after large ransoms were paid” (Shay, 2009). These attacks were acts of violence against innocent civilians, and came on the heels of a few other attacks of note.
In April of 1995, Abu Sayyaf became active in a bombing campaign that resulted in the hostage of thirty civilians, and the eventual death of fifty-three (Shay, 2009). In February of 2004, the group committed another bombing on the Superferry 14, which resulted in the death of 116 people (Banlaoi, 2006). This attack was the world’s deadliest terrorist attack at sea. Finally, in 2007, seven workers were abducted and beheaded; Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the beheadings (Shay, 2009).
V. Leadership and Membership
The leadership of Abu Sayyaf has long been the province of radical Muslims. According to Shay, “ [in 2006] Khadaffy Janjalani and two other high-ranking Abu Sayyaf leaders with important connections to funding in the Middle East were killed. According to one analyst, Abu Sayyaf is running low on funds, and no new leader has come forward to unite the disgruntled factions within the group” (Shay, 2009). Current-day leadership is confusing within the organization, although the FBI (2013) claims that the religious leader Yasser Igsan was posted to the position after Khadaffy Janjalani and other high-ranking officials were killed. Membership consists largely of Muslims from the Philippines who feel disenfranchised and downtrodden by the current system.
VI. Abu Sayyaf and al Qaeda
Abu Sayyaf has long been thought to have ties to al Qaeda; indeed, Abu Sayyaf is thought to have gotten its first flush of money from Osama bin Laden when Khadaffy Janjalani’s brother initially left the Philippines to study Arabic and Islamic scholarship in the Middle East (Filler, 2004). In addition, a number of al-Qaeda-associated terrorists, including the famous Ramzi Yousef, trained and operated in the Philippines in the 1990s (Filler, 2004). Until the United States cracked down on terrorist activity after September 11, 2001, the ties between al Qaeda and Abu Sayyaf were very tightly wrought.
VII. Conclusion
Abu Sayyaf calls itself a separatist group that supports the institution of Sharia law in a separate Muslim province of the Philippines, but in reality, the group engages in behavior that is similar to other separatist movements around the world. There seems to be very little that the group will not do to achieve their ends, including kidnapping and executing innocent civilians, both inside the Philippines and outside. Although many analysts hoped that the death of Khadaffy Janjalani would cripple the organization, the organization continues to limp on, spurred forth by ideological ties to a more powerful global organization. The organization continues to be dangerous, if not powerful, and the Philippine government is having continued difficulty removing the group from society as a whole. If the Philippine government did grant the group a separate state, there is no indication that the group would be able to acquire funding to truly fund a government well enough to remain stable without resorting to kidnappings and extortions.
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