As in all other Socratic dialogues, Socrates demands that it is necessary to first understand the true and correct nature of that which one wishes to understand by correctly defining its essence. He requires a full definition which is not fragmented, as only this can clearly explain the essence of the issue at hand. According to Socrates, in order to understand whether virtue can be taught, one must first understand what virtue truly is. He prioritizes correctly defining terms, before pursuing the path through which one may fully understand the term.
Meno’s first suggestion is that there exist different types of virtues for different types of people. Socrates is quick to dismiss this definition as he is interested in the shared qualities of these different types of wisdom. Meno then suggests that virtue is the ability to rule over people. Socrates quickly dismisses this definition on the grounds that children or slaves cannot virtuously rule over people, and that ruling can only be virtuous if done justly. This prompts Meno to define it as justice. For this definition, Socrates says that justice many be a form of virtue, but is not in itself, virtue.
Once more Meno tries to define virtue as the desire for good things and the ability or power to acquire them, if, and only if, this is done justly. Once again, Socrates is opposed to this definition, as it uses a form if virtue to define virtue. At this point, Meno wishes to have Socrates define virtue and whether it can be taught. Here, Socrates argues that if virtue is indeed a type of knowledge, it can then be taught. He goes further to say that if there exists anything that is good and is not knowledge, then there is a possibility that virtue may not be a kind of knowledge. He then adds that there exists nothing good if it is not accompanied by wisdom. This brings him to the conclusion that virtue is wisdom, and is therefore not something human beings are born with.
Meno is about to come to the conclusion that virtue is something that can be taught. Socrates hesitates. He questions this thinking and asks that if virtue can be taught, where then, are the teachers? He finally concludes that virtue is not a type of knowledge, although it is a type of wisdom. He suggests that it is not, perhaps, a result of knowledge, but is indeed a result of true belief. According to Socrates, knowledge is about being able to account for what we know, while at the same time being able to hold true beliefs without necessarily being to give explanations for them. According to Socrates, it can neither be taught nor is it inborn. He speculates that it could be some gift from the gods, which is given without our understanding.
In refuting that virtue can be learned, Socrates comes up with the following argument. In order to know about a fact, one must inquire whether they know or do not know. If one knows, then it is not necessary for them to inquire. On the other hand, if one does not know, it is impossible to inquire. This brings one to the conclusion that inquiry is either not necessary or is impossible. This brings him to conclude that one can move from a state of not knowing to a state of knowing through recollection. In this manner, one makes conscious what is latent, and this makes learning possible.
Socrates also differentiates between knowledge and true opinion. In some cases, true opinions can be as good as knowledge because the answers it yields are both correct and true. The difference is that true opinion is not as stable as knowledge. In order to have knowledge, it is important to have the ability to reason and put it into account. According to Socrates, knowledge comes from recollection, and this gives it stability. Because of this stability, knowledge becomes more valuable than true opinion. This stability gives it the ability to provide the correct answers at all times, and these answers are always true.
In the Phaedo, there existed only one true currency through which all things could be bought. Only in exchange for wisdom and in its company can one acquire all other things. This includes other virtues such as temperance, justice and courage. All true virtues must be accompanied by wisdom, regardless of the fear or pleasure involved, or the good or evil involved. When separated from wisdom, all other virtues become corrupted. Separation of virtues from wisdom deprives of freedom, health and truth. Exchanging wisdom for all other virtues leads to purging of all these vices and it brings other virtues such courage and justice. Truly rich rulers are not those who have silver and gold, but those who have been gifted with wisdom and virtues from the gods, and these are the truest blessings of life.
Works Cited
Day, Jane. Plato's Meno In Focus. London: Routledge, 2012. Print.
Plato. Meno. Trans. Cathal Woods. Kansas, MO: SSRN, 2010. Print.
—. Phaedo. New York : U.P., 1875. Print.
Scott, Dominic. Plato's Meno. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Print.
