INTRODUCTION
With the collapse of the USSR towards the stretch of the last decade of the last century, the Cold War – that delicate seesaw balance of power between the United States and the Union Soviet Socialist Republic – ended resulting significant changes, especially in the areas of intelligence and espionage. Russia’s standing in the international community as a superpower has diminished and presumably, its capabilities in intelligence gathering. Prior to the end of th4e Cold War, Russia closely competed with the US in terms of intelligence gathering and collection. Russia’s chief intelligence arm is the notorious KGB known for its ability to infiltrate even the most secure organizations in the world. With the collapse and the defragmentation of the USSR, its capabilities in many areas, including foreign intelligence, have been diminished. With the passing of the years, however, Russia is slowly recovering and so with its foreign intelligence arms. With recent events in mind, there is doubt as to whether Russian foreign intelligence has actually decreased, and even if it did decrease, there is probability that it is resurging. In addition, although Russian foreign intelligence has been concerned with regional concerns after the end of the Cold War, recent events have also shown that this is not entirely true. Thus, it can be said that although Russian foreign intelligence have undergone restructuring, its size and capabilities cannot be said exactly to have diminished and its concerns with regional intelligence have not hindered its ability to employ its capabilities and resources against its old nemesis – the United States.
RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO SOVIET COLLAPSE
During the Cold War, Russian capabilities in the area of foreign intelligence had been at par with that of the United States. The Soviets had been known to operate and maintain an intelligence network that was as capable and as relentless as that of the other superpower. Prior to the collapse of the Union Soviet Socialist Republic or USSR in 1998, it maintained two intelligence agencies. These were the KGB and the Main Intelligence Directorate (or GRU) of the General Staff. The KGB, which stands for Community for State Security, was “the largest and most complex intelligence gathering system in history.” It was a state committee with ministerial status and it had the dual function of maintaining security on the domestic and foreign fronts. It was estimated that between 1974 and 1986, the KGB maintained a staff of 490,000 persons. In 1988, it was reported that the intelligence agency operated with five major directorates and three smaller ones. Among these directorates, the First Chief Directorate, the Seventh Directorate and the Eight Chief Directorate were all involved in foreign intelligence. The First Chief Directorate (Foreign Operations), for instance, was chiefly responsible for foreign operations and intelligence-gathering, but the Second Chief Directorate assisted by recruiting agents from foreigners who were visiting or were stationed in the Soviet. This Directorate trained and managed spies or covert personnel, collect and analyze various intelligence data, in the areas of politics, technology and science culled from various foreign countries. A group called spetsnaz was created in 1989 for the purpose of conducting “external reconnaissance, sabotage, training and security missions.” The KGB not only pursued its mandate in straightforward intelligence gathering, but also engaged in active measures and even influenced Russian foreign policy-making. All these proved the extent, size and strength of the Russian foreign intelligence capabilities.
KGB operations increased during the period of détente that started in 1972. KGB agents were able to enter the US during this time disguised as diplomats, trade officials, journalists and even as students. It was estimated that of all the Soviet citizens who were able to enter the US at that time, 30 to 40% were KGB agents. The KGB utilized and exploited the intelligence services of satellite countries, such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Cuba, and Bulgaria to accomplish its missions.
The other foreign intelligence arm of the Soviets was as big and as capable as the KGB. Structure-wise, the GRU, which is short for Main Intelligence Directorate, was simpler than the KGB because unlike the KGB, it had no responsibilities involving internal security. It was purely concerned with foreign intelligence gathering. This did not, however, diminish the strength or capabilities of the agency. The GRU was created to primarily to gather intelligence data from western military technology. Towards this end, GRU spies were integrated into various news media agencies and cultural exchanges to infiltrate and collect intelligence information. GRU agents were trained in Moscow in an airfield called Khodinka Field or ‘the Centre.’ The Centre is surrounded by innocuous-looking buildings, such as offices and living quarters to shield the place from prying eyes. The runways were used to take people in and out the area. The location was perfect for the operation of GRU.
Prior to the collapse of the USSR, its foreign intelligence was used to gain advantage for the republic in several areas without necessarily going through the usual route. Between World War I and World War II, and during the Cold War, Russia’s foreign intelligence was built around gaining knowledge, whether overtly or covertly, of its ‘adversary’ states. Knowledge about economic, technological, industrial and scientific advances of those adversary states were the focused of Russian foreign intelligence. In between the periods of the two world wars, Russian foreign intelligence particularly concerned itself with the advances of those states in the field of steel-making, machine-building, aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding. After World War II, Russian intelligence began fascinated with nuclear, especially in the US and the UK, and with the help of scientists from those countries whose ideologies were in concert with those of Russia, the latter was able to obtain knowledge in that field that allowed it to save on two years in research. As can be seen from all these, Russian foreign intelligence had been used to surreptitiously exploit knowledge gained by other states to improve its own.
AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, which paved the way for the thawing of the Cold War, Russian foreign intelligence underwent a restructuring. The former USSR was shattered and many states that used to be part of it declared their respective independence. Russia was not only teetering with political confusion, but economic as well. As a result, its foreign intelligence suffered from lack of financial support. In addition, many of its former strategies and techniques were exposed by agents who defected to the West. There was necessity to revamp and restructure the KGB and other foreign intelligence agencies. At present, Russia has three foreign intelligence services, namely the SVR, the GRU, and the FSB. The SVR, which is the Foreign Intelligence Service, is assigned to conduct intelligence gathering in Western Europe and the United States. The SVR is also a faction of the old KGB, particularly the First Chief Directorate – which used to be the eyes and ears of USSR. However, its size was significantly decreased by 30% to 40% with many of former personnel moving to the private sector. With decreased resources, the SVR diminished its coverage of smaller countries, but increased coverage in the Baltic States and countries that were formerly part of the USSR. With the election of Yeltsin, SVR slowly gained strength. Yeltsin believed accurate intelligence as important in Russia’s quest to regain international fame. SVR relied on its human resources to compensate for its lack of financial resources. Proof of SVR’s expertise in this aspect is the use of FBI Special Agent Robert Hansen, who had been selling American national security data to SVR until his arrest in 2001. The SVR also employed ‘illegals’ directorate or Russian spies or sleeper agents who come to the US as academicians, journalists, students, and businessmen. This was in the case of Anna Chapman and nine others arrested in 2010 by the FBI. All these showed that Russia’s foreign intelligence still sees the US and the West as a focus of its operations and activities, like what it did before the collapse of the Cold War.
The other Russian foreign intelligence agency, the GRU, has been retained with the same functions as it had before the Soviet collapse. According to a 21-page report of the US Office of Naval Intelligence, the GRU has emerged to be the top foreign intelligence arm of Russia. In addition, nothing has really changed with this intelligence agency as it continues to maintain the same overseas residencies and agent networks it had established during the Cold War era. As a matter of fact, the Report believed that the GRU, rather than the FSB or SVR, is the major foreign intelligence threat to the West. The same Report also noted that GRU is extensively engaged in the electronic surveillance operation against the US and its allies allowing it to identify the location of various strategic aircrafts in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. This surveillance system is known as SIGINT or signals intelligence.
The FSB, which is the Federal Security Service, is known to be the direct successor of the old KGB, but is now chiefly assigned in the old Soviet nations, but is also active in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Originally, the plan was to fully dismantle the KGB, but Boris Yeltsin had to shelve it after meeting strong resistance from influential former KGB officers. The FSB is perceived to be the most obvious successor of the KGB. Although the CIS states were suspicious of FSB dominance in the region, the perfect timing of the creation of an anti-terrorist regional agency in 2001 compelled the states to tolerate the FSB. Unlike SVR, which signed an agreement with other intelligence agencies in the CIS region not to spy on each other, the FSB made no such commitment. Thus, FSB has often found itself deeply involved in the affairs of CIS states. For example, in 2005 FSB claimed that it helped reveal a plot against the sitting government in Belarus – a plot confirmed by the Belarus intelligence agency.
CONCLUSION: RUSSIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE – NEW COVER SAME CONTENT
The recent days and in the past months proved that Russia’s ability to collect foreign intelligence has not decreased, nor its size significantly diminished. These events also showed that Russia’s intelligence focus on the West, particularly the United States, has changed despite its interest in its immediate neighboring region. For example, news reports in December of last year gave accounts of Russian cyber attacks by the “Dukes” a cyberespionage group associated with Russia. This event was deemed to be the first sign indicating the group’s interference through hacking of the US 2016 elections. The US intelligence community itself had laid the blame on Russia for hacking computer systems, particularly of the Democratic National Committee as well as the campaign chairman of the Democratic Party’s presidential contender Hilary Clinton. These events showed that Russian intelligence focus on the West, especially the United States, remains to be of the same intensity even after the end of the Cold War and the restructuring of its own intelligence system.
The above news reports and the present structure and activities of the Russian foreign intelligence belie the suggestion that the country’s foreign intelligence capabilities have waned or that its priorities have changed. On the contrary, all these showed that Russian foreign intelligence have significantly expanded employing advances in telecommunications technology in addition to its capabilities in the more traditional use of human resources for covert espionage activities. The implication is that Russian intelligence have grown in capabilities rather than decreased. As earlier stated, Russian foreign intelligence agencies have gradually grown almost to the same size before the collapse of the Cold War, particularly in the size of the FSB affirming the claim that the its numbers have not considerably decreased. Notwithstanding Russia’s evident concern with the use of intelligence resources in Eastern European region, particularly on its former states, recent events showed that this only implied an expansion of coverage of foreign intelligence coverage rather than shift of coverage. Thus, instead of focusing only on the US and other Western states, Russian foreign intelligence simply added states located near it.
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