In Allan Bloom’s book The Closing of the American Mind, he essentially argues that the modern liberal idea of cultural and societal pluralism is leading to an inability to perform critical thinking. Essentially, instead of saying one of two differing choices is better, one would simply ‘see the merits’ in both – this leads to us not forming opinions of our own, but instead offering a milquetoast acceptance of everything that dilutes our experience. While these concerns are valid, these arguments do not necessarily correlate to an objective assessment of how critical thinking works, and instead reads as a grumpy treatise on the changing and opening standards of morality and social norms. Bloom’s worries that the American Mind is ‘closing’ is somewhat premature and overly reductive, as it presumes nothing new can be learned and we must instead learn to think correctly. Instead, pluralism should be celebrated as a base of critical thinking and the chance to form more personal spiritual truths than Bloom’s authoritative truth can provide.
Bloom, in his book, argues that critical thought is in danger of being diluted unnecessarily by things like deconstructionism and other pluralistic schools of thought. Bloom argues for critical thinking and philosophy having objective elements, things that have been verified and time-tested to be enduring and true (Bloom 379). The works of Plato and Shakespeare, for example, are works that have lasted centuries because of their inescapable influence and the fascinating truths that they can impart upon the reader. However, given the “post-Sartrean” approach of Deconstructionism, something he argues is prevalent in modern academic study, “the interpreter’s creative ability is more important than the text; there is no text, only interpretation” (Bloom 379). Bloom opposes this, as he believes that it simply opens up canonic texts to whatever subjective meanings that the reader can interpret from their own minds, which may not be what the author intended.
However, what Bloom fails to realize or account for in his analysis of Deconstructionism is the fact that all consumption and reading of art is interpretation; it is impossible to actually get the objective account of what an author intended in a work, particularly in the case of ‘canon’ authors like Shakespeare. When someone reads and interprets a work, they are working from their own understanding of the material and how it speaks to them – this was the case even when creating the canonic interpretations of a work. Bloom’s worries that deconstructionism robs academia’s ability to “[liberate] us from our increasingly low and narrow horizon” are somewhat overblown; deconstruction itself is a practice of critical thinking, after all (Bloom 379). When performing literary criticism and analysis, we are, in fact, stretching our creative muscles and thinking critically about a work; Bloom paradoxically seems to worry that this will get us further from his own subjective sense of the truth, which he deems objective anyway.
One of Bloom’s issues is that his claims do not have empirical confirmation with data, especially as Bloom does not like empiricism “as a path to truth” (Kurfiss 5). However, this seems to clash with Bloom’s message; if he does not like empiricism, then there is no real way to determine an objective sense of ‘truth’ as pertaining to a canonical set of philosophies or literature. While this is perfectly valid, the search for truth without empiricism involves the same kind of critical thinking and subjectivity that Bloom seems to distrust in his estimation of the higher education system. Without a real sense of evidence in the form of empiricism, Bloom does not have the sufficient tools to convince his readers of something that they do not already fear – a ‘dumbing down’ of college students that can only be recorded anecdotally and emotionally. Bloom’s consideration of what is important is thus achieved by broad consensus (a sense of what has been important for a long period of time), which does not really open the door to critical thinking. After all, there are many cases in which works of literature or philosophical ideas have been legitimately uplifted long after their original entry into the world – the Sherlock Holmes stories, for example, were essentially populist works of pulp fiction until later scholarly investigation gave them literary significance. To that end, it is difficult to find the line between what Bloom considers important and what actually is important, thus making it hard to take his complaints seriously.
It is argued that Bloom’s concerns are not misplaced, but he blames them on the wrong thing – Bloom rails against a generalized “feeling of malaise” found in schools (Bloom). However, this is not due to educational relativism and the forwarding of all ideas as valid. Instead, it is argued that this decline can be attributed to “the unwillingness of American academics to make the difficult choices that modernity has forced upon us” (Macey 1038). Any perceived shortcomings that come about as a result of higher education is simply cowardice on the part of educators to make sure their teaching is of the highest quality, and on administrators to make sure they make the right choices in times of controversy (Macey 1039). For example, Bloom’s idea that the teacher who threatened to kill a black student who declined to participate in a 1960s demonstration is a symptom of the evils of relativism is false; instead, the problem is with the administrator themselves being too cowardly to fire the teacher and stand by the rules of the school (Macey 1039). Bloom would blame the problem on relativism allowing such destructive and life-threatening behavior to be morally accepted; however, Macey argues that the behavior is considered unacceptable, but no one does anything about it anyway. In this way, the proper response to Bloom’s worries is for teachers and administrators to stand more firmly behind their own convictions, rather than hide behind a vague sense of moral decay.
Bloom does, in fact, have some understandable concerns – he fears that the American college education does not sufficiently arm children with “the basic knowledge of Western civilization,” leaving them less able to function appropriately in the world at large as they do not have the same sense of cultural literacy as others (Elkind 116). The worry is that, in an education where a canonic sense of literature and basic skills is not honored, it is possible for educators to gloss over or ignore vital skills and information that children will need to succeed and communicate with others in a meaningful way. However, again, these concerns are overblown, as nothing of the sort is happening to any significant degree, especially according to developmental philosophers, who “believe that children who are curious, active learners will acquire much of the knowledge that Bennett, Bloom, and Hirsch call for” (Elkind 116). If critical thinking is taught correctly, Bloom’s canon would likely eventually be found anyway.
There is no significant evidence to suggest that the basic things that people should learn are not being taught by instructors; no one is outright losing the importance of the canon in terms of building cultural literacy. However, the introduction of things like Deconstructionism and cultural relativism allow for less frequently-represented schools of thought to get their time in the sun. If Bloom argues that there are ineffable truths to literacy and philosophy, the learner should be able to figure those out through their own critical thinking skills and form their own preferences. The restrictions and preferences of a student should not be assigned to them without room for discussion, for fear that people will miss the point in Bloom’s estimation. Instead, let pluralism be taught in schools, which will give students the wide world of options from which to form their own opinions. If the canon is as timeless and important as Bloom claims, the student will pick up on that anyway.
Instilling basic cultural knowledge and skills is one thing, but after someone has left school they must be able to use these skills on their own. Of course, this requires the teaching of critical thinking skills above all, which is the primary purpose of education. The goal, then, must be to instill that aforementioned sense of curiosity and activity in learners, who can then go on and find those things on their own. This can be done through teacher training, guided curriculum using empirical approaches to how students learn, and proper instruction and assessment (Elkind 116). Critical thinking, as best as can be empirically shown, requires a curriculum-wide “integration of content and reasoning,” involving the constant use of “sustained, guided, collaborative inquiry” (Kurfiss 118). In short, critical thinking is taught by instructors constantly asking questions and keeping students engaged with their material and the world around them. This leads to the active, engaged learners that Bloom feels can find their way appropriately through the world; however, this sense of sustained inquiry seems antithetical to Bloom’s focus on the canon, and certain essential and objective claims to philosophical truth. This creates a contradiction in which thinking is encouraged, but only insofar as it leads to acceptance of Bloom’s pre-approved list of canonical skills and literary works.
What Bloom seems to ignore in all of his hand-wringing about the canon and the inherent spiritual truths that lie within them is that interpretation and critical thinking are skills that are applied to the canon as well. If someone reads a work by Shakespeare and finds it wanting for very thorough and well-thought-out reasons, are they lacking in critical thinking? Or unaware of the spiritual truth of it, according to Bloom? Bloom’s canon presumes a universal significance beyond social and cultural literacy, but does not account for the possibility of other stories carrying spiritual truths that resonate more with the individual than others. Because Bloom shies away from empiricism, he has no leg to stand on when he claims that some works are inherently more ‘spiritual’ than others, and that pluralism makes people spiritually empty. It is entirely possible, conversely, that Bloom simply does not see the spirituality in these other works, and that other people do. To that end, pluralism is important due to its ability to expose students to a wide variety of ideas and works, allowing them to gravitate towards what resonates with them. Pluralism does not necessarily preclude looking at something uncritically; it merely provides other, less mainstream options on which to focus critical thinking.
Bloom’s assertion is that classical education has been wrongly strayed from in favor of creating a loosey-goosey morass of equally celebrated ideas regardless of the desire for moral and educational absolutes. However, these absolutes are what stifle innovation in the first place, and would ensure that only the canon was celebrated, and not ever changed or added to: “Professor Bloom believes that his way is the only way and his books are the only books and anyone who disagrees is either a socialist, a nihilist, or worse, a feminist” (Macey 1040). By having such a restrictive, absolutist view, education is in no way helped – we are not thinking critically or getting closer to the truth, but just aping what our betters are telling us to think and not stepping outside the box. Bloom fears the straying of education from the way he knows it, and his work seems to unfairly lash out at youth and relativism for offering other ways of thinking.
In his conclusion, Bloom argues that the highest form of society “is the community of those who seek the truth, of the potential knowers, that is, in principle, of all men to the extent they desire to know” (Bloom 381). However, what he seems to miss in his rather myopic view of that search for truth is that everyone is still searching for truth; pluralism isn’t a sense of hiding from the truth, but instead finding a wider truth. There is no one single truth, something which Bloom ostensibly agrees with in his ignorance of empiricism; rather, everyone searches far and wide to find a single truth while also discussing with others the nature of their own personal truths. It is in this interrelation of ideas, all distinct but none discounted outright as false, that we find the real truth Bloom so desperately seeks. Critical thinking, especially as we relate to stories, is vital to our understanding of knowledge and the tales we experience; however, the absolutist view that Bloom gives in his book does not encourage critical thinking, but merely a regurgitation of subjective claims of the absolute without room for independent study and thought. Bloom simply wants everyone to reach the same conclusion, but that is impossible if it is done honestly. We all relate to stories in different ways; this is pluralism, to be sure, but it is not ugly nor is it spiritually empty. On the contrary, it offers people a more intimate connection with the spiritual by finding their own interpretation of a story or work. Bloom’s insistence that fealty to the author is restricting, as it potentially forces someone to abandon a greater personal truth in favor of the author’s intended message (as subjectively as that can be found). When fewer voices are given the chance to speak and make their truths known, the opposite of Bloom’s intended sense of education occurs.
Works Cited
Bloom, Allan. The Closing of the American Mind. Simon & Schuster, 1987.
Elkind, David. "Developmentally appropriate practice: Philosophical and practical
implications." Phi Delta Kappan 71.2 (1989): 113-117.
Kurfiss, Joanne Gainen. Critical Thinking: Theory, Research, Practice, and Possibilities. ASHE-
ERIC Higher Education Report No. 2, 1988. ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Reports, The George Washington University, 1988.
Macey, Jonathan R. "Allan Bloom and the American Law School." (1987): 1038.
