Question:
Based on current concepts and amphibious capabilities, are we better prepared to conduct forcible entry operations than we were during the landing at Inchon, and subsequent liberation of Seoul?
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Amphibious landings have a long history, mentioned in the mythical account of the Trojan War as the opening move of the Greeks as they attacked Troy. The ability to launch amphibious attacks is a dimension-changing aspect of warfare, by sending land forces over the sea a natural barrier is eliminated and turned into a gateway for men and supply. In more recent history, the idea of forcible entry over hostile forces has come to the fore as the key problem with any amphibious operation. Gaining entry into hostile territory has become more difficult as opponents study and prepare for such operations, as was shown in the Gulf War (Streitz, Forcible Entry: A Hard Nut to Crack, Page 1). The USMC is the world’s pre-eminent amphibious force, yet its ability to conduct forcible entry operations is nuanced and context dependent. This paper proposes that the preparedness to conduct amphibious entry is a complex mix of technological, resource, and political factors, which are effective in some contexts and ineffective in others.
Inchon: A Successful Expedition
The landing at Inchon is one of the most spectacular examples of amphibious forces success in an expeditionary mission. The more so, given that the preparedness for that assault was deeply problematic strategically, logistically and operationally. In 1950, the North Korean army (NKPA) had launched a successful surprise attack on Republic of Korea (ROK) forces after crossing the 38th parallel. The invasion was condemned by the UN, and the US took up the mantle of ejecting the North Koreans from South Korea. However, the poorly prepared ROK forces, supported by a handful of US military advisors, were rapidly pushed back and soon the US was fighting a rearguard action to slow the NKPA advance. Before long, the ROK and US forces were pushed back to south eastern Korea around the town of Pusan. Despite being resupplied from the sea, and in fact having numerical and asset superiority over the depleted NKPA forces (stretched by long supply lines), the situation was grim (Sweeney, The United Nations Landing at Inchon: Operation Chromite, Page 8).
General MacArthur, veteran of the Pacific theatre, perceived early on how useful a marine offensive could be. As early as July of 1950, he saw that a marine assault on Inchon, then pushing further in a thrust at Seoul could sever the NKPA’s supply lines and turn the tide of the war. The flanking operation alone would relieve pressure on the southern front, possibly allowing for a counteroffensive. However, though an assault was planned for July 1950, it was cancelled as the pressure of fighting the NKPA offensive did not leave adequate resources for an entry by Inchon. At the time there were significant resource constraints in the Pacific, as it was believed that Europe was the key battleground. The nuclear option was throwing doubt upon conventional warfare strategies, such as amphibious maneuvers. Lastly, amphibious assault was politically difficult thanks to the large numbers of human casualties often incurred during landings, such as at Normandy or Iwo Jima.
However, as the pressure on Pusan sector continued, General MacArthur was able to convince command about the need and effectiveness of an amphibious flanking operation. The required forces assembled, an amphibious entry was finally attempted in September 1950. Operation Chromite was successful beyond expectations (perhaps the expectations of everyone but General MacArthur) leading to recapture of Seoul and the retreat of NKPA to behind the 38th parallel once more. The forcible entry at Inchon is now a textbook case of amphibious operations, representing the best of inter-service coordination, strategic planning, leadership at the operational level, and logistical effectiveness. It also demonstrated that the more limited sub-theatre amphibious capabilities extant after World War II could be a powerful tool, despite not having the same scale of sea-land capacity. However, amphibious operations since have been used generally in a support capability, and the growing knowledge and sophistication of our opponents has made forcible entry a challenge indeed.
The Emerging Theatre: New Global Equations
Traditional American doctrine is facing new challenges, including the spread of Islamic extremism, the rise of China, the threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states (or, nuclear armed states going rogue) and the threat of cyber warfare. In this scenario, amphibious assault may yet play critical roles, making it necessary to develop preparedness for at least 3 scenarios:
Small Scale Expeditionary Forces: The rise of China and its moves in the South China Sea are likely to be a focus of near-term concerns in the amphibious domain. The islands and atolls of the region are similar to the Pacific where the USMC waged several amphibious landings during WW II. The US has a commitment to defend several of the countries that have territorial disputes with China such as Japan, South Korea and of course Taiwan. As China is claiming almost the entire sea as an economic zone, should there be substantial hydrocarbon resources at stake the situation might become more heated. In terms of being ready for amphibious assault, the technical and resource constraints are in line with those maintained by the USMC currently. The political dimension is another matter – that any assault may trigger confrontation with China on a larger scale.
In terms of the effectiveness of forcible entry, the potential cost of any such entry is likely to be high. China has begun to fortify those parts of island chains it is in possession of. A determined effort to resist US forces gaining a land-hold might well be successful. In the case of China, strategic planners should acknowledge that the US would be facing a foe with vastly greater resources in terms of quantity of men and machines (at least in such proximity to the mainland). Technologically as well, China has worked hard to neutralize US maritime strength with innovations like ship-killing missiles and a large submarine fleet. The preparedness of forcible entry against China must be regarded as low, since the question would require new tactical approaches, and a level of inter-service coordination difficult to bring about in the current doctrinal approach. The fact that the theatre is wholly littoral and there are no other access points available shows a major vulnerability in US readiness for combat in the South China Sea.
Large Scale Expeditionary Forces: While the need for it has not been felt for some time, changing geopolitics indicates that it may be needed again. The most likely need will be when a state degenerates or collapses, and the ensuing chaos requires massive intervention. Libya and Yemen are showing indications of going under the storm of Islamic extremism. It is possible that the situation with Iran and Pakistan may deteriorate in the future (due to different reasons). There is at the moment, a shortage on both political and resource fronts in terms of mounting any such operation.
The issue of forcible entry in this scenario is different. The chaotic nature of tactics used by Islamic opponents (which often makes them deadly and unpredictable on land) will probably reduce their effectiveness at sea. It is unlikely that any expeditionary force would face heavy harbor defenses or precision missile attack. However, determined shore defense and small arms fire is likely to be a given. In this case, the current doctrine of forcible entry is likely to be effective; possibly at minimum cost with adequate air support and special forces action.
Flanking or Strategic Maneuver Operations: Similar to the use at Inchon – to change the dimensions of war and outmaneuver the enemy. Such a case may emerge in any situation where the US is engaged with an enemy having a coastline, and may even be applied in riverine systems (as was tried in Vietnam). Forcible entry in this case becomes dependent on point of entry, since a little defended situation may allow for easy access. Arguably, this is at present the best suited of amphibious theatres for the USMC right now. The political fallout is likely to be lower (at least for the landing itself, given that the war will likely have begun elsewhere) and the current force strength of the corps is aligned to just such a role.
It is important that Inchon was also such a maneuver, rather than a full scale invasion by sea of the sort seen during WW II. In that sense, we are as prepared today (or perhaps better prepared) for an Inchon-like situation. Such a case may arise, for instance should the US be in conflict with Iran in the future, where both the Persian Gulf and Caspian Sea may offer opportunities for both diversionary and flanking action via amphibious assault.
Conclusions
The United States has been the world’s pre-eminent maritime power since WW II, however the role of amphibious assault, and even more of forced entry, has declined steadily since that time. It must be admitted that the current situation is not amenable to large scale forced entry operations. However, the use of forced entry for maneuver is still viable, and the technological improvements in landing vehicles and the advantages of networked battlefields allow the USMC several advantages. Key to achieving entry is the synergy and coordination between the different services, it cannot be a marines-only situation (Kinder, Forcible Entry Operations – A CINC’s Trump Card, Page 26).
Whether this capability is still useful depends on the wars of the future. The land based nature of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have not left much opportunity for amphibious operations. The danger that capabilities will atrophy without use is real: not just hardware or experience, but the strategic acumen of commanders to use marine forces in their best application.
There are yet more pressing problems – such as that the US may not be able to effect forcible entry against opponents any more. Acknowledgement of this would be a severe blow to US prestige and perceptions of unchallenged military might. It is important therefore, to invest in innovations for forcible entry, to maintain the advantage over opponents today and for the future. The usage of electronic and cyber attacks, particularly in a diversionary measure, should be actively explored as a maneuvering tool to aid forced entry.
