Essay 1
Introduction
Maurice Cranston expressed skepticism over the status of social, cultural, and economic rights as genuine human rights. Cranston gave various objections for the status of social, cultural, and economic rights as genuine human rights. The context in which these reasons are best understood is the context in which the concept of genuine human rights is understood. This paper explores the reasons for which Cranston denies the social, cultural, and economic rights the status of genuine human rights. This feat will be achieved by considering the concept of genuine human rights.
Cranston makes two significant objections to the status of social, cultural, and economic rights as genuine human rights. One of the objections is philosophical in nature. The objections is two-pronged, with the first prong based on the claim of incoherence. Cranston (2001, p.164) argues that the inclusion of economic and social rights in the newly developed theory on human rights fails to make sense. Cranston (2001, p.166), in advancing the philosophical objection to the status of social, cultural, and economic rights as genuine human rights introduces the claim of impossibility. This claim implies that it is not possible to translate the social, cultural and economic rights into genuine rights that can be enforced through legal doctrines. The understanding of Cranston (2001, p.166) is that unlike the civil and political rights, the social and economic rights fail the test of practicability. His reason is that the economic and social rights do not have a lucid correlation with duties. The assessment of the reasons behind these objects shows an alternative that renders the consideration of the reasons untenable. For instance, economic and social rights can be achieved. It would require a long time and several changes to achieve the economic and social rights. The length of time is not an indication of the impracticability of the social and economic rights. The other test that relates to the philosophical objection Cranston (2001, p.166) is the test of universality. Cranston’s argument is that genuine human rights are genuinely universal, an attribute that is not found in economic and social rights. There are apt counter arguments for this reason. For instance, reproductive rights are genuinely universal.
Cranston (2001, p.164) also makes a political objection to the status of social, cultural, and economic rights as genuine human rights. He argues that the genuine human rights are universally known as such, and that the labelling of economic and social rights as genuine human rights is not only a confused approach, but also a hindrance to the effective protection of genuine human rights (Cranston, 2001, p.164). Cranston finds that the elimination of the confusion requires an understanding of the fact that human rights are concerned with the protections, goods, and freedoms which are extremely important. It is this kind of reasoning that relegates the economic and social rights to a place of less importance according to Cranston (2001, p.164). He reaches the conclusion because in his conception, economic and social rights do not protect against important goods.
Conclusion
The concept of human rights has evolved over time. The concept of ‘what is important’ has also evolved with time; thereby influencing the understanding the human rights in a different way. Cranston did not believe economic and social rights to be important enough to be considered genuine human rights. However, the consideration of the dynamics in the contemporary society and the application of the tests of universality and practicability have raised objections that challenge the reasons upon which the objections of Cranston are based.
Essay Two
Introduction
Thomas Pogge, a renowned scholar and one of repute once quipped that the wealth countries are responsible for the violation of the human rights of the citizens of the poor countries. The arguments by Pogge are not to the effect that the wealthy countries are insensitive to the need for help by the poor countries. Instead, Pogge argues that the wealthy countries are actively harming the citizens in the poor countries. This paper will assess these claims on the basis of the understanding and scope of the arguments described above. The paper will explore both the negative and positive duty as it relates to his arguments.
In advancing his arguments, Pogge (2011, p.78) highlights the role of supranational rules, and especially the role of the United States in creating these rules. Pogge (2011, p.78) finds that the supranational institutions that result from the supranational rules one-sidedly benefit the hedge funds, multinational corporations, industry associations, banks, and other business entities that are based in the United States. The violation of the rights of the citizens of the poor countries in this instance is brought about by the fact that the expansion of the share of these organizations that are based in the United States coincides with the decline of the business entities and economies of the poor countries (Pogge, 2011, p.78). Pogge finds that the poor countries have a handicap because they lack the adequacy of resources to mount a defense for their interests. Even so, Pogge (2011, p.78) finds that the wealthy countries have a positive duty to lobby the other wealthy countries to consider the interests of the poor countries when making international decisions. Pogge (2011, p.79) argues that one of the considerations would be an assessment of the effect of the supranational rules and international treaties on global poverty. The conclusion by Pogge that the economic elite are violating the rights of the poor nations is influenced by the lack of action towards considering the plight of the poor nations.
The premise of the arguments that Pogge makes is the understanding by the wealth nations that they have a moral duty to address the prevalent global poverty; that in pursuing this moral duty, their individual and collective actions should consider the effect of their decisions on the poor nations. One argument against this premise and all the arguments that result from it is that many of the rich nations operate on capitalism ideals. Under the capitalism ideals, the advancement of their business entities is the primary objective. As such, the development of supranational rules that allow the expansions the business interests serves the primary objective of capitalist economies. Additionally, the rich countries may not always use the rights approach to ethics and morality which is the dominant ethical and moral philosophy upon which the arguments by Pogge are based. Under the utilitarian ethics, the fact that the actions of the rich countries result in the expansion of their business interests make their actions ethical. However, Pogge (2011, p.78) challenges these counterarguments from a sustainability standpoint. It is in the best business interests of the rich countries to increase the purchasing power of the poor countries so that they server as markets for their multinational organizations.
Conclusion
Essay Three
Introduction
The civil strife in different countries results in the displacement of the citizens in the severely affected areas. The displaced people seek refuge in neighboring countries as refugees. The neighboring countries have an obligation to help the refugees. However, arguments exists that the obligation is not boundless. The expansion of these arguments cites boundaries such as the right to self-determination, the cost of hosting the refugees, and the need to preserve the way of life for the hosting countries. This paper examines the boundaries highlighted above in the context of the constraints to the hosting nations and the needs of the genuine refugees. The paper will present an academic opinion on whether the boundaries of the obligation for mutual aid highlighted above are substantial justifications for denying genuine refugees a safe haven.
Carens (1992, p.31) contributes to the debate on the boundaries of the obligations by nations to take in genuine refugees. While the author informs the reader that he does not have distinctive answers to the debate on boundaries of the obligations of the nations, the author helps reduce the disagreement between the opponents and proponents. Carens (1992, p.31) cites Michel Walzer who holds that nations reserve both the moral and legal right to choose who to admit. This arguments means that refugees are not exempt from the actions of nations to exercise their right to determine who they admit. This argument is framed in an extremist approach. This is because it does not bestow upon nations an obligation to admit genuine refugees to a certain extent. The basis of the argument is that the control over who a nation can admit is a crucial tenet to the communal self-determination of the nation (Carens 1992, p.31).
However, Carens (1992, p.31) finds that Walzer acknowledges the principle of mutual aid and how it affects the obligations of nations towards refugees. The application of this principle means that that the nations have an obligation to help genuine refugees who have urgent needs. However, the aspect of cost erects a constraint on the performance of this obligation. This is because the governments of the hosting nations incur costs in hosting the employees. There is the consideration of the fact that some refugees cannot reasonably hope to return home in the short-term because of the state of affairs in their mother country. The conclusion is that the obligations to the refugees based on the principle of mutual aid ends when the costs exceed what is reasonably feasible for the nation.
The argument of costs of hosting refugees is valid, especially if the international community does not contribute towards hosting the refugees. Some nations may not have the financial resources to host large numbers of refugees for extended periods. The aspect of cost would be justifiable in turning back genuine refugees. However, the need of a country for self-determination and the preservation of a country’s way of life are not justifiable arguments for the exclusion of genuine refugees. This is because the principle of mutual aid negates these arguments and bestows a responsibility on nations to help people with an urgent need; a classification in which refugees belong.
Essay Four
Introduction
The article by Lamey (2012, p.235) is a response to the article by Arendt who argued that the search for refuge by refugees presents significant challenges for liberalism. Lamey (2012, p.235) finds a conflict between the endorsement of human rights by liberalist theorists and the fact that they do not recognized sovereignty. Sovereign states would seek to control the access of the country through their borders. The conflict occurs when such sovereign countries also subscribe to the human rights ideals. This is because it would mean that no refugee would be denied entry into the country because it would be tantamount to the violation of their rights. Lamey (2012, p.235) proposes a model that acknowledges the rights of the refugees despite the fact of border controls. This paper analyzes the rights-based model to considering the search for asylum by individuals or groups of individuals.
The first tenet of the rights-based approach proposed by Lamey (2012, p.248) is the right to non-refoulement. This tenet means that the refugees reserve the right to be allowed to evade the place of persecution. This further means that even if a country does not want to offer asylum to the refugees, the country cannot return the refugee to the place from where they are freeing. This is good alternative to countries that want to maintain their sovereignty by way of controlling entry through their borders. It allows such countries to achieve their need for self-determination while also respecting the right of the refugee to non-refoulement.
Lamey (2012, p.248) explores further ways through which the right to non-refoulement can be enforced in an environment where border controls are a manifestation of the sovereignty of nations. Lamey (2012, p.248) proposes rights for refugees that are to be implemented through the constitution. One of the rights is the on an oral hearing through which one’s status as an asylum-seeker is determined. This right creates a forum through which the claims of the asylum-seekers are investigated to determine whether they are genuine refugees (Lamey, 2012, p.249). The second right entails the representation by a lawyer during the oral hearing. The representation by a lawyers ensures that the determination of the case for the asylum seekers is done in accordance to the laws and relevant legal doctrines. The final right relates to the judicial review of the decisions regarding detention. This relates to the demonstration of the need for detention in prison-like facilities. The pursuit of this right is in recognition of the distress and trauma suffered by asylum-seekers seeking asylum in Australia (Lamey, 2012, p.249). Judicial reviews of the decisions relating to detention will ensure that such decisions are based on a consideration of facts that meet the right threshold.
Conclusion
The rights-based model proposed by Lamey offers alternatives for nations that seek to enforce their sovereignty while also hoping to uphold the human rights of the refugees. By offering them an oral hearing to determine their status as genuine refugees, such nations can opt to transfer the genuine refugees to other nations that can offer asylum to the seekers. In this way, the nations will respect the right to non-refoulement of the refugees, maintain their sovereignty, and also uphold the human rights of the refugees.
References
Carens, J. 1992. Refugees and the Limits of Obligation, Public Affairs Quarterly, 6(1): 31-44.
Cranston, M. 2001. ‘Human rights, real and supposed’, in Patrick Hayden (ed.) The Philosophy of Human Rights. Saint Paul, MN: Paragon House. pp.163-173
Lamey, A. 2012. A liberal theory of asylum, Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 11(3): 235–57.
Pogge, T. 2011. Are We Violating the Human Rights of the World’s Poor?, Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 14:1-33.
