Introduction
There have been wars and threats of wars throughout human history. One of the memorable of these wars is the Yom Kipur War. This war was between the Israel and the Coalition of Arab Nations. It also involved two major military super powers Russia and the United States which backed their respective allies during the war. This has caused too many casualties on both sides and has made many war critiques question the effectiveness of ceasefire agreements entered into by opposing factions. Understanding the biases and errors in information processing that led to faulty decisions before and during the war could help in the avoidance of such errors and biases the future which could ultimately help lead humanity to create a more peaceful world and stronger agreements among nations. It should be noted that the warring factions in the Yom Kipur War are still in an unpleasant diplomatic relationship at present; hence, there is a likelihood that such war could arise again especially when the lessons from the Yom Kipur War are not considered. Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer in their research, “Is there method in our madness? Ways of assessing cognition in international relations,” explained that such studies are very important in improving international relations. The purpose of this study is, therefore, to understand the instances where biases and errors in information processing are evident and come into a conclusion or a recommendation on how to avoid them in the future.
Theoretical Framework
This proposed study will utilize the groupthink theory as its theoretical framework. In summary, the theory suggests that a group; such as, a nations armed forces, comes up with a decision to act upon a particular interference in such a way that the action does not coincide with the evidence that they have. In other words, the group members twist the interpretation of evidences in order to suit their preconceived idea of a correct action. There are eight known indications of group think. These indications include: illusions of invulnerability, collective rationalization, belief in inherent morality of the group, out, direct pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, illusions of unanimity, and self-appointed mind guards. The presence of at least one of these is an indication of a group think and group think is an indication of biases and errors in information processing.
The applicability of this theory is already hinted by a number of studies to topics related to the subject of this proposed research. For example, in “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure,” Uri Bar-Joseph and Jacks S. Levy explained that evidences of intelligence failure or the deliberate information distortion in in the side of Israel before and during the Yom Kipur War exist. Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski in “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” explained that leading political figures in Israel have exhibited the lack of cognitive closure in addition to intelligence failure which have put Israel into an adverse or losing position on the onset of the Yom Kipur War and has almost resulted into a much greater war between Russia and the US. Gabriela Heichal supports this view in “Perception, Image Formation and Coping in the Pre-Crisis Stage of the Yom Kipur War,” and further explained that the time to respond to threat is based on objective and subjective factors. This explanation would imply that there was a bias or subjectivity in the interpretation of the threat posed by the Coalition of Arab Nations as they posed to battle with Israel. Lieutenant Youssef H. Aboul-Enein of the U.S. Navy in his article, “TheYom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings,” have also expressed his opinion that there was an intelligence failure in the side of Israel because it dealt with its intelligence data subjectively. There more other accounts that describes why the Yom Kipur War had great casualties and these reasons can be best studied using the group think theory.
The same theory will be used to test the following hypotheses:
H1: The Israeli high ranking officials have relied too much on ceasefire agreement and in the integrity of the opposing forces which in turn lead to great casualties of war;
H2: There was a religious bias in the side of Israel so they did not anticipate that the Coalition of Arab Nations would attack at the very day of a holy festivity.
Research Design
This proposed research will utilize secondary information obtained from past literatures. There are inclusion criteria that will be used in order to determine the literatures to be used. These inclusion criteria include: the literatures should be the most current ones – they should be written within the past decade, and that the literatures should be peer reviewed. These inclusion criteria will help ensure the reliability and validity of the findings that will be arrived at in this study.
The information shall be analyzed using content analysis. In this method of analysis, the information derived from the literatures shall be collected and then organized into groups based from their themes. The themes which will be used are the eight symptoms or indications of group think. The major themes shall then be identified further and separated from the minor themes. A conclusion can then be made in accordance with this categorization. For example, the major errors and biases can be associated with that information that fell under the major themes, or the theme with the highest number of occurrences shall be the major evidences of biases and errors in information processing before and during the Yom Kipur War. The majority of the sources or case studies used will those written by Uri Bar-Joseph and his colleagues. The reason for this is that Uri Bar-Joseph has done extensive studies on this topic and are the most current with publication dates within the 21st century, hence they meet the inclusion criteria that are proposed to be used in this study. the information that they have gathered shall also be incorporated in this study.
In summary, the analysis procedure would include creating a table of all the biases and errors of information assessment and processing before and during the Yom Kipur War which led to great casualties of war. The table will have eight columns and each column will represent a theme consistent with the eight symptoms or indications of group think. The number of evidences for each column or theme shall be counted. The themes with the highest counts or evidences shall be deemed the major themes and the rest will be designated as minor themes. A conclusion on how to avoid such biases and errors in information processing shall then be made in accordance with the major and minor themes. Table 1 provides a sample table for the analysis of information.
It should be noted that this study has its limitations. Accordingly, this study could only rely on secondary information and not on primary information. This means that the biases of the past literatures in obtaining and presenting information are also incorporated in this study. Moreover, since the majority of the sources shall come from the studied conducted by Uri Bar-Joseph and those of the US records, there is a limit as to the perspective of the other factions – Russia and the Coalition of Arab Nations. Nevertheless, efforts shall be made in order to obtain the perspective of the other factions although there are very little studies done by researchers on their side on this topic thus far.
Conclusion
Understanding the biases and errors in information processing or assessment before and during the Yom Kipur War is very important in order to avoid the same pitfalls that resulted to great war causalities. Such a study is also important in order to improve international relations. Fortunately, there are enough published research literatures that are readily accessible to conduct such research, and this proposed research is one of such.
Preliminary Source List
Aboul-Enien, Youssef H. “TheYom Kippur War: Indications and Warnings.” Militray Review (2003): 52 – 54.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise.” Political Psychology 24, no. 1, (2003): 75 – 99.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure. Israel: UBESCO Publishing. 2002. Pp. 11 – 34.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era. Israel Affairs 14, no.1 (2008): 70 – 83.
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Arie W. Kruglanski. “Political. Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise.” Uri Psychology 24, no.1 (2003): 75 – 98.
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Jacks S. Levy. “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure.” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 3. (2009): 461 – 488.
Cottam, Martha L. Introduction to Political Psychology (2nd Edition). Psychology Press. (n.d.): 37 – 52.
Tetlock, Philip E. “Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable Futures in World Politics: Are We Prisoners of Our Preconceptions?” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 2 (1999): pp. 335-366..
Young, Michael and Mark Schafer. “Is there method in our madness? Ways of assessing cognition in international relations.” Mershon International Studies Review 42, (1998): 63 – 69.
Reference List
Bar-Joseph, Uri. “Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise.” Political Psychology 24, no. 1, (2003): 75 – 99.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Israel’s 1973 Intelligence Failure. Israel: UBESCO Publishing. 2002. Pp. 11 – 34.
Bar-Joseph, Uri. Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era. Israel Affairs 14, no.1 (2008): 70 – 83.
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Arie W. Kruglanski. “Political. Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise.” Uri Psychology 24, no.1 (2003): 75 – 98.
Bar-Joseph, Uri and Jacks S. Levy. “Conscious Action and Intelligence Failure.” Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 3. (2009): 461 – 488.
Heichal, Gabriela. Perception, Image Formation and Coping in the Pre-Crisis Stage of the Yom Kipur War. Jerusalem: UBESCO Publishing. (2002): 196 – 220.
Whyte, W. H., Jr. "Groupthink". Fortune. (1953): 114–117.
Young, Michael and Mark Schafer. “Is there method in our madness? Ways of assessing cognition in international relations.” Mershon International Studies Review 42, (1998): 63 – 69.
