Security Concerns: Libraries
Personnel thefts, crimes against property are some of the major issues that are besetting building and facility administrators at present. Entities invest significant amounts in developing and acquiring technologies with the goal of enhancing security levels, safeguarding personnel, and resolving security problems. These technologies include burglar alerts, fire defense alarms, video monitoring systems, and illegal entry devices and systems. Operated by technically-proficient personnel, will be able to aid in decreasing property risks, reduce resource losses, and enhance personnel as well as visitor security (Schneider, 2006, p. 1).
The fundamental objective of competent layouts and space management for libraries is that the building must answer to the demands of the population being serviced. When the demands of the “service population” are established, the library design must be adaptable in order to accommodate the changes in both the interior and exterior elements for the facility to be able to address the current as well as the future requirements of the service population. Even as early as the latter parts of the 1970s, progressive technologies and substitute options on the manner of delivering services to its “audience.”
These innovations include “distance learning,” “electronic media,” and others that have persisted in its development and progression since that time. Prior to the 1970s, the primary function of libraries was storing print data; at present, aside from still storing print media, providing access to the Internet for research purposes, computer facilities, and other contemporary forms of data transference and storage have a significant impact on the manner that libraries are built. Owing to these considerations, libraries must be constructed factoring in all of these elements in the use and operation of these elements in the future (Whole Building Design Guide-National Institute of Building Sciences, 2014, p. 1).
Physical plant intrusion (e.g., burglary)
The most potent method in preventing burglaries starts with the knowledge that buildings, as well as the components and offices in the building, is different in the manner that it operates, is built, exposed, and the manner that one gains access to them. Each of the components will present one problem as well as have a different threat level. From the viewpoint of security, the lone standing commonality between the various points of concern is that these are within one facility. Apart from this factor, even though that these are found in the same facility, the security requirements for each component will be completely distinct from each other. Simply put, what will be effective for one will be inadequate for the other.
In establishing the defense of the office against burglary, one must then ask what must be protected, how it will be defended, and the threats that pose a risk to these assets. It must first be established that any office will be threatened by burglary. Even on the most secure locations, such as military installations and penal facilities, these can still be vulnerable to burglary. One can construct a “burglary-proof” facility; however, the finances needed to construct such a facility will be extremely prohibitive, and one of the most significant factors in lay outing security schemes is expense (San Luis, 1994, p. 24).
A simple discovery mechanism for detecting intrusion is traditionally the most familiar principle of security for the average person. “Intrusion detection” makes use of such technologies as door and window view holes, “glass contacts,” and motion detectors. These, in combination with other technologies such as loud alarms systems, will alert the police or security personnel in the vicinity of a break-in into the facility. This protocol in responding to incidents is sufficient and swiftly responding to these exigencies. However, the efficacy of the response mechanism at “ground zero” and the ensuing prosecution of the perpetrators are highly dependent on a number of factors.
Among these factors include one, the distance of security personnel facility to the location; two, the severity of the incident, and lastly, the number of parties involved in the incident. However, resolution of such cases would be greatly aided by the availability of more data. These would include the specific details of the event that can result in drawing the appropriate resources and method of response to the event. In this light, it can be stated that the door, glass, and motion detection devices can also be used in gathering information that can lead to the prosecution of the perpetrators (Schneider Electric, 2006, p. 6).
Property and Individual Security Measures
Thieves and assailants will always “case” the facilities’ reception area, or the librarian’s area, to look for opportunities to commit criminal acts. The receiving area, whether in a library or in a commercial building, is the facilities’ initial “line of defense” when the library is open. Often times, the receiving area is the only defense mechanism against thievery and attacks against persons. Though the reception area is the first defense line in a facility, it is ironic to discover that majority of the computers and other items in the building are stolen at this location. In this light, administrative decisions are posed regarding the “why” of the security protocols of the particular facility. However, the more difficult question to ask in this situation is why so many offices and facilities are operated in such a way as to “invite” acts of criminality?
Sadly, the “office thief” is typically ones that are regularly entering and exiting the facility. For example, the thief or assailant may be an office messenger or a delivery man. There must be a protocol that establishes the practice of receiving packages and papers at the reception area or in another area within the facility. Here, there must be policies that will ensure that the receiving area will always be manned, meeting and guiding patrons whether new or current to the proper areas in the library, and handling deliveries at the entrance rather than within the premises can be considered as simple steps, but the impact of these policies on robberies during the “open hours” and burglary is quite significant. In addition, these “open hour” policies can also aid in reducing criminal events by hiding potential targets.
When the library closes or after business hours, the doors of the building should be locked even if there are employees still inside the building. Thieves perceive the times prior and immediately after the close of business as the most opportune times to commit crimes. During these hours, when the pedestrian traffic in the officers and hallways are reduced, criminals are greatly motivated for robbery and violent attacks. One person should be designated as the one responsible for locking and securing the entrance/exit of the building, as well as setting the alarms, fire exits, and motion and camera sensors. Another employee should double-check the locks and alarms to obviate any lapse in security protocols (San Luis, 1994, p. 15).
Information/records security
The safeguarding of information on computers and systems is an increasingly rising and costly issue. However, the loss of information and intellectual properties are only among the pressing concerns at facilities and even companies (Schneider, 2006, p. 4). With libraries having improved capacities to store an increasing amount of computer data, often coming in digital formats, librarians should be more vigilant in protecting the public interest. In this regard, there are procedures that can be done in order to safeguard information in the library’s systems.
These steps must be geared to optimize the protection of the people that use the facilities of the library. This information can include identities and other personal digital information that if left unguarded can be used by nefarious elements in their criminal activities. First, curators should conduct regular “privacy or confidentiality” checks of their respective systems. Library administrators should regularly examine day to day operation conduct to familiarize themselves with the varied types of records that connect customer/user “identifiers” with requests for data.
These include searches in the library’s databases, applications for photocopies, lists of Web pages accessed on the library’s terminals, and electronic messages that were received or sent on these terminals (Magi, 2006, p. 1). Systems and technologies will also be beneficial in protecting information on the library’s terminals. However, there are no devices that can aid in protecting data and give out the data, or allow themselves to be deluded with ill-gotten gain, or allow unsanctioned individuals to freely roam around the library.
One of the best options is to use “silent/call back modems.” These modems, rather than emit a high pitched tone when one dials into a terminal, the system will require the access code of the patron, and the library’s database will verify this information with the records in the system. If the information is valid, the system hangs up and contacts the user that is also prelisted on the system. The system will now process the access application of the user (San Luis, 1994, p. 144).
As long as particular types of records and information are being used by the library’s patrons, curators will never be able to completely ensure total protection for these records, whether written or on digital formats. Librarians must continue in practicing “selective” information publication; in addition, librarians must also seek the authorization of the patron in episodes and then brief them on the potential risks to them (Magi, 2006, p. 2).
Emergency planning and response
There has been a wide ranging shift to incorporating a number of “stand alone” systems, combining these mechanisms for remote areas, and fire and exigency control management. A number of CCTV, illegal intrusion systems, fire, and mass information disbursement systems, have established the core of “access control.” The rising paradigm is the amalgamation of security systems with fire and personnel operational protocols. By involving stakeholders in the facility, from the conceptual stages to the eventual operation of the facility, disposition anchored policies can be effectively incorporated with security personnel measures as well as systems (Whole Building Design, 2014, p. 1).
OSHA standards and violations
On the average, public book repositories should afford five seats for every 1,000 members in its service population. As a rule of thumb, non-private repositories that serve the needs of less than 10,000 users should receive 7 to 10 seats for every thousand users. These principles do not engage the seats in convention facilities and staff spaces. The amount of seats can be adopted depending on the type of repository.
The guiding framework can be, for example, if the athenaeum is geared to encourage long term usage by patrons-large collections of research literature, then the size of the facility should be enlarged. However, if the facility encourages short reading periods, then the number of seats may be lessened. For the needs of the staff, employee spaces should integrate areas for online access to external resource bases.
Employee workloads and the amount of library personnel where the services of the facility are offered such as the reference area, circulation stations, and multimedia work places, are critical to establishing the space that must be allotted for the staff. In addition, work areas for library managers and designated “staff-only” areas-employee lounges and pantries-are also integral to the allotment of staff space in a facility.
Hiring practices
Security personnel are taken from a diverse field of occupations, inclusive of those with long experiences in the area of private security. Some are hired from former law enforcement and military elements after these have received some form of security training both in theoretical and practical terms. However, there is a tendency to present information to these potential security personnel that is outside of the requirements of the officer in the field. In this light, there will be a need to craft a training regimen that will address the situations and events that the officer will likely encounter on a daily basis. Before the 9/11 attacks, not even half of the states regulated private security; that number has increased over the years (Layne, 2014, p. 38).
Training practices
The International Foundation for Cultural Property Protection (IFCPP) developed a primary security “security officer training program” that embraces the requirements needed to address the most fundamental mission of any private security entity: “Prevent, Protect, Observe, and Report.” Officer training regimens must include a strong focus on servicing the needs of the customers of the facility. Here, it is recommended that written and field tests be conducted to handle various exigent situations in such a facility (Layne, 2014, p. 39).
In the work of Stellitano (2005), an equipping program for maintenance and cleaning personnel can be crafted. The program will be focused on familiarizing these personnel to recognize suspicious individuals and behaviors, discarded parcels and packages, uncommon smells, broken light fixtures, and so forth. Equipping and motivating other personnel as well can help in providing support for the security detail or law enforcement officers. By training and equipping employees, this will result in heightened awareness among staff to habitual awareness and surveillance practices within and outside of the workplace (Chalinger, 2008, pp. 12-13).
Legal issues unique to the site
The right to search all parcels and packages for patrons who come into the facility must be reiterated often. Institutions retain the right to examine and investigate the contents of parcels as well as search people that enter these facilities. Here, it is recommended that a copy of the clause be placed at all entry points for the public; in addition, restrictions on carrying weapons, even those with “concealed carry” waivers, should be conspicuously posted at entry points and in different areas in the library (Layne, 2014, p. 55).
Installing monitoring devices such as cameras within the facility is fraught with risks. The risk does not lie within the framework of possible conflicts with the law; rather, it is that there is too little judicial precedent to proceed for possible risk mitigation. Nevertheless, there are principles in law that can help guiding possible legal precepts on the matter. One is that building administrators or operators are obliged to provide their patrons and staff a safe and secure environment; however, that duty can vary with regards to degree of responsibility. It is suggested that the cameras’ purposes and other monitoring devices on and at the exterior of the facility be declared to avoid confusion and other possible legal issues (Kirschenbau, 2007, p. 1).
Recommended policies and procedures
In summary, these security protocols must be promptly within the reach of the occupants of the building at any given time. Security personnel must also ensure those occupants the specific steps are and the reason why these protocols must be followed. Giving the reasons why these steps must be followed emphasizes the importance of the steps when exigencies will arise. Furthermore, the involvement of the occupants and the staff in ensuring the security will enlist their aid in safeguarding the overall security of the facility (Challinger, 2008, p. 20).
Other proposed measures can include, but is not limited to, the following:
-Enhance information deletion and discharging policies
-Restrict person-to-person exchanges aside from those that are unavoidable, and
-Standardize training and equipping policies for security personnel and practices.
References
Challinger, D. (2008). “From the ground up: security for tall buildings.” Retrieved 13 December 2014 from <http://www.popcenter.org/library/crisp/security-tall-buildings.pdf
Kirschenblau, K. (2007). “The legal side: liability for installed surveillance cameras.” Retrieved 13 December 2014 from <http://www.securityinfowatch.com/article/10546713/the-legal-side-liability-for-installed-surveillance-cameras
Layne, S.P (2014). Safeguarding cultural properties: security for museums, libraries, parks, and zoos. Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann
Magi, T.J (2006). “Protecting library patron confidentiality-checklist of best practices.” Retrieved 6 December 2014 from <http://www.ila.org/advocacy-files/pdf/Confidentiality_Best_Practices.pdf
San Luis, E (1994). Office and office building security. Houston: Gulf Publishing Company
Schneider Electric (2006) “Integration: the future of commercial office building security” Retrieved 6 December 2014 from <http://www.schneider-electric.com.ph/documents/buildings/office_building_security.pdf
Whole Building Design-National Institute of Building Sciences (2014) “Public library” Retrieved 9 December 2014 from <http://www.wbdg.org/design/public_library.php
