Criminal Law
The Speedy Trial Act has reference to the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution that ensures all criminal defendants the right to speedy and public trial (Campbell and Ohm, 2007, p. 146). In most cases, while there are some defendants who are given trials that they feel are altogether too speedy, the constitutional guarantee really serves 2 purposes. The first purpose is that speedy trial shall relieve the defendant of the pervasive consequences involved with being accused. In the event that the accused is subjected to imprisonment, the length of time that is spent in prison is considered as oppressive considering the loss of business and the personal anxiety that is felt by the accused. The second purpose is that speedy trial is to promote the interest of the community for the timely disposition of charges. The right to a speedy trial begins after the accused has been indicted, taken into custody and arrested. The right is to a speedy trial will be violated when the accused is arrested, even if the accused shall be subsequently released or not recalled for a substantial period of time (Campbell and Ohm, 2007). The speed in the disposition of the case shall be dependent on the judge who shall weigh in the conduct of the prosecution and the defendant, by taking into the additional factors such as delay, defendant’s declaration or denial of rights and the actual prejudice that is caused to the defendant. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 under the Federal Court, the trial should start within seventy (70) days from the date of filing of the information or indictment or from the exact date that the defendant shall appear before the court. However, there are some delays that are recognized under the law such as those that are caused by the pre-trial motions. In the case of Henderson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that Section 3161(h) (1) (F) shall not include as part of the delay the time that lapsed from the time the motion is filed and the ruling of the court upon the hearing on such motion, regardless of whether the delay during the conduct of the hearing was “reasonably indispensable”. The Speedy Trial Act does not include a period of 30 days, from the time the motion is under the court’s advisement. Some of the other delays that will not be included in the counting shall cover the delays which resulted from the unavailability of the accused or any of the indispensable witnesses. To summarize, the two of the federal time limitations are: 1.) The government should formally charge the accused or the defendant with a crime within 30 days from his or her arrest, and 2.) That the government should bring the case to court not less than 30 days or more than 70 days after the defendant had been charged of a crime.
In the case of speedy trials statute of Florida, the non-incarcerated defendant should go to trial within 120 days, and an incarcerated defendant has a shorter trial time limit which is 90 days (Campbell and Ohm, 2007). The procedural time limitation under the statute of Florida are not set in fixed time limits and are subjected to some exceptions of delay in the proceedings. One of which is that both the prosecutors and the defendants have agreed to such delay in the trial proceedings. In the event that the prosecutor shall deliberately cause the delay of the trial to his or her advantage, the speedy trial claim of the defendant is expected to prosper. One of the effects of the violation of the right to a speedy trial of the accused can result to the dismissal of the case. However, in the event that the delay is caused by the efforts of the accused, the accused shall be deemed to have waived his or her Constitutional right to a speedy trial (Campbell and Ohm, 2007).
In the case of Barker v. Wingo, the petitioner filed an action for the purpose of overturning his conviction for murder when it was only after sixteen continuances for the past five year that he was tried and convicted for such crime. The rationale of this case is that while there is a right to a speedy trial that is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is obligatory upon the defendant to assert that his right to the speedy trial had been compromised. The Supreme Court held that there is a four-factor balancing test for the determination if the right to a speedy trial had been denied. These four factors shall include: 1.) The length of the delay; 2.) The governmental reasons for delay; 3.) The responsibility of the defendant to assert his rights; and
4.) The prejudice that had been caused to the defendant (Smith, 2003, p. 156). In this case of Barker, the Supreme Court held that he court found that there was no prejudice that was caused to the defendant for his failure to invoke the right to a speedy trial and to object to the delays until such time that they actually took place. The court deemed that Barker was merely betting on his chances with regard to the result of the trial and he opted to wait for the delays. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in trial.
On the other hand, the case of Doggett v. United States the state prosecuted the petitioner Doggett for drug charges that lasted for a period of eight and one half years before he was finally indicted. The rationale behind the ruling of the High Court is that the unreasonable delay between the indictment and prosecution is considered as a violation of the defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. In this given case, Doggett was indicted in 1980 for drug offenses but was not brought to trial until 1988 caused by the government’s inaction or lack of diligence to track down the accused. The accused was charged to conspiracy to import and distribute cocaine. When the government agents were about to arrest him in his residence, they discovered that Doggett was in Colombia. After almost two years, the agents learned that transferred to Panama; and a year later he was able to reside in Virginia (Aspen Case Notes, 2005). It was only after six years that the government was able to arrest and prosecute the accused. The accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking the violation of his right to a speedy trial. The trial court denied his motion and Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. The issue in this case is whether or not the eight and a half year delay between the indictment and prosecution raised the presumption of prejudice to the defendant’s right to a speedy trial if the delay was due to the negligence of the government. The Supreme Court held that the delay between the indictment and the prosecution on the part of Doggett was considered as excessive. The negligence of the government to track him down for a period of 8.5 years before his indicting and prosecuting is prejudicial on the part of the accused. The Sixth Amendment has guaranteed that every accused is entitled to a speedy trial in all criminal proceedings. The precedent has shown that there are critical factors that have to be considered are: the length of the delay; the governmental reasons for delay; the responsibility of the defendant to assert his rights; and the prejudice that had been caused to the defendant (Aspen Case Notes, 2005). In the present case of Doggett, the delay of more than 8 years between indictment and arrest was uncommonly lengthy delay. The argument of the government that they used due diligence to locate the defendant is contrary to evidence. The government had to wait for six long years to make serious efforts to find him before he was indicted and arrested. There was no evidence to prove that the accused was aware of his indictment making it impossible for him to invoke his right to speedy trial prior to his arrest. Hence, the final factor is the prejudice that the accused suffered because of the delay on the part of the government. The unreasonable delay on the part of the government has established the presumption of prejudice. Such presumption of prejudice and the negligence on the part of the government which caused the delay is substantial enough to show that the right of the accused to speedy trial has been violated (Aspen Case Notes, 2005).
The difference between the case of Barker v. Wingo and Doggett v. U.S. is that in first case of Barker, the Supreme Court held that he court found that there was no prejudice since it was because of his own doing that he failed to invoke the right to a speedy trial before he objected to the delays that occurred in his case. The court deemed that Barker opted to wait for the delays and waited for the final determination of the case. Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay in trial since he is deemed to have waived his right to a speedy trial (Campbell and Ohm, 2007). On the other hand, in the case of Doggett, the Supreme Court held that the accused was entitled to invoke the right to speedy trial because he was prejudiced by the unreasonable delay on the part of the government before he was charged and arrested.
References
Aspen Publishers (2005). Casenote Legal Briefs: Keyed to Weaver, Abramson, Bacigal, Burkoff,
Hancock and Lively’s Criminal Procedure. New York: Aspen Publishers.
Barker v. Wingo 407 U.S. 514, (1972).
Campbell, A. and Ohm, R.C. (2007). Legal Ease: A Guide to Criminal Law, Evidence, and
Procedure. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher.
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, (1992).
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 330, (1986).
Herman, S.N. (2005). The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial: A Reference Guide to the United
States Constitution. California: Greenwood Publishing.
Smith, C.E. (2003). Courts and Trials: A Reference Handbook. California: ABC-CLIO.
