Admissibility of the statement made by Martin to Justice
One of the rights protected under the Fifth Amendment is the right against self incrimination or the right to remain silent (Fireside, 1998). Essentially, the right protects a person from either being compelled to make an incriminating statement, or the same statement being used against the person. Accordingly, a statement obtained from a suspect in violation of this right is not admissible in court, and may be suppressed.
However, a statement made voluntarily without any coercion is not protected under the amendment, regardless of how incriminating or ruinous it may be. This was established in United States v. Washington. The court further stated that the Miranda warning was not necessary to a statement made when the suspect is not being interrogated. Interrogation was defined in as questioning initiated by a law enforcement officer. Additionally, the court in United States v. Monia stated that any person desiring the protection against self incrimination must claim it; otherwise any ensuing statement will not be regarded as compelled.
Accordingly, Martin’s statement to officer Justice in relation to ownership of the firearm is admissible and cannot be suppressed. It was made voluntarily, with no iota of compulsion. Additionally, a Miranda warning was not necessary as the statement was made in response to a statement, not a question. Therefore it is safe to say that the statement was made outside the purview of custodial interrogation. Furthermore, the preceding statement by officer justice was more of a dialogue initiator, to which Martin was not under an obligation to respond to. Accordingly, and as held in Rhode Island v. Innis, such is not an interrogation.
The statement also made to detective Quickdraw as regards ownership of the firearm is also admissible. This is because it was made voluntarily and not in custodial interrogation. No question had been asked to elicit the response thus it was made outside interrogation. Additionally, the injection by Martin can be regarded as a waiver of the right against self incrimination. The import of the interjection is that Martin knew her rights and the consequences of the waiver. This further lends credence to the fact that the statement was made voluntarily and ought to be admitted.
Another statement that is admissible is the statement relating to selling the heroine. Though the statement was made in custody, it nevertheless was not a result of custodial interrogation. No question had been asked, and Martin was under no obligation to make the statement. Accordingly, the statement was made voluntarily and without a breach of the right against self incrimination. It is thus admissible at trial.
Statement made to Officer Justice, “In my bedroom!”
In Miranda v. Arizona, the court stated that a statement made by a suspect during custodial interrogation is generally inadmissible, unless it is shown that procedural safeguards were utilized to protect the right against self incrimination. Examples of these procedural safeguards are the Miranda warning and the right to counsel, under the Sixth amendment. Additionally, any requisite processes must be adhered to pursuant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth amendment.
Consequently, this statement made to office Justice is not admissible and should be suppressed. This is because it was made in respond to a question. The question marked the beginning of a custodial interrogation, as defined in Miranda (supra). Therefore, officer Justice should have informed Martin of the Miranda warning either before questioning her or before Martin gave her response. Without such procedural safeguards, the confession by Martin was obtained in violation of the right against self incrimination, thus its admission at trial would be unconstitutional.
Constitutional rights Detective Quickdraw should inform Martin
The Miranda warning contains the substance of the rights that an accused person should be informed of. These rights are: one, the right against self incrimination. Essentially, Detective Quickdraw should inform Martin that she has the right to remain silent, and that anything she says may be used against her in a court of law. This captures the substance of the Fifth Amendment on the right to remain silent.
Secondly, he should tell her that she has the right to an attorney, and if she cannot afford one will be appointed on her behalf by the state, and that she has the right to have the attorney present during the interrogation. This captures the right to counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment. Thirdly, detective Quickdraw should inform Martin of the consequences of waiving these rights.
Statements made in the interview room
Generally, self incriminatory statements made without a violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments are admissible. It is needless to say any statement obtained in violation of these provisions is not admissible. In this regard, the statements made in the interview room that are admissible are the statements made as to the ownership of the firearm. The reasons for the admissibility have been discussed in the foregoing.
The admissibility of the other statements is affected by the fact that they were made after Martin had invoked a critical right, the right to counsel. In Escobedo v. Illinois, the court ruled that an accused person should not be questioned further once they ask for an attorney. The court further stated that any ensuing confession would be inadmissible (Ramen, 2001). This was also affirmed in Miranda (supra), with the court stating that an interrogation that subsists after the invocation of the right to counsel would be illegal. Accordingly, the questioning in the interview room should have stopped once Martin asked for a lawyer. The failure to stop the questioning at that point renders the proceeding statements inadmissible.
References
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)
Fireside, H. (1998). The Fifth Amendment: The Right to Remain Silent. New Jersey: Enslow
Publishers, Inc. Print.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)
Ramen, F. (2001). The Rights of the Accused (1st ed). New York: Rosen Publishing Group, Inc.
Print.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980)
United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943)
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977)
