1.
While this statement by Kydd and Walter (80) may be true to some extent, it does not hold for all democracies across the globe. For example, the United States has a long standing and unwavering policy that “we don’t negotiate with terrorists” hence whatever the costs of terrorism and the war against terror, some democracies will risk everything to win the fight. However, at the same time, this statement represents the current reality that is gaining ground or momentum in most democracies including the US, to the effect that winning the fight against terrorism requires more than mere military retaliation, but rather a concession with the countries and leaders believed to be funding or harboring the terror organizations.
2.
Yes, I agree with Pape’s statement that our prior understanding of the fanatical nature of the specific terrorists should influence our understanding of how terrorists assess the effectiveness of suicide terrorism (351). This is because, by understanding the fanaticism behind any suicide terrorism, we can easily determine what really motivates such acts and then act on the real causes or reasons for suicide terrorism. Further, Pape states elsewhere in his work, the main purpose of terrorism is coercion (350) and hence knowing in advance what motivates the suicide bomber such as religious fanaticism will have an influence on our understanding of how terrorists assess whether or not their acts are effective depending on the value likely to be derived from such acts.
3.
No, I don’t believe that citizen rights and foreign intelligence tradeoff can be assured by judicial review. This because the judiciary alone cannot be effective in ensuring people’s rights and at the same time providing foreign intelligence given that its role is limited to interpretation of laws.
4.
Yes, I believe there is a conflict between international human rights law and effectively prosecuting terrorists. This is because most international human rights instruments that bind states such as the Torture Convention define torture so broadly that it tends to protect terrorists from interrogation and prosecution. For instance, article 25 of the Torture Convention is inappropriate in so far as it broadly defines those protected against torture, possibly including terror suspects. Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is inappropriate when dealing with terrorists since it requires that no one be subjected to torture or cruel inhuman and degrading treatment. The inappropriateness of this provision lies in the fact that terrorists themselves subject innocent victims to torture, cruel and inhuman treatment while human rights law seems to justify their acts and afford them protection.
5.
No, I don’t think terrorism should be defined through legislative prescription but instead through judicial development. This is because it may not be easy to arrive at a universal definition of terrorism given the multifaceted or complex nature of terrorist organizations. Moreover, legislative definition would mean that some jurisdictions or states will apply less standards as compared to others thus frustrating global efforts to fight terrorism. As Lutz and Lutz point out, the existence of several definitions of terrorism already shows how difficult it is to arrive at a conclusive common definition of terrorism (6).
Works Cited
Kydd, Andrew H and Barbara F Walter. "The strategies of terrorism." International Security Journal 31.1 (2006): 49-80. Print.
Lutz, James M and Brenda J Lutz. "Definitions, classifications and causes." Lutz, ames M and Brenda J Lutz. Terrorism: Origins and evolutions. Gordinsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 6-27.
Pape, Robert A. "The strategic logic of suicide terrorism." The American Political Science Review 97.3 (2003): 343-361. Web. 20 May 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3117613>.
