Intelligence Community
In the weeks and the months following the 9/11 attacks the press evokes a huge failure of intelligence. Experts and Veterans of Special Services were asked to provide explanations, and often drive the point: "You cannot imagine how this goes wrong, - said Bob Baer - , a former CIA officer. The White House was saved when Flight 93 one that crashed in Pennsylvania! And that's why you pay thirty billion dollars? This has resulted in the largest series of surveys since the mid-1970s. The largest was conducted by the National Commission on the 11 September. Supported by the powerful association of the families of victims of the attacks, the commission has acquired a remarkable influence. As soon published its investigation report became a bestseller. It included a long series of recommendations to reform the intelligence and US security apparatus. They were approved in their entirety by President Bush and most members - regardless of political divisions. If its bankruptcy seems obvious, the division of responsibilities is much less clear. For the analysis of the attacks indicated that several agencies had pieces of a puzzle wrong or not assembled. The CIA and the FBI have thus thrown the stone, as policymakers in the Bush and Clinton administrations. The strong consensus that has emerged is that September 11 was a national failure. To different extent all intelligence agencies found themselves involved. For instance CIA and its fieldworkers, who regained favor with Americans because they were seen as the only ones capable of neutralizing other threats. September 11 thus had the effect of tipping the balance between the technical and human intelligence in favor of the second. A peak was reached in 2004 when 134,000 people were turned candidates for 200 vacancies. The September 11 attacks also revealed the limits of an anti-terrorist response essentially judicial. "It's as if we had asked the special agents to go to Tokyo and stop the Emperor after the attack on Pearl Harbor," said one of them before Congress Benjamin D. and S. Simon, the Age of Sacred Terror the powers of the services has been improved, but they were also asked to work hand in hand. Because large quantities of fragmented information should be cut in order to have a chance to stop a terrorist network with international vocation before it goes into action. They must be shared between the different actors of the fight against terrorism, many incidentally: the intelligence services, of course, but also the police at the local and national, airports, port areas, guards borders, coast guard, customs, immigration, etc. In summary, this is not the rule of "need to know" that bonus - partition information to ensure confidentiality - but the "need to share", brought up to date and adapted to the nature of new threats (Badey, 89).
The reforms undertaken after the attacks thus aim to bring down a strict division of tasks established in 1947 with reinforcement of new institutions and new laws such as the Patriot Act. The latter example eased restrictions on the FBI to monitor suspected terrorists or foreign agents. This measure is part of a broader framework to expand the Bureau intelligence capabilities. But, despite these reforms and the growing number of foreign officials under his control (about 200, according to the latest estimates), the FBI "is acculturates" hardly practical intelligence. It will never become the kind of domestic security service (like the British MI-5) some of which called for the establishment in the aftermath of 11 September. Especially in this time when the army is deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, several concessions have been granted to the military, through the influence of politicians wishing to preserve the old balance of power, including the Secretary of Defense. Anticipating a wave of reforms, Donald Rumsfeld has also established in 2003 Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence in order to defend the best interests of the Pentagon. This is a kind of "Military Intelligence Directorate," since all Pentagon intelligence agencies subordinate to it. The traditional aversion of Americans to the centralization of power has played for the DNI is not the all powerful leader recommended by the National Commission on the 11 September.
The DNI will indeed a say in the appointment of heads of the various services. It will control the budget and identify priorities for civilian agencies, but the Pentagon will have the last word as regards the allocation of staff and budget of military intelligence - a good half of the tens of billions of dollars awarded annually to intelligence. Thus, the major problem of the law on intelligence reform is that it assigns considerable responsibility to the Director of National Intelligence, without the authority and related authorities. It does not explicitly specify what the DNI can and cannot do, and leaves a margin wide enough man to work for different agencies did not comply with its guidelines. It was a six-point program aimed at further promoting integration and collaboration within the community: creating a "culture of collaboration"; develop information sharing; encourage the transformation of analysis and collection activities; regain the initiative and excellence in technology; modernize relations with the private sector; and finally clarify the authority of the DNI. The United States are experimenting with solutions which inspired many countries face - all things being equal - the same threats. But he is not about to break a system criticized as too rigid to build another. "The main difficulty, as pointed McConnell, rightly, is to find the right balance between centralized direction and decentralized execution, so that the office of the Director of National Intelligence does not become a mere bureaucracy placed on top of existing structures Foreign Affairs, 86/4, July-August 2007"(Badey, 103).
Possible respond to terrorist threat by Intelligence Community
This is the problem left to the new administration and especially the new DNI from political alternation. For intelligence policy, President Obama quickly distanced himself from the "mistakes" of the Bush administration, such as the use of intelligence for political purposes and the conditions of detention of prisoners and other "enemy combatants". During a speech accompanying the appointment of the new DNI and the new CIA director in January 2009, Obama has said that under his administration, the United States will not be practicing torture. It certainly reminded how it was "difficult to overstate the importance of intelligence for the XXI century. “Good intelligence is not a luxury but a necessity. We can rest on the successes and good reforms conducted in recent years." But the president added that "here in Washington, we also learned hard lessons. We learned that to make pragmatic policy choices, we will build on the current estimates solely on facts, not on information corroborating any ideological project Speech 9 January 2009 (Bray, 234).
Allocation of Functions inside Intelligence Community
The new DNI boss, Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, and the new CIA director, Leon Panetta, have notably been chosen because they were in any way associated with the most controversial practices and the choices of the outgoing administration in intelligence. Former commander of US forces in the Pacific, Blair has no particular and personal ties with Obama, but he advised the latter on several occasions when he was senator from Illinois. It is on these occasions that Obama has acknowledged and appreciated Blair's views to strengthen and streamline the US intelligence community. In the Navy, where he became familiar with business intelligence, Blair is actually regarded as a thinker, an excellent strategist and a charismatic leader. Since the CIA, he also coordinated the military and intelligence operations during the Clinton administration. Former congressman and secretary general of the White House under Bill Clinton, Leon Panetta has not, however, a very limited experience and knowledge of the information. To channel and discipline the CIA, Obama has preferred the services of a good manager and a loyal politician to those of a seasoned professional, but close to his compromise in one way or another in the controversies of past. Indeed, the question of the authority of the DNI and his ability to lead the intelligence community is still pending. February 5, 2009, at a hearing in Congress before the confirmation of Panetta, Senator Carl Levin asked if it would work under the supervision of the DNI. Not satisfied, obviously, to be asking such a question, Panetta still answered in the affirmative. Adding that the CIA was "operational arm", while the mission of the Admiral Blair was "to coordinate the activities" of the NSA, NRO and other agencies (Bray, 242).
Global WMD proliferation as threat to the US national security and responses to it
Three major difficulties weaken the non-proliferation regime of WND, foremost nuclear weapons: first, the increasingly porous border between civil and military nuclear technology; secondly, the declaratory nature of the monitoring process and the non-real definition of "evidence" of any shortcomings. Finally, the possibility for some NNWS bound by the Treaty to continue to maneuver to reach the "threshold" nuclear or beyond, throughout a signature sequence-ratification-application that can drag on (Müller, 61). "The author concludes by quoting blackheads always topical:" Main downside to identify: Atomic rise of enemy brothers of South Asia, India and Pakistan became nuclear powers respectively military in 1974 in 1985 - and have not signed the NPT. The case of Iran seems clear: countries that signed the treaty, would violate its commitments apparently seeking the weapon; safeguards, no more China than Russia can have any effective influence on the choice of this country. North Korea, meanwhile, offers the review also a serious case, since unlike Iran, she withdrew from the treaty in 2003. On the other hand, his progress, although late, were long enjoyed a certain benevolence on the part of China.
A second category of countries with atomic weapons as some of Israel have not signed the NPT and detain hundreds of bombs. This is also the case of India and Pakistan who develop without problems both civilian nuclear power but also military nuclear. A third class consists of countries mastering civilian nuclear power but have not developed military technology although they can quickly make is the case of Germany and Japan. We also have those who in theory of civilian nuclear reactors, (Spain, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Belgium) and former Eastern countries suspected of not being sufficiently vigilant in monitoring uranium and their risk of being "stolen" by Islamic terrorists (Kreps, 146).
We finally plague two countries first that North Korea would have the atomic bomb, nuclear reactors and which aims to launch a rocket with satellite on April 12 the day of the centenary of Kim Il-sung's father Korean communism. North Korea will not abandon "never" the right to launch "peaceful satellite, so they can see with their own eyes the peaceful nature of our satellite launch." Then Iran which painfully has been able to walk, despite all impediments, the Buscheer Central and wants to enrich its own uranium, which wants banned Western countries and Israel.
Iran does not stop declaring that its program is peaceful. Just a few weeks we thought we were on the verge of an attack from Israel who, with US help, think punish Iran in the bombing. Moreover, it seems that almost two-thirds of Israeli Jews believe that an attack against Iran would be less dangerous than leaving the Islamic Republic to acquire nuclear weapons. (Müller, 62). Meir Dagan, former head of Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, said he was opposed to the time of the strikes against Iranian nuclear sites, in an interview on US television. "Attacking Iran before thinking to all other approaches is not sustainable," said M.Dagan in extracts of an interview with CBS and to be broadcast in full on Sunday. Barack Obama "has made it clear that the military option is possible and he would not allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and experience I trust the American president," yet entrusted Meir Dagan. US President Barack Obama said that the security of the world depended on actions agreed between the US Intelligence Community (Kreps, 151). "The security of the world depends on the actions we take" here, Mr. Obama said, "much had been achieved" since the inaugural summit in Washington in 2010, citing the strengthening of security at nuclear sites and elimination or making safe of dangerous materials. Countries shall be called upon to do more often used his services, to comply with its regulatory frameworks and to increase financial contributions they pay him. As announced before the opening of the summit, issues of the North Korean and Iranian nuclear were not discussed in plenary, but only in bilateral exchanges.
Works cited:
Badey, T.J. "Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-Based Threat Assessment". Intelligence and National Security 16.2 (2001): 39-54. Web.
Bray, David A. "Collective Intelligence And Knowledge Ecosystems: The Future Of The U.S. Intelligence Community". SSRN Electronic Journal n. pag. Web.
Kreps, Sarah E. "Shifting Currents: Changes In National Intelligence Estimates On The Iran Nuclear Threat". Intelligence and National Security 23.5 (2008): 608-628. Web.
Müller, Harald. "Viewpoint: Neither Hype Nor Complacency: WMD Proliferation After The Cold War". The Nonproliferation Review 4.2 (1997): 62-71. Web.
