One of the most common characteristics of human societies is that they have established a distinct separation between what is good and what is bad. Nevertheless, throughout the different cultures, people have come to various conclusions as to what these entail. It is then logical to ask for the basis of morality, the main issue at stake in one of Plato’s great dialogues, Euthyphro. The two people that interact are Socrates and the eponymous character, the latter of which claims to know about morality. Nevertheless, by employing his maieutic, Socrates leads Euthyphro to make two arguments, neither of which he is able to solidly uphold. The first definition that Euthyphro proposes is that the definition of good is that which is loved by the gods. They then discard this, as their polytheistic system may lead the gods to have differences. After, he states that what is holy is that which is loved by all of the gods. This would mean that these deities are the basis of morality, all loving something it is holy. Nevertheless, this obviously does not lead to an essential definition of goodness as Socrates was asking for. It is only through the introduction on the part of another concept, justice, that it seems to start to be established as something different than the gods. However, this would really also be unacceptable because it only transfers the problem to another word, which one would also have to define in an essential way, away from the gods. It is only through its location in language with respect to other concepts that one may understand what it means. Plato’s Euthyphro evidences that one enters a paradoxical structure when one attempts to base one’s morality on another being, so it must be placed in a system with other societal constructs.
Pleasure and Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics
Deciding how to lead one’s life has always been the subject for much philosophical discussion. One can see that pleasure is one of the topics that most interested the great philosopher Aristotle, as he dedicated two lengthy sections to its discussion. As such, he proposes that pleasure is not equal to good, but an aggregate value that would be implied in eudaimonia. Even though he attempts to rigorously consider and negate other points of view, there are some flaws in his theory. Therefore, even though Aristotle proposes that pleasure would be an aggregate good to a well-lived life, this means that there would be a proper way to lead one’s life and that this would mean not seeking pleasure, which can be readily questioned.
For Aristotle, the main problem regarding pleasure was its relationship to happiness. According to him, pleasure would be the “activity of the natural state” (123), not necessarily being perceptible or unimpeded. In this sense, it was obviously linked to happiness or flourishing. Nevertheless, the issue of whether one should equate it to happiness or, if not, how much importance pleasure with have with regards to happiness would be up for discussion.
As one can see, there are two standard opposing views regarding pleasure. As both excellence and tendency are oriented towards pleasure, some, like Eudoxus, believe it to be the greatest good (Aristotle 164). As all things sought to avoid pain, it was seen as something negative, an object that would never be chosen. On the other hand, Plato believed that good and pleasure should be separated because the good life is lived philosophically. According to Aristotle, Plato “argues that the pleasant life is more desirable with wisdom that without, and if that if the mixture is better, pleasure is not the good” (164). Being his master, Aristotle largely agreed with Plato, yet had a more concrete point of view.
Logically, there are many claims that Aristotle has to attack employing solid ground. The chief of these would be hedonism, the belief that pleasure and happiness were the same. He contradicts this by saying that there are different types of pleasure, yet eudaimonia is only one, meaning that they would not be the same. He also argues against taking happiness to be a mere process, as the end result is often different than the process itself.
As one can see, pleasure is not the chief good to eudaimonia. For him, what one should lead one’s life according to is virtue and reason. Reason would be more important than the senses, showing both the orientation of his ethics and the importance of thinking in this sense. However, it is important to note that pleasure is considered a good; it is something that one would expect from eudaimonia, as everybody would prefer pleasure over pain.
Nevertheless, pleasure in itself is not good because the former is broader than the latter. For him, virtuous people were wont to experience more pleasure than others if they had enough resources to perform those activities that were excellent. In this manner, for Aristotle, the highest good would be a type of pleasure, yet not all of it. Particularly, it would be that which is experienced by the gods, who constantly enjoy intellectual activities. One would not seek virtuous activity for pleasure, but arrives at the latter by leading life according to the former.
Pleasure is related to eudaimonia in that the former is a necessary component of the latter. According to Aristotle, the only way to be truly happy is to include pleasure in one’s life. Nevertheless, it would really be the result of leading a good life. In that sense, one could think of it as the cherry on top of eudaimonia, completing it; pleasure is a bonus that people have when they lead a happy life, yet is not happiness in and of itself.
As one can see, Aristotle constantly strives to take into consideration different sides of the issue at hand. He first lays them all out, giving various pieces of evidence and arguments for each of them. In fact, he dedicates the whole of chapter 11 in book VII to this (121-122). While this may only be an outline of a presentation for all of the different sides, it is important to note that he, at this point gives them equal footing as his. In fact, sometimes it is difficult to determine what his positions is, because of the amount of time he allots to these other conceptions.
In my opinion, he does take the other perspectives into account as well and fair as possible. However, as would be expected, he sometimes twists logic to his advantage, stating his premises as if they were evident fact. Thus, he does his own arguments a disservice by not giving them fair treatment. As such, his arguments do not become valid, sound and undeniable, but a bit forced.
As such, I am not convinced by Aristotle’s arguments, even though I do find them compelling. For example, I find there to be gaping holes in the theory, some of which he was even aware of. “But whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life is a question we may dismiss for the present” (Aristotle 169). Nevertheless, one could believe this to be the crux of the problem. By not completely working towards understanding the problem at hand, Aristotle fails to take into account an important aspect of the relationship between pleasure and good.
As a whole, I do not agree with Aristotle’s, because he seeks to determine only one way to live one’s life, and I believe that there are many. For example, he constantly says that everybody strives towards pleasure, something that can evidently be disputed with such commonplace phenomena as women returning to the husband that beats them. He also believes that “Some things are pleasant by nature” (Aristotle 113), which may also be disputed, as not everybody finds pleasure in the same things.
In conclusion, Aristotle believes that pleasure is an added value to happiness, yet proposes a theory that does not take other people into account. He believes that pleasure is a good, but not the good; by working towards reason and virtue, one would reach eudaimonia. He takes into account many theories other than his own in a fair manner, yet allows his to make a leap of faith into his own conclusions. In general, I disagree with him as he attempts to universalize humans, without taking their particularities into account.
Works Cited
Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Trans. W. D. Ross. Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999. PDF. <http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/aristotle/Ethics.pdf>.
