Section 1 - "An Analysis of the Battle of Goose Green"
The history of past battles is often studied and analyzed for a variety of reasons. However, in most cases, it is failures rather than the successes that are being analyzed whenever military history is studied. Close affairs are quite common in a majority of battles; either side could have been victorious. In many of these battles, it is not the things done right by the winner that decide the final result, but the things done wrong by the ruler. The Battle of Goose Green between Great Britain and Argentina during the Falklands War was one such battle. Even though the Argentineans successfully invaded the Falkland Islands, but a majority of the subsequent operations did not go well for them. On the other hand, the nearest base of the British was merely thousands of miles away from the islands. Yet, they managed to ascend an amphibious landing at San Carlos that was unopposed, win all land engagements, and reign supreme in the air throughout the campaign. The Argentineans were successful to some extent, for instance, they sunk at least 6 British ships, but as a result, the Argentina Air Force and Argentina Naval Aviation lost a lot of aircrafts and pilots (Hastings & Jenkins, 1984).
Based on military doctrine that is well-known and the troops that were available at the time, the fact that Argentina lost so easily does not seem to add up, and this is what makes the Battle of Goose Green so intriguing. From an exclusively military outlook, it was inevitable that the British would eventually be victorious, however, the fact that they literally walked over the Argentineans should not have happened. Moreover, the British public would never have been willing to pay considerable cost in human lives, without which the British could not have been victorious, so it seems and might be possible that the victory of the British victory was negotiated. However, considering the fact that operational and tactical failures were constantly emerging, the chances of success of such a strategy seem faint. The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the events leading to the May 1982 Battle of Goose Green fought between Argentine and Britain, the battle itself, and its results. The following Battle Analysis will also answer the question: Was the victory of the victory of the British forces in Battle of Goose Green in May 1982 imminent and inevitable? This Battle Analysis paper will analyze the battle in terms of the point in the Falklands War that at which it was fought.
Literature Review
The purpose of this section is to collectively analyze and evaluate the sources used for this paper.
Adkin, M. (2007). Goose Green: A Battle Is Fought To Be Won. Phoenix.
Review: One of the most detailed and legible book about the Falklands War, especially the Battle of Goose Green. The book is succinct yet very informative. The book makes it easier to comprehend the politics of the controversial and a bit hard to follow battle. The book is an honest account on the conflict, and the accompanying maps and sketches make the book even more interesting.
Banks, T. (2012, Mar 2). A Very Dirty War: British Soldiers Shot Dead By Enemy Troops Waving The White Flag And Argentinian Prisoners Bayoneted In Cold Blood. An Ex-Para Tells Of The Horrors Of The Falklands. Retrieved from http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2109429/A-dirty-war-British-soldiers-shot-dead-enemy-troops-waving-white-flag-Argentinian-prisoners-bayoneted-cold-blood-An-ex-Para-tells-horrors-Falklands.html
Review: When writing about the Battle of Goose Green, knowing about the horrors of the war is very important, and what makes this article a reliable source for this battle analysis is that it presents the personal perspective of an ex-Para from the British 2 Para Regiment that fought in the battle.
Clapp, M., & Southby-Tailyour, E. (2007). Amphibious assault Falklands: The battle of San Carlos Water. Pen & Sword Books.
Review: Commodore Mike Clapp, the author of this book, was Commodore Amphibious Warfare during the Falklands War. A source material for the analysis of the Battle of Goose Green does not get as credible as this. Michael Clapp played an integral role in Britain’s success in the Falklands War, and in this personal account, he especially writes about the amphibious operations in the war and the battle.
Costa, E. J. (1988). Guerra Bajo La Cruz Del Sur. Hyspamérica.
Review: This book in Spanish with a title that translates to “War Under the Southern Cross” provides great and valuable insight into the Battle of Goose Green from the perspective of the Argentinean military force, especially their battle strategies and tactics.
Falklands war: The First Day, 2 April 1982. (2002, Apr 2). Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1899334.stm
Review: This BBC news article provides a very detailed timeline in terms of the occurrences that took place with each passing hour on the first day of the Falklands War, making in a reliable source to understand the origin of the Battle of Goose Green.
General leopoldo galtieri argentine dictator who ordered the invasion of the falkland islands to distract. (n.d.). Retrieved from http://www.soaw.org/soaw/index.php?view=article&catid=6&id=1924&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=64
Review: Reading this article is enough to understand precisely why General Leopoldo Galtieri refused to remove the Argentine military from the Falklands Islands even though there was a possibility of settlement, and the war could have been avoided.
Gilbert, D. (2013, Jan 4). Argentina Presses Claim To Falkland Islands, Accusing Uk Of Colonialism. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/europe/argentina-falklands-letter
Review: This fairly recent article on CNN.com is a useful material for writing the concluding paragraphs of this battle analysis since we get hints of the impact of the war and the battle, and realize the fact that the Falklands conflict is still going on.
Haines, S. (2012, May 28). Falklands Anniversary: Memories Of Battle Of Goose Green. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-18226155
Review: Another recent article, merely a year old, and again we get some personal insight from a soldier who was fighting on the British side. It seems he has quite an interesting perspective of the war, calling it an “amazing adventure” yet “stupid.”
Hastings, M., & Jenkins, S. (1984). The Battle for the Falklands. W. W. Norton & Company.
Review: This is yet another important book on the Falklands War. Of course, the book is from the British perspective; however, the perspective of the authors is comprehensive. While praising the victory of the British, they do not shy out of point out their flaws.
Middlebrook, M. (2001). The Falklands war, 1982 (penguin classic military history). (Revised ed.). Penguin Classics.
Review: Middlebrook is a prominent historian. This is a credible and reliable account of the Falklands War because of the research that Middlebrook put into writing this book. The great thing about this specific book is that he presents perfectives of the British and the Argentineans.
Neild, B., & Gilbert, D. (2013, Jan 3). What Lies Behind Renewed Tensions Over The Falkland Islands?. Retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2013/01/03/world/falklands-argentina-background
Review: Another very recent article from CNN that again that reveals that the conflict regarding the sovereignty of the Falklands Islands because of which the war was fought still continues.
Thompson, J. (2001). No picnic. Cassell.
Review: The Falklands War was a controversial and peculiar war. This book, with an interesting title, is quite interesting itself, and interestingly, it presents very solid personal observations, making them seem more like expert observations.
Wilsey, J. (2003). H. Jones Vc: The Life And Death Of An Unusual Hero. (1st ed.). Arrow Books Ltd.
Review: The Battle of Goose Green, and more specifically, the participation of H Jones VC, in the battle, is the third topic covered in this book. However, this final material is particular important since it tells us about the role of the man who was commanding the British troops and lost his life during the battle.
Section 2 - "Events Leading to the Battle of Goose Green and the Argentine-Britain Strategic Situation Prior to the Battle"
The Conflict between Argentine and Britain over the Falklands Islands
(2) Argentina and Britain had been in conflict with each other regarding the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, which are also called the “Islas Malvinas” (Gilbert, 2013), for more than 150 years. The truth is that Argentina had tried to diplomatically regain the islands. However, diplomatic effort failed because of the growing economic and social pressures on General Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government, and so Argentina decided to forcefully occupy the islands so that the Argentinean public back at home would support them ("General Leopoldo Galtieri"). Since Argentina was experiencing persistent economic troubles when it invaded the Falkland Islands, and it can be argued that the invasion could have been a distraction. However, the British remain steadfast on their point of view that the Argentine military violated international law and thus, Britain took the military route.
However, the Argentineans state a different reason as to why the Malvinas (Falklands) War started and why the Battle of Goose Green was fought. According to the Argentine junta, the Falkland Islands simply did not belong to the British; they used their military might, particularly their navy, during the days of the British Empire, to occupy the islands. Not only the Argentine government, but even the people in Argentina held the argument that the Argentine mainland was just 200 miles away from the islands, therefore, the Falklands Islands belonged Argentina because it was the nearest country. Nonetheless, from the Argentine viewpoint, the Falklands Islands were logically never British territory and Britain managed to occupy the islands simply because of its imperial might.
The fierce and savage Battle of Goose Green that lasted for two days, from 28th to 29th May, 1982 was the first major land battle of the Falklands War (Haines, 2012). Even though the settlement of Goose Green in the Falkland Islands had no economic or strategic value at the time, the Argentinean military force had occupied the Falkland Islands. Under international law, this was a gross violation. Although Al Haig, the American Secretary of State at the time tried to intervene on a diplomatic level; General Galtieri, the leader of the Argentine military junta refused to remove the Argentine military troops off British territory. That was when the British decided to respond and this is what led to the Battle of Goose Greens. At least that is how the British explain that the war and this particular battle started – the Goose Greens settlement and the rest of the Falklands Island had been illegally occupied by the Argentine military and the Argentine government refused to remove them.
The Argentine-Britain Military Force and Weapons Used During the Battle of Falklands
The British military force was under the command of Brigadier Julian Thompson and Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert ‘H’ Jones. Under their command they had the whole of Jones’s 2 Battalion, Parachute Regiment (2 Para), which gave them more than 600 and approximately up to 700 soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, who lost his life in the battle, was a veteran and had toured Northern Ireland several times in the past. Lieutenant-Colonel Jones’s style of command was to set an example for his men by leading them from the front, encouraging and inspiring them in the process. Britain’s initial strategy was to seek a cease-fire and implement a settlement that would result in the complete withdrawal of the Argentine military force from the Falklands Islands. However, after Argentine’s refusal to withdraw, Britain willingly decided to use force, and this is how Lieutenant-Colonel Jones along with his battalion attacked the Argentine military force.
On the Argentinean side, Argentine’s Task Force Mercedes was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ítalo Ángel Piaggi. The task force included soldiers from Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi’s 12th Infantry Regiment, and portions of several other Companies from other Regiments. This gave him command over approximately more than 1200 soldiers in total, and a military that was two-third larger than that British military force. To this day, Argentine believes that the Falklands Islands should be a part of Argentine, and during the war, the Argentine’s strategy was to simply occupy the islands, meet the anticipated attacks from the British, and hopefully be victorious. However, since Argentine was defeated, Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi was blamed and criticized for the defeat, and was even dishonorably discharged from the army.
Even though the Battle of Goose Green was fought in relatively modern times, a variety of conventional weapons were used by both the Argentine and British military forces. Each solider from the British military force was equipped with the L9A1 Browning 9 mm semi-automatic handgun while the Argentine military force was equipped with different types of handguns. The British soldiers were also equipped with semi and fully-automatic machine guns and rifles, such as the L1A1 SLR, L14A1 Carl Gustav recoilless rifle, L42A1 sniper rifles, Rocket 66 mm HEAT L1A1 rocket launchers, L2-A2 fragmentation grenades, mortar guns and other infantry weapons. The Argentine soldiers were using a variety of submachine guns, especially the PAM-1 and PAM-2 La Engrasadora, automatic rifles, such as the 90 mm Recoilless Rifle, and a variety of mines that had been set up during the battle. Additionally, 105 mm artillery, aircrafts, anti-aircraft guns, anti-ship missiles, ships, and surface to air missiles were also used in the battle.
Section 3 - "What Happened During The Battle of Goose Green"
Within days after the invasion of Falklands Islands on 2 April, 1982 ("Falklands war: The," 2002), Britain had sent a task force to the South Atlantic across the ocean to remove the Argentineans using military force and to reoccupy the islands. On 21st May, the British 3 Commando Brigade successfully landed at San Carlos without facing any opposition from the Argentine military. The hills that surrounded the settlement were also occupied by the British and the defense of the beachhead was strengthened. On 25th May, the Argentine military used Exocet missiles to strike down the “Atlantic Conveyor,” a Merchant Navy supply ship (Zampini) that was carrying British helicopters and troops. As a result, in order to carry on with the campaign, the British needed to change their strategy completely. The British military force would now have to advance almost 50 miles to the capital of the Falklands Islands, Port Stanley, on foot and it was winter in the South Atlantic at the time.
Even though four British ships were struck down by the AAF and ANA, the Argentine military did not try to prevent the amphibious landing made by the British (Clapp & Southby-Tailyour, 2007). The first reason behind this was that there were fewer roads on the islands and the Argentine military did not have land vehicles that would be able to cross the terrain. Another reason is that it was too risky for the Argentineans to use helicopters because the British were far superior when it came to air combat. Moreover, under no circumstances would the Argentine military force at Goose Green make it to San Carlos on foot because by the time they would reach there, the British troops would have already set up defensive positions. However, a major obstacle that posed a threat to the advancing British troops was that a considerable Argentine garrison was positioned in the area near Port Stanley. Five hundred men of the 2nd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment (2 Para) began advancing towards Darwin on 28th May during the early hours.
Brigadier Julian Thompson was the commander of the landing force at the time. He ordered Colonel Herbert “H” Jones, who was the commander of 2 Para, to organize an incursion on the Argentine military forces stationed at Goose Green and Darwin. These positions, situated on a narrow strip of land with sea on both sides that connected East Faukland and Lafonia to each other, were of no strategic importance. Port Stanley Brigadier Thompson emphasized on the objective of occupying Port Stanley. However, it took several days before his brigade was ready to advance towards the capital. Two weeks later, Major General Jeremy Moore arrived in the Falklands and took charge over the land forces (Thompson, 2001, p.66-68). Nonetheless, the Brigadier Thompson cancelled the incursion because the British realized that they did not have enough helicopters to move a sufficient amount of artillery. He believed that the incursion was not necessary and he was not willing to send the battalion without sufficient artillery, risking the lives of his men.
The Joint headquarters in the United Kingdom was worried that the Falklands War was not going in favor of the British since four British ships had already been sunk and there had been no victories. The Joint headquarters was willing to take the risk and ordered Brigadier Thompson to send his battalion to occupy the positions and secure a victory for the British using whatever artillery was available. Thus, 2 Para made advanced towards Darwin in the South, while the other three battalions of the brigade moved towards Port Stanley in the East. The last battalion stayed back at San Carlos for defense (Thompson, 2001, p.70-72).
When organizing the advance, Colonel Jones planned the operation to include 6 phases in which his patrolling company and 3 rifle companies would have to coordinate accurately and be exquisitely timed. Colonel Jones’s plan was that the battalion would move toward Camilla Creek House on foot, which was in the north of Darwin, almost 8 kilometers away. There the battalion would take a break, and then cross the start line in the middle of Darwin and Camilla Creek. From there, one company would move down each side of the narrow strip of land connecting East Faukland and Lafonia. Depending on the phase of Colonel Jones’s plan, the rest of the companies were to support the two companies from behind, and proceed with their own objectives. The British battalion had three L118 Light Guns, while the naval gunfire support would be provided by guns on the Royal Navy ship, HMS Arrow. Colonel Jones had ordered his troops to commence most of the fighting before dawn because the ship would have to retreat to safety by daylight (Adkin, 2007, p.145-168).
Back at Goose Green, Lieutenant-Colonel Italo Piaggi was commanding the entire Argentine military force. Most of the men and officers were from the A and C companies of Piaggi’s 12th Infantry Regiment, while a small number from two other regiments had also joined in. However, they were still short of almost 66 men and officers in comparison to the British infantry battalion that was approaching. Since the peacetime garrison of Piaggi’s 12th Regiment was located in Mercedes, Buenos Aires, therefore, the Argentine military force occupying Goose Green was given the name of “Task Force Mercedes.” Additionally, apart from the infantry itself, Task Force Mercedes was had three OTO Melara Mod 56 guns and a small number of antiaircraft guns. Wilson Pedrozo, the Vice Commodore at the time, was commanding more than two hundred Argentine Air Force troops at Goose Green at Goose Green, all of which had been sent to Port Stanley.
Theoretically, the British could have attacked the Argentine military force at Goose Green from the air in the South, from the beaches, or from the north on foot since they had control of the air and sea surrounding the Falklands Islands. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi had no intelligence of what the British intended to do, hence he moved his troops into positions where they could deal with a threat from all directions. Thus, the troops were divided; a detachment was placed in the north and west of Darwin in the small hills, another was placed in the south, and the rest of the troops remained at Goose Green. Days before the British had landed; the Argentine troops in the North had positioned themselves across narrow strip of land that connected East Faukland and Lafonia to each other. From there they were in perfect position to fire on British troops approaching from the north and reposition themselves to deal with an amphibious operation. Additionally, boobytraps and minefields were also placed in front of these positions to further hinder the approaching British troops (Costa, 1988, p.346-347).
Even though the Argentineans prepared their defense to quite an extent, on 26 May, Piaggi received orders to evacuate from the positions secured in the north and employ a more aggressive response towards the British attack that was expected. On 28th May, early in the morning, the British troops finally came into contact with the defending Argentine military force. However, they were not met with units ready to attack from trenches; instead, the Argentinean troops were retreating, exposed out in the open, along a line of minefields in their path. Naturally, the Argentine troops were taken by surprise by the British advance; hence they were not able to stand their ground and immediately began retreating (Costa, 1988, p.347).
The British troops were advancing along the eastern side of the narrow strip of land connecting the settlements. The Argentine troops, being driven by the British, retreated back into the positions they prepared, where they managed to reassemble into organized groups in order to stop the progressing British troops approaching them. Meanwhile, the Argentine military force on the right side of the British troops was resisting heavily since a reinforcements had been sent from Stanley by helicopter in order to join the rest of the attack and defending Argentine force. As a result, the British advance on the western side was halted, and ended up in deadlock. There was an Argentine position on the left of the British troops and in order to try to break free of the deadlock, Colonel Jones ordered his men to charge towards the position. Jones was killed in the process after being shot by rifle fire, but it was too late; the Paras continue charging out of impulse and succeeded in overturning all the Argentine positions around Darwin. This attack and another attack by a company of Paras along the beach outmaneuvered the Argentine troops from both sides. The Argentine forces were almost out of ammunition and had lost a considerable number of men already, so they began withdrawing toward Goose Green (Wilsey, 2003, p.269-283).
After Colonel Jones’s death, Major Chris Keeble assumed command of the British battalion. He felt it was point to continue fighting since the British battalion no longer had sufficient ammunition or men to assault the increased Argentine force in the village. However, he knew an assault was imminent since the Argentineans, who were surrounded, would eventually have to die in combat, or surrender. Another reason Major Keeble was not willing to assault Goose Green because during the battle, more than hundred residents had been detained in the village’s community hall. Bombarding the village from air and using artillery could result in innocent casualties. However, Major Keeble had a note sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi that suggested that he would exactly this. In the note, Keeble gave Piaggi the ultimatum to order his troops to surrender, and if he did not, the British troops would bombard the settlement. Although air support and the use of artillery had been ineffective during the battle, cluster bombs had been dropped by three Harriers near Argentine positions just before nightfall.
Nonetheless, Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi and the Argentine troops clearly knew and understood what could be accomplished if the British battalion made a precise strike on their position. Since Major Keeble gave Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi a warning beforehand, the note also stated that the death of any civilians would be on Piaggi’s hands according to the rules stated in the Geneva Conventions (Adkin, 2007, p.351-352). Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi finally realized that it was pointless proceed with battle, risking not only the lives of his men but also of innocent civilians. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi explained the joint commander at Stanley that there was no choice but to surrender, and he was granted the authority to do so. Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi he left it up to the officers in Goose Green to decide what they wished to do, and in order to avoid further carnage, a unanimous decision to surrender was made. On 29th May Argentine military force surrendered to the British, and the Battle of Goose Green officially came to an end (Adkin, 2007, p.357-359). Ironically, it was the National Day of Argentina’s Army on the day the battle ended.
Section 4 - "The Impact and Legacy of the Battle of Goose Green"
Even though the Battle of Goose Green ended in favor of the British, the Falklands War continued for another month. Despite the victory, there has been controversy surrounding the first land battle in the Falklands War. Some have even criticized the British key objective. Even Lieutenant-Colonel ‘H’ Jones’s role in the Battle of Goose Green, even though he had been killed in combat, has been criticized. He is hailed as a hero by many, for becoming an inspiration for the British troops by courageously giving up his life for his country. Others have criticized that the single-handed on Goose Green did not have any major impact on the battle’s outcome. According to them, the British troops at a critical time were deprived of their commanding officer because of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones’s rash action. Nonetheless, the insufficient fire support caused the British battalion to become frustrated and maintaining the moment of the assault was necessary at the time.
Thus Battle of Goose Green now serves as an example of a valiant victory for some, and an example of a controversial battle for others. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that the victory of the British would not have been possible if the officers and men had not been as determined and full of fighting spirit as they had been. The British government direly needed this victory in order to boost the morale of the British public back at home. Since the British Task Force had had not been doing well in the war, the victory also revived their spirits. After the Battle of Goose Green, the British troops also discovered that the Argentinean soldiers were ill fed, poorly trained, and not well supplied, and a determined attack could defeat them. The number of Argentine troops defeated at Goose Green was considerable; as a result, the British were clear to begin advancing towards Port Stanley from bridgehead of San Carlos Water. Several other fierce battles took place in the next two weeks, and the British ultimately recaptured the Falklands Island when the war ended.
After the conclusive victory of the British in the Battle of Goose Green and consequently in the Falklands War, the British sovereignty of the islands was reclaimed and the islanders were able to choose their own government. Ever since the war, the Falklands Islands have become far more prosperous. Even though Argentine continues to claim that the sovereignty of islands belongs to them, the islands will continue to prosper for years to come because of the possibility of oil reserves in the waters (Neild & Gilbert, 2013). Margaret Thatcher managed to garner substantial support for her Conservative government in Britain because of the military success. Sooner after in 1983, her party scored a victory in the general election. By the end of 1983, General Leopoldo Galtieri’s military government also came to an end. Galtieri’s “junta” was replaced a democratic government and resulted in the diminishing of several military dictatorships throughout South America.
No doubt, Argentine task force at Goose Green had several disadvantages against the British. There Argentinean troops there were not well supplied nor were they well trained. The British military had air and naval superiority (Banks, 2012). However, regardless of these disadvantages, the Argentine troops could have counterattacked, and they had considerably more officers and men than those in the British battalion. These and several other factors should have given the Argentine military force the upper hand. It was not necessary that the British military would be victorious in the Battle of Goose Green, and the British forces certainly did not win because of their superior leadership or technology. Rather, the British military won the Battle of Goose Green and consequently the Falklands War because the Argentine side was not well organized and was unable to provide the troops in the trenches with sufficient supplies. The Argentine Army was willing to win and could have one, but the British battalion was better organized, and that is what led them to victory.
