The Battle of Lundy’s Lane has stood as the bloodiest land-based battle fought during the War of 1812. Fought on July 25, 1814 and known alternatively as the Battle of Niagara Falls, the Battle of Lundy’s Lane involved a military faceoff between the United States (US) and the British Empire on Canadian territory, on present-day Niagara Falls, Ontario. The victory of the US army at the Battle of Chippawa prompted them to advance to Queenston, which in turn required them to pass by Niagara Falls – by then a stronghold of the British army. The US army, commandeered by Major General Jacob Brown, went face-to-face with the British army, led by Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond, upon arriving at Niagara Falls. Both the US army and the British army were fully concentrated by the time the Battle of Lundy’s Lane broke out, henceforth causing both parties to use their forces inefficiently alongside their respective lack of information on one another. Such has prompted both the US army and the British army to strike one another on first contact. This essay, apart from detailing a thorough description of the characteristics of the Battle of Lundy’s Lane primarily within the perspective of the US army, seeks to provide a thorough analysis in line with three of the six Mission Command Principles – create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent and accept prudent risk.
b. Description of the Battle
Disposition of Forces
Maj. Gen. Brown led the US army towards Niagara Falls following their victory over the British army in the Battle of Chippawa. However, in the course of advance, the US army encountered a dilemma – the need to cross Niagara River and Niagara Falls, Ontario, in order to reach Queenston. Aware of the need for reinforcements in the form of heavier arms due to the fact that Lake Ontario – which is at the mouth of the Niagara River, is under rigid control of the British army, Maj. Gen. Brown sought the help of Commodore Isaac Chauncey, who commanded ships of the US army in New York. Cmdr. Chauncey was in charge of waiting for new heavy arm shipments in New York, all of which could provide a strong challenge against the roaming forces of the British army in Lake Ontario. However, and much to the misfortune of the US army commanded by Maj. Gen. Brown, Cmdr. Chauncey fell ill and rendered himself unable to help in the advance to Queenston. With such a major dilemma putting the advancement efforts of the US army in Lake Ontario at stake, Maj. Gen. Brown ordered the US army to advance by land instead.
Initially, the British Army under Lt. Gen. Drummond expected that the US army would attack them at Niagara Falls by advancing from the west side of the Niagara River. By then, the British army, through forces led by Lieutenant Colonel John Tucker on orders from Major General Phineas Riall, stationed itself from Fort Niagara in the north down to Queenston, at the east side of the Niagara River, where they expected the US army to advance. However, Maj. Gen. Brown made it a point to advance northwards instead, prompting Lt. Col. John Tucker to retreat his forces to protect Fort George. Col. Hercules Scott took command of forces that replaced that of Lt. Col. Tucker in Queenston, acting on orders from Maj. Gen. Riall. However, Lt. Gen. Drummond issued a countermanding order against Maj. Gen. Riall, prompting him to lead reinforcements to Lundy’s Lane – a hilly ground north of the west bank of the Niagara River. The first attack came at 6:00 pm, when forces of the US army under Brigadier General Winfried Scott arrived at Lundy’s Lane from the south at a time when the British army from the north was still positioning themselves.
Major Phases and Key Events
6:00-9:00 pm: Attack of Brigadier General Winfried Scott. Forces led by Brig. Gen. Scott were the first in the US army to arrive at Lundy’s Lane. Numbering around 1,070, the forces of Brig. Gen. Scott positioned themselves under his aggressive stance against the British army, which he did not know numbered around up to 1,800. Brig. Gen. Scott did not ask for reinforcements given his lack of knowledge on the size of the forces of the British army at Lundy’s Lane, which was mainly because of the general lack of cavalry they received that would have helped them scout the area adequately prior to attacking. The US army commenced its attack at Lundy’s Lane at 6:00 pm, with Brig. Gen. Scott commandeering the direct advancement of forces under the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments towards the British army on the hills, duly assisted by the three-gun artillery battery led by Captain Nathan Towson. The forces of Brig. Gen. Scott had hoped to disarm the British army, which kept heavy arms in the highest point of Lundy’s Lane.
While the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments under Brig. Gen. Scott engaged against the British army, the 25th infantry regiment under Major Thomas Jesup pushed northwards in flanking positions. The forces of Maj. Jesup caught the British army at a time when they were undergoing redeployment, unaware that the US army would advance towards them. As a result, the US army successfully drove the British army away to retreat away from Portage Road. In the course of the retreat of the British army, the forces of Maj. Jesup, specifically through directing the light infantry company led by Captain Daniel Ketchum, were able to secure the area converging Lundy’s Lane and Portage Road. As a result, the forces of Maj. Jesup and Capt. Ketchum became successful in rounding up messengers and wounded of the British army under their custody, with Maj. Gen. Riall and Captain William Hamilton Merritt having stood as their most prominent captives.
9:00 pm-12:00 am: Attack of Major General Jacob Brown. The exhaustion of the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments led by Brig. Gen. Scott on the frontlines and the 25th infantry regiment under Maj. Jesup and Capt. Ketchum on the flank led Maj. Gen. Brown to lead reinforcement forces. Comprised of brigades each led by Brigadier Generals Eleazer Ripley and Peter Porter and artillery commands each under Captains Ritchie and Biddle, the reinforcement forces of Maj. Gen. Brown supplemented the forces of the US army, increasing the forces to as much as 1,900 and heavy arms to seven. Such was despite the exhaustion of the forces under Brig. Gen. Scott, with most of them having retreated already that time due to exhaustion. However, the reinforcements for the British army also arrived during the same time, bringing the total number of its forces to around 2,600 with seven heavy arms of stronger capacity. In numerical terms, the British army still had greater advantage than the US army, yet what mattered more in this phase is the strength of their artillery. The US army, at this point, has now found itself in a difficult position to launch counterattacks against the British army, whose strong artillery seriously threatened them towards defeat.
In perhaps one of the most iconic events of the Battle of Lundy’s Lane for the US army, Brig. Gen. Ripley, acting on orders from Maj. Gen. Brown, tasked Colonel James Miller to head the 21st infantry regiment to assault the battery of the British Army, as he and Brig. Gen. Porter led the right and left flanks, respectively. Capt. Richie took charge of and In response to the order of Brig. Gen. Ripley, Col. Miller rendered his renowned reply, “I’ll try, sir,” which has since endured as among the symbols of the dogged perseverance the US army has exhibited throughout the War of 1812. Shortly before 10:00 pm, the US army is ready to launch more attacks against the British army.
Forces of the British army dealt with several attacks by the US army, through the 1st infantry regiment, led by Lieutenant Colonel Robert Nicholas, on their right side, leading their artillery vulnerable. Brig. Gen. Ripley and Col. Miller exploited such an opportunity and launched full-scale attacks using muskets and bayonets in order to drive away the artillery of the British army manned by the 2nd Battalion on the 89th foot. The success of Brig. Gen. Ripley and Col. Miller served as perhaps the long-lasting testament to the strength of the US army in the face of the numerically superior British army.
As fighting continued, Col. Scott of the British army and his forces left their unwanted diversionary point, Queenston, and proceeded to reinforce the British army at Lundy’s Lane. However, Col. Scott and his forces were not aware that the US army, through the forces of Brig. Gen. Ripley and Col. Miller, was able to charge past the artillery of the British army at Lundy’s Lane. Such has led the forces of Col. Scott to lose three of their six-pounder guns. The 41st foot light company of the British army eventually recovered the guns but eventually abandoned them later on.
9:00 pm-12:00 am: Counterattack of Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond. Lt. Gen. Drummond, who sustained a wound on his neck, sought to recapture the artillery seized by the US army from the British army. Notable in the counterattacking efforts of Lt. Gen. Drummond, however, is his choice not to act strategically, which would entail him to cause disorder among forces of the US army, as he merely launched his attacks directly. Such led to the failure of the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond to penetrate the forces of the US army at Lundy’s Lane, which are now empowered with artillery seized from the British army. Such blunder preceded a series of mistakes by the British army, most notably their confusion over attacking their very own forces from the Glengarry light infantry, which they mistook for forces of the US army.
Regardless of the unfortunate outcomes, the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond refused to succumb to failure by prompting the launch of another attack similar to the one he first launched. This time, however, the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond were more successful in wearing out the forces of the US army led by Brig. Gen. Ripley and Col. Miller. The 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments of Brig. Gen. Scott, which combined into a single unit led by Maj. Leavenworth, carried out an unsanctioned attack against the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond. Although the forces of Brig. Gen. Scott and Maj. Leavenworth successfully pushed back the forces of the forces of Lt. Drummond, they nevertheless weakened due to the confusion they had in encountering the forces of Brig. Gen. Ripley and Col. Miller. In addition, by the time the forces of Brig. Gen. Scott merged with the forces of Maj. Jesup, almost many of them within the US army were heavily injured. Lt. Gen. Drummond, deeply discontented with his counterattacking failures, launched a third counterattack that used a mixture of detachments within the already exhausted British army. Yet, despite the involvement of more close-range attacks using bayonets, the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond and the rest of the British army decided to fall back out of extreme tiredness.
Outcome
Aftermath. With only around 700 in line, many from the forces of the US army suffered severe injuries by the turn of midnight. Maj. Gen. Brown and Brig. Gen. Scott were among those injured and they both led their forces to retreat due to lack of needed supplies. Yet, the decision to retreat was not popular. Brig. Gen. Porter insisted against the retreat, until he realized that there is no practical way to maintain his position as many others have already withdrawn. In comparison, however, the forces of the British army comprised around 1,400 in line, yet made sure that they kept a considerable distance away from Lundy’s Lane as a matter of safety against the US army. In general, the US army also lost much of its artillery in the course of conflict against the British army. Despite having scourged abandoned artillery, the presence of forces led by Lt. Gen. Drummond led the US army to retreat southwards to Fort Erie, effectively ending their short stint of occupying a strategic area of Canadian territory held by the British army. The US army registered a greater number of deaths and wounded among its forces compared to the British army, with 171 dead and 572 wounded as against 84 dead and 559 wounded. Nevertheless, the conflict effectively ended as a draw, given that both the US army and the British army opted to retreat from Lundy’s Lane because of massive exhaustion and lack of organization within their forces.
Legacy. The Battle of Lundy’s Lane left a distinct legacy cemented within the US army as a historical event that highlighted their bravery and dedication to fight for the US. The remark rendered by Col. Miller to Brig. Gen. Ripley, “I’ll try, sir,” has since became the official motto of the current 5th infantry of the US army formed shortly after the War of 1812. Despite having suffered massive losses, the US army has since regarded the Battle of Lundy’s Lane as a victorious instance in which its forces were able to organize against the numerically superior forces of the British army, despite lack of assistance in several quarters.
c. Analysis According to Mission Command Principles
Create Shared Understanding
Perhaps a highly crucial mission command principle the US army has exhibited during the Battle of Lundy’s Lane is the fact that members of its forces have been able to create a shared understanding with one another. A closer look at the circumstances reveals that the Battle of Lundy’s Lane actually served both the US army and the British army with dilemmas with regard to proper military communication. Several instances of confusion have emerged from miscommunication between forces of both the US army and the British army and the alienating effects of friendly fires have threatened the prospects of success in conflict for each of them. Yet, given the relatively organized stance of the US army, as evident in the way its forces have tried to outflank and target the artillery of the British army and in how they endured the numerical superiority of their opponents, one can assert that it has exhibited the value of shared understanding well. For instance, the move of the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments under Brig. Gen. Scott to merge into one unit under Maj. Leavenworth upon the massive reduction of their forces proved a strategic decision borne on a collective comprehension of the circumstances, which involved the need to mobilize strategically against the powerful British army. At the same time, reinforcements proved instrumental to reaching the goals of the US army, which was short of numbers in its forces compared to that of the British army, as in the case of the fabled surge of Col. Miller against enemy artillery. Such found due supplementation by the attacks of the forces led by Brig. Gen. Ripley and Brig. Gen. Porter on the flanks. The unsanctioned attacks of the consolidated forces led by Brig. Gen. Scott and Maj. Leavenworth against the forces of Lt. Gen. Drummond also helped in terms of securing the forces of the US army against the expected effects of outnumbering by the British army.
Provide a Clear Commander’s Intent
Clearly, the intent of the US army in the Battle of Lundy’s Lane is to secure the occupation of strongholds of the British army in Canada by compelling their withdrawal from Niagara Falls and other surrounding areas. One could discern that the US army exhibited the expression of clear intent from its commanders, despite troubles arising from lack of assistance leading to inadequate information on the British army. The initial failure of Cmdr. Chauncey to help the US army with their naval, artillery and intelligence needs against the British army in Niagara Falls did not deter its forces to stray away from their main purpose of launching attacks. Crucial decisions such as consolidating the forces of the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments into a single unit, as commanded by Brig. Gen. Scott, also reflected the strong sense of clarity commanders of the US army had during the Battle of Lundy’s Lane.
Accept Prudent Risk
Prudence in terms of gauging risks proved to be an instrumental attitude that propelled the US army towards survival, if not outright victory, in matching up against the numerical superiority of the British army. With the knowledge that depletion of forces is imminent in the face of sophisticated artillery and numerical strength possessed by the British army, the US army took reasonable grounds to utilize strategies that would urge their enemies to withdraw, keeping in mind the risks involved. Again, the move of Brig. Gen. Scott to merge the 9th, 11th and 22nd infantry regiments into a single unit under Maj. Leavenworth brought risks in terms of disseminated mobilization, but it duly served the purpose of forces made compact out of circumstance – their exhaustion at the starting stages of the conflict, specifically. Moreover, the daring feat of Brig. Gen. Ripley in ordering Col. Miller to lead forces against the artillery of the British army denoted that the US army recognized the risk of defeat amidst great potential in destabilizing the enemy, which faced vulnerability due to the error of its forces.
Bibliography
Barbuto, Richard. Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000.
Borneman, Walter. 1812: The War That Forged a Nation. New York City, NY: HarperCollins, 2004.
Elting, John. Amateurs, To Arms!: A Military History of the War Of 1812 (Major Battles & Campaigns). Chapel Hill, NC: Da Capo Press, 1995.
Quimby, Robert. The U.S. Army in the War of 1812: An Operational and Command Study (2 Vol. Set). East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1997.
US Army. ADP 6-0: Mission Command. 2012.
