Part I: Introduction: In this research paper I will be comparing and contrasting the two memos “The challenger” by Roger Boisjoly and the “Three Mile Island” written by D.F. Hallman. D.F. Hallman wrote this memo in the year nineteen seventy eight at a time when he was “the manager of the Plant Performance Services” (Three Mile Island p.3). He was replying to a previous Memorandum which had been written earlier by Dunn. In this memo, Hallman was reiterating that proper expected procedures due to the demerits as a result of changes in piping not forgetting the coolant process. “Roger Boisjoly wrote “The Challenger” in 1985 to his bosses. At this time Roger was working to transform “the O-rings which connect segments of Morton Thiokol’s Solid Rocket Booster” (The Challenger disaster 1). In this memo Roger made it clear that there could be an accident which could lead to deaths of people especially in extremely cold weather. The areas of comparison and contrast will be on how these memos presented the information, whether the information was acted upon and so on.
Part II: Examination of memo 1: Hallman’s memo came after a series of communications to act on the operator instructions by engineers, managers. None of these requests was acted upon. Hallman in his Memo had requested the manager Mr. B.A. Karrasch, who was the manager in charge of Plant Integration to change how the pressure injection system should be used. He made several follow ups orally to persuade the involved parties to take action. The amazing part is that the manager did not do anything until March nineteen seventy nine when the catastrophe took place. The memo was written in English and its subject was “Operator Interruption of High Pressure Injection (HPI) “(Memo 1). Hallman had reference to the previous memos by B. M. Dunn which he had written to J. Taylor. The discourse used in this memo includes abbreviations used by engineers such as “RCS, HPI,” He presents his concerns in form of two questions. The voice of this memo is that of regret as the writer regrets why Mr. Karrasch had not acted on the previous memos which had been written by Dunn on the same issue. He also regrets why the Nuclear Service had not informed the firm’s operating plants to act upon the Operation Interruption of High Pressure Injection yet a risk was waiting to occur. Hallman also was asking the manager of this department to handle technical conflict which was occurring between managers of two different departments. This memo just like the previous ones was not acted upon until the accident occurred. Hallman did his part by reminding the manager to act upon the previous memos.
Part III: Examination of memo 2: In this memo “The Challenger” was written some months before the space shuttle “Challenger exploded over Florida on Jan. 28, 1986” (Roger Boisjoly 1). It was written by Roger Boisjoluy sounding a warning of launching the space shuttle during the cold season. In this memo Roger said that it would be a disaster which could lead to lose of lives (Memo 1). The style of this memo is written in form of a letter. As it starts the writer says “this letter is written..” It takes the form of an official letter and the layout is equally similar to that of an official letter. The voice of this memo is remorseful and cautious as Roger wrote it to caution the Vice President of Engineering of the danger which was posed by the O-ring problem in the SRM joints. The memo is written from an engineer’s point of view. Roger explains to make the management alert makes every effort to emphasize the dangers they could face if they go contrary to his caution. It is important to note that some effort was taken although not fully because it only ended in paperwork.
The Challenger Space shuttle Roger Boisjoly
Part IV: Conclusion: What these two writers were trying to do was to use their professional knowledge to combat disaster. What amazes a careful observer though is the reason why the people to whom these memos were addressed to did not take the necessary measures. Hallman’s memo was not well detailed and appears complicated since not everybody can understand. He employed too many abbreviations so that if a reader is not an engineer it is just a toll order to understand the contents and aim of the memo. According to my opinion this disqualifies this memo in terms of literary techniques in favor of they memo by Roger. Roger’s Memo is written in such a way that you do not need to be an engineer to understand the message he was passing over to the vice president of the engineering department. There is a lot of emphasis on the main message. He went ahead to show that magnitude of the danger which could follow if the advice is not followed. The two memos show a situation whereby accidents occurred due to failure to act on a given instructions.
Work Cited
Hallman, D.F. TMI-Memo. 1978. Web. 19th July 2012: file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/admin/Desktop/THE%20MEMO-%20Hallman.htm
Martin, D. Roger Boisjoly, 73, Dies; warned of Shuttle Danger.2012. Web. 19th July 2012: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/04/us/roger-boisjoly-73-dies-warned-of-shuttle-danger.html?_r=2
Mathes, J.C. Three Mile Island; The Management Communication Role. Netherlands: Elsevier Science, 2002. Print
Memo from Roger Boisjoly on O-Ring Erosion. 1985. Web. 19th July 2012: http://www.onlineethics.org/CMS/profpractice/exempindex/RB-intro/Erosion.aspx
National Academy of Sciences, Roger Boisjoly- The Challenger Disaster. 2012
