Under the leadership of President, Dwight Eisenhower, the United States developed the need to use military action to prevent the spread and impact of communism or any other radical movements. Eisenhower used the doctrine that asserts that use nukes and spooks to prevent communists or any other radical takeovers. The doctrine was created after the U.S had realized that is was likely for a global takeover by communists. President Eisenhower had massive military experience in military action, and he knew the importance and effectiveness of military action when an impactful intervention was required (Jones, 2008).
At the time of the reign of Eisenhower, there was a major rift between communist parties and liberal countries. In addition, major communist countries had massive military support and had taken part in the World War. The countries had the intention of making the whole world embrace communism. This was, however, against the value of the United States. Apart from communism, radicalization across the globe was becoming a global problem. In an argument by Boyle (2005) this was also a threat to the global leadership position of the United States. The author further points out that the intensity of the world wars made military action inappropriate foreign affairs doctrine (Boyle, 2005). At the time, the United States expenditure on military was extravagant. For this reason, more expenditure in the field would have resulted into a budget debt (Jones, 2008). Additionally, the president realized more expenditure on the military would minimize his support from the citizens. The president was relying on cold war, but its efficiency was questioned. A more direct and efficient doctrine was required.
The effects of the doctrine in the United States and other countries were numerous. From a financial perspective, the doctrine developed a cheaper negotiation technique. This replaced military action that costly. The United States also benefited from the numerous negotiation successes. The development of nuclear infrastructure was controlled as nations feared the threats issued. The defeat of the Vietnam and Guatemala was attributed to the success of the doctrine. From a general perspective, the United States was against the rule under communism. The rule increased popularity threatened the existence of the county. Under the doctrine, communism was abolished in numerous countries. At the time the doctrine was developed, the United States was referred as the super power. To protect its global dominance nuclear threats provided an efficient strategy. The United States was able to minimize threats from communist countries (Bowie & Immerman, 1998). The forecasted impact of the doctrine was successful. To other countries, the impact of the doctrine was determined by either their support of communism or liberalism. Countries that embraced liberalism were under massive threats from communists. From the intervention the United States, the existence of these countries was assured. On the other hand, communist countries suffered as an effect of the doctrine. For instance, the war in Vietnam was as a result of failed diplomacy by the doctrine (Bowie & Immerman, 2008). The war resulted into death of thousands of people.
There are numerous merits and demerits of the doctrine used by Eisenhower. One merit is that the doctrine was able to minimize the global communist threat. Prior to the doctrine, the Soviet Union colonized numerous nations and instilled the communism rule. Poor nations could not be able to defend against the invasion from the Soviet Union. However, the doctrine was able to minimize the Russian resurgence. Another merit is that the doctrine increased the willingness of nations to negotiate. The fear of nuclear attacks increased the need by nations to participate and corporate with global bodies. One major demerit of the doctrine is that it provided an advantage to the United States during negotiations. Jones (2008) is of the assumption that the United States was in a position to influence the outcomes of diplomacy. The author further asserts that the doctrine could not be as effective if all nations were provided with a similar advantage (Jones, 2008).
References
Bogle, L. (2001). The Cold War. New York: Routledge.
Bowie, R. & Immerman, R. (1998). Waging Peace: How Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Boyle, P. (2005). The Eden–Eisenhower correspondence, 1955–1957. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.
Jones, M. (2008). "Targeting China: U.S. Nuclear Planning and 'Massive Retaliation' in East Asia, 1953–1955". Journal of Cold War Studies, 10 (4): 37–65.
