Findings of the 9/11 Commission Report
One of the major findings of the commission is the gross ignorance by the Bush administration about the intelligence warnings, and it was reported by other sources that the president made little effort to improve or prevent domestic attacks. While the report does not explicitly talk about the latter, it is supported by the fact that the president only made counterterrorism a priority after 9/11. The lack to heed to the intelligence reports may be attributed to the failure of the portended "millennium attacks" President Clinton had been warned. Security at the airports and borders had been enhanced, and when it failed to happen, the administration was under the impression that security was taken care. They neglected to take note that the reinforcement was only temporary.
Another major finding by the commission is the lack of security agencies to identify or arrest any of the suspected hijackers, and they gained entry into the country quite easily. For example, some terrorists who were spotted in Bangkok as they made their way to the US were later located in the country, but the agencies could not connect them to the imminent attack at the time. It exposed the loopholes security agencies had which could be attributed to the limited resources they were working with having been slashed by the White House earlier that year. The report is written in a retrospective manner that demonstrated it, and the US intelligence was aware and had spotted these individuals as they moved around globally. It is reported that the FBI had requested for more than 50 analysts at the beginning of 2001, but the administration had not taken terrorism as a priority and their requests thus denied. These are statements the report does not make because it was authored by members of the Congress who were probably responsible for cutting the budget. While it is not possible to say the implications increasing the intelligence funding would have had pre 9/11, I would be remiss to state that if the FBI had got their 54 analysts, they would have may be noticed the pattern of these hijackers vis-à-vis the attack. (Perrow, 2006).
Finally, the report exposed the lack of an emergency plan in the airspace where planes were used as weapons. The planes were caught completely off-guard and now depended on untrained civilians to try and stop the attacks. The airports also had serious security loopholes and allowed the entry of faulty passports such as those used by some of the hijackers. These individuals despite their known presence in the country were not included in the no-fly lists, and the airports could not tell them apart from other well-meaning foreigners coming to the country. No one person can be blamed, this much I agree with the report, but it brought to light the vulnerability of the US intelligence, security, policy, administration and all other facets geared towards protecting domestic terrorist attacks. The most damning finding to this day is the unheeded warnings, though, leaders found it hard to believe the al-Qaeda were capable of carrying out such elaborate attacks unaware of their vast resources and networks.
Improvements: Real or Myth?
While the report has clearly elaborated the events leading up to the 9/11 attacks in great detail, it seems to leave out how the attacks went unimpeded. The excuse made for this is that the Clinton and Bush administration had carried out investigations about the numerous warnings they had received about an imminent attack and their intelligence pointed to attacks outside the country. Thus, they only prepared to attacks outside the country; others would argue that the country ignored intelligence from France, Italy, Egypt and Jordan. One of the major improvements that are evident, and frankly a headache to say the least is the reinforcement in airport security. Before 9/11, only a simple metal detector was used, and passengers without proper ID or boarding tickets were allowed to get into the planes. Getting through airport security is a nightmare, and it takes hours, advanced detection systems are utilized. Identification is a requirement, and it should match one's ticket without which you cannot board the plane. An extensive search of luggage is also conducted, and passengers are required to remove their shoes and all other accessories as they patted down rigorously by the security guards.
However, the airport security impact has mostly affected foreigners who wish to enter the country. While I agree with the improvements, it may not be efficient in stopping wrongful persons onto the planes. It was demonstrated so when a passenger with a fake ID was caught, and he conceded to traveling multiple times with it. From this incidence, it is both an improvement and a failure. The improvement being that the security was able to catch him but a failure that he had slipped through security multiple times without detection. Some say enhanced security is a myth especially with the radicalization of domestic citizens. On paper, these individuals may meet all the requirements of a law-abiding citizen, but once they board the planes, security is out of the government's scope. Even with more air marshals situated in every flight, it is hard to predict what happens once the flight takes off.
Another improvement made is to consolidate the Department of Homeland Security, which is an umbrella agency for several federal agencies. It was meant to coordinate intelligence between them open up sharing channels between which was previously restricted. It has been reported that indeed the FBI did intensify its terrorist search activities, and there seemed to be a laxity on the drug smuggling front. While it is not possible to tell whether the department is efficient (I think it would be demonstrated during another attack) it has thwarted some operations within the country including the infamous Virginia Jihadists. (Perrow, 2006).
References
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. (2016). The 9/11 Commission Report. Retrieved online from www.9-11commission.gov
Perrow, C. (2006). The Disaster after 9/11: The Department of Homeland Security and Intelligence Reorganization. The Journal of the NPS Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Retrieved online from www.hsaj.org
Taylor, A. B., CPO, and Steedman, S. (2003). The Evolution of Airline Security since 9/11. International Foundation for Protection Officers. Retrieved online from www.ifpo.org
Villemiez, J. (2011). 9/11 to Now: Ways we have changed. PBS. Retrieved online from www.pbs.org
