The Fukushima Daichi is a technological disaster triggered by natural calamities on March 11th, 2011, when a massive earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale hit Japan. The earthquake originated from Honshu Island, and it created a tsunami. Following the tremor, reactors one, two and three automatically shut down. Reactors 4, 5 and 6 had been previously shut down for maintenance and repairs. Due to felled power supply lines, the Fukushima Daichi reactor complex was cut off from the electricity grid. As the operating reactors had shut down, they could not generate power for them to cool down, and therefore the backup diesel engines kicked into power the cooling machines.
Almost an hour after the earthquake, a massive tsunami wave hit the nuclear reactor complex. As the wave was vast and powerful, it breached the rectors' sea wall, and water quickly flooded the underground rooms which housed the backup generators. This critically disabled the cooling pumps that were powered by the generators. These pumps had to be continually powered for several days as the rods in the reactor gave off residual heat even after cooling.
There were backup pumps to keep cooling but after a day, they also failed because they ran out of power and were battery powered. The loss of this heat sink was the last straw, and the fuel rods started overheating, and there was a total loss of power. This meant that all electrical control systems were not functioning, and cooling systems completely failed. The first three reactors went into meltdown. The fuel rods melted through their enclosures and seeped into the ground.
During the meltdown, zirconium in the fuel rods reacted with water and formed hydrogen gas. The gas leaked from the pressure vessels into the domes, where it mixed with air and after accumulating it reached explosive levels. Reactor 1 was the first to explode, and due to a shared piping connection, reactor 3 and 4 also exploded. These hydrogen explosions led to even more spread of nuclear materials to the environment.
Ultimately, radioactive materials which were used as fuel in the reactors were spread to the environment. It is estimated that 2% of iodine isotopes and 1% cesium isotopes from the reactor were released (Miyake, Matsuzaki, Fujiwara, Saito, Yamagata, Honda, & Muramatsu, 2012). It was also confirmed that pollution had occurred in land, air and sea.
There were no short-term casualties from the nuclear incident, though around 18500 died during the earthquake and tsunami. It was estimated the number of victims from the nuclear accident will be up to 10000 and those that will probably die from cancer related complications at 1500. There was up to five times the detected stress levels found in victims due to shock from the earthquake as well as the evacuation.
DISASTER MANAGEMENT EFFORTS
For frequent disasters such as floods, storms, and minor natural calamities, a hierarchical disaster management strategy is employed. Local authorities first try to mitigate the catastrophe and when their resources are exhausted they turn to regional authorities, who turn to the national government if need be. Sometimes the disasters necessitate international intervention.
The disaster in Japan, however, offers a different type of calamity where tens of thousands are immediately at risk from the earthquake and tsunami. Resources at the local authorities are often unavailable from the onset due to loss of infrastructure. Due to this, the government is unable to prioritize needs as many situations require interventions and often the first responders to the crisis end up as victims of the tragedy.
Large scale disasters such as the Fukushima incident require very fast and urgent response. As the number of lives is too many, the government must put comprehensive support systems within 72 hours. Therefore, laxity and discord cannot be tolerated. The Japan incident also presented a significant communication challenge as most of the information coming from the ground was still evolving and therefore inconsistent and data would change rapidly which meant international co-operation was necessary to keep up and minimize casualties.
Following reports of the earthquake, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry created a disaster response headquarters and immediately started gathering information on areas in the affected reactors. The Prime Minister's Office also known as the Kantei formed a Cabinet response team and a high-level crisis meeting involving all ministers in the relevant ministries was held. The Disaster Response Headquarters were at the Prime Minister's office, and he was the head of the taskforce.
When the Fukushima Daichi power plant lost its electricity supply, the director of Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) notified the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) as required by law. NISA informed the cabinet and in conjunction with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry set up a nuclear disaster center and an offsite response center. The main decisions were made in the Prime Minister's office, where a meeting between him, the deputy general of NISA, ministers of relevant ministries and several TEPCO executives came up with ways to handle the situation. This organizational management was however faulted because there was a lack of adequate communication from the Prime Minister's office to the lower bodies. Furthermore. TEPCO was seen as lax and uncooperative in handling the crisis.
After the water got into the reactor, the governor of Fukushima ordered the immediate evacuation of all residents within a two-kilometer radius. The Prime Minister in his capacity as head of the Nuclear Response team ordered all local authorities to evacuate residents living within a 3-kilometer radius as stipulated by the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act while residents within a 10-kilometer radius were advised to take refuge as a cautionary measure. The following day, however, following the rising pressure in reactor 1 due to failing of the cooling pumps, an order was issued to evacuate all citizens within a 10-kilometer radius. This order was extended on the same day to cover a range of 20 kilometers after reactor 1 exploded. An advisory was issued to residents within a 20 to 30-kilometer radius to stay indoors after the hydrogen explosions in the nuclear complex.
At that time, the total number of evictees in the Fukushima prefecture stood at around 158000 residents. Of these, 97000 were relocated to safe areas within the Prefecture while the remaining 62000 were housed outside the Prefecture (Cabinet, 2012). By April that year, the area within a 2o kilometer radius of the nuclear plant was declared a no-entry zone. Temporary re-entry policies were made on humanitarian grounds, and some areas were set aside for anticipated evacuations and others as recommended safe zones.
HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS
Following the incident, a lot of resources had to be pooled to cater for evacuation and later on the restoration of the affected areas. Many of the efforts were carried out by the government, in coordination with help from other countries. Humanitarian organizations, religious organizations, non-profit and for-profit institutions and individuals alike also assisted in the disaster mitigation efforts. Japan requested the help of several countries such as USA, United Kingdom, Canada, South Korea, and China among others to help. It also requested the Charter on Space and International Disasters to be invoked so as to get satellite imagery of affected areas. Other countries also offered monetary and technical assistance in the form of grants, medical supplies, food and clothing, human labor and expertise, equipment among other things.
The non-governmental organizations involved were both for-profit and non-profit. Nonprofit agencies such as the Red Cross played a huge role. They provided shelter, medical facilities and first aid services, helped the government in evacuation and setting up safety zones. Others such as the Swiss Corps provided rescue teams and sniffer dogs to find survivors. Churches and religious organizations also came in to provide counseling, emotional support, food and clothing to those displaced.
Several for-profit companies were also involved in the rescue efforts. They included private medical and security firms. Their role was auxiliary and provided support to the government and served a minority of the victims. They were also involved in debris cleaning, creation of exclusion zones and later in the analysis of the extent of the damage.
Fundraisers were also held worldwide by NGO’s, religious organizations, student bodies, and individuals. While many of these were in good faith, many questioned if some of the fundraisers were necessary seeing that Japan was a wealthy country that was able to support itself. For example, it was estimated that Americans alone donated close to 800 million dollars (Japan Center for International Exchange, 2015). Many argued that this money could have been channeled to less wealthy countries. Some of the organizations were also accused of taking advantage of the humanitarian crisis to raise their funds. They were seen to jump onto the bandwagon because many people would readily donate, and then use the surplus amounts to fund projects in other countries. It was also claimed that some only wanted to enrich their portfolio of efforts they were involved in and would participate in the rescue operations just to make a name for themselves (Paulson, 2015).
RESPONSE AND PLANNING SHORTCOMINGS
The incident at Fukushima can be mainly attributed to lack of tsunami preparation and inadequate backup plans in the nuclear reactor complex. Despite detected foreshocks within the vicinity of Fukushima, no preventive steps were taken in case of a larger disaster. Many of the investigations done named the Fukushima incident as a man-made disaster rather than a natural one, as poor planning on the side of TEPCO caused the reactor meltdowns. This poor planning was alluded to Japan’s rigorous advocacy of nuclear power as clean energy without proper risk assessment.
Japan’s disaster management was also seen as bureaucratic, with the state controlling majority of the mechanisms. This posed a challenge as poor communication slowed don response. Local governments had also cut disaster management budgets, and this rendered them unprepared. There was also disharmony between TEPCO and NISA, which slowed down the efforts to manage the nuclear plant which led to radioactive wastes seeping through to the sea water.
With these lessons from the incident, it is imperative to develop a comprehensive disaster management policy to prevent other possible disasters such as this since Japan has had a history of high seismic activity. Among the necessary changes was the need to formulate a platform for information exchange between parastatals and government agencies during disasters. An independent and well-staffed nuclear oversight agency are needed to plan for and manage nuclear plants and put in place safety measures in case of failure. On top of this, a permanent centralized body should be created to handle disaster management and prevent conflict of interest and ensure it is sufficiently funded.
REFERENCES
Miyake, Y., Matsuzaki, H., Fujiwara, T., Saito, T., Yamagata, T., Honda, M., & Muramatsu, Y. (2012). Isotopic ratio of radioactive iodine (129I/131I) released from Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. Geochem. J. GEOCHEMICAL JOURNAL, 46(4), 327-333.
Paulson, T. (2011, March 16). Guest post: The ugly game of relief for Japan - Humanosphere. Retrieved April 14, 2016, from http://www.humanosphere.org/basics/2011/03/guest-post-the-ugly-game-of-relief-for-japan/
Cabinet Secretariat, (2011). Establishment of the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, Cabinet Decision.
Gannon, J. (2014, July). US Giving for Japan Disaster Reaches $730 Million - JCIE Disaster Response Initiative: Learning from 3/11. Retrieved April 14, 2016, from http://www.jcie.org/311recovery/usgiving4.html
