INTRODUCTION
Adequate comprehension of the composition of the mind is somewhat challenging from the literal perspective. Precisely, it is difficult to explain how the consciousness occurs from a scientific perspective due to the presence of the complexities of the human cognition. David Chalmers (1995) proposes that there are many “easy” problems of consciousness, but one genuinely “hard” problem, namely what philosophers call “qualia”, or phenomenal experience. He argues that the reductive physical, mechanical and functional explanations made by cognitive science are only adequate to explain the easy problems, and that the hard problem requires explanations different not just in difficulty, but rather in kind. In response, Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed Chalmers’ argument by revealing the inadequacies of the existence of hard problems. In this paper, I will defend Chalmers argument against Dennett: I will argue that the hard problem of consciousness does exist, and that it is distinct in type from the so-called easy problems, and that it is crucial to be clear about the difference in order to generate more productive and honest research in the cognitive sciences.
DISCUSSION
The hard problem of consciousness
David Chalmers explains that the easy problems of consciousness are ones that concern the explanation of cognitive abilities and functions in terms of mechanism, such as the ability to discriminate, integrate information, report mental states, etc., these so-called easy problems can be explained by the methods cognitive science. Specifically, simple cognitive tasks can easily be deciphered through the utilization of scientific principles. However, it is worth appreciating the fact that not all aspects of consciousness can be explained through scientific principles. For starters, even if we gave a perfectly complete physical description of a living human being –be it on the levels of function, of behavior or of neurophysiology- we would still have left something out. Some of the aspects that would be difficult to comprehend include the person’s rich subjective phenomenal experience, the first personal “what-it-is-likeness” of being a being.
Chalmers argues that the disparity between the easy and hard problems is quite distinct and can be quantified through an influential understanding of the cognitive capacities. This distinction arises from the persistence of the hard problem even when all relevant functions are explained. There is no explanation of cognitive processes; regardless of how detailed or complete, that answers the further question of why said process should be accompanied by phenomenal experience. With this claim, Chalmers proposes that one cannot justify the possibility of establishing the accuracy of this claim is almost impossible. Why doesn’t it all just happen “in the dark” as we can envision in a well-designed robot or a well-spoken zombie? As Chalmers (1995) states it: “Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does” (p. 201). That is the problem. Dennett (1996) insists that there is no “hard” problem above and beyond the easy ones.
Dennett’s Objection: The Hard Problem of Life
On the contrary, Dennett (1996) proposes a contrasting argument about the role of utilizing scientific principles to explain the overall cognitive processes. Specifically, he argues that consciousness can be delineated through the utilization of scientific cognition. He makes his point by drawing a compelling analogy; imagine if someone said that the easy problems of life include those of explaining things like growth and reproduction, but that the really hard problem is life itself. Furthermore, we can imagine something that was capable of development and reproduction so on, but that isn’t alive. With this claim, Dennett argues that hard problems associated with consciousness can be solved through proper utilization of cognitive science. As such, he disputes Chalmers proposition.
Accordingly, Dennett’s analogy fails because it does not convey this difference between a conceptual error and a nontrivial further question, and therefore, he is wrong to claim that the hard problem is different than the “easy” problems of consciousness.
Block’s Phenomenal Consciousness
Like Chalmers, Ned Block (1995) asserts that "consciousness" refers to many different concepts and phenomena, and suggests that we run into problems when we try to analyze certain aspects of consciousness using premises that cannot be applied to other aspects of consciousness. In hopes to clear up the confusion associated with reasoning about consciousness, Block divides consciousness into several different concepts, with his primary distinction being access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness.
Access consciousness is mainly aimed at promoting oneness and a comprehension of the conscious perspectives. It is mainly aimed at making an individual conscious enough to the point where they can appreciate their role in making change. As such, it gives a provision for explaining what is not understandable in one’s life and aid in the creation of a solution. Phenomenal consciousness is relatively more subjective as opposed to the former. It establishes the cognitive structure and explains consciousness through the utilization of subjective knowledge, contrast and experiences (Block 2011). As such, Block’s general argument upholds the fact that cognitive science can be used to explain consciousness up to an acceptable level.
It is worth mentioning that there is an undisputed similarity between Block’s argument and Chalmers’s proposition. For starters, they both acknowledge the possibility of comprehending cognitive abilities through easy problems. As such, Block maintains that consciousness can be evaluated through appropriate scientific principles. Similarly, Chalmers’ ideology maintains a similar proposition. He suggests that mechanical, functional and reductive physical aspects can be comprehended through the utilization of cognitive knowledge. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the composition of one’s consequences through the assessment of their mental abilities. Consequently, the existence of hard problems can be established since Block’s argument ascertains the credibility of Chalmers’ claim.
Chalmers’ distinction is useful for research
Dennett (1996) describes the categorical dividing between easy and hard problems as a “major misdirect of attention, an illusion generator” and hence not “a useful contribution to research”. Chalmers’ particular proposal — in which qualia are set in a class of their own — is largely a response to researchers who claim having made a genuine progress in explaining subjective experience, and who in reality have done no such thing. “It is common to see a paper on consciousness,” Chalmers (1995) critiques, “begin with an invocation of the mystery of consciousness, noting the strange intangibility and ineffability of subjectivity, and worrying that so far we have no theory of the phenomenon. Here, the topic is clearly the hard problem. [But] in the second half of the paper, the tone becomes more optimistic, and the author’s own theory of consciousness is outlined. This implies that there is no assurance of the nature of the problem being hard. In spite of the author’s focus on the difficulty in solving the issue, it is worth mentioning that this notion is not hard. Rather, it is an easy problem.
Upon examination, this theory turns out to be [of one of the easy problems, and] the reader is left feeling like the victim of a bait and switch” (p. 202). This kind of sleight-of-hand, or if it not deliberately done, simple confusion creates a cloudy pond of conceptual difficulties, whose effect retards scientific progress in the study of the mind. With this claim, one can conclude that the nature of the problems described by this author is an easy one and should not be substituted with a hard problem. Taking this initiative would be promoting erroneous ideologies to the philosophical field and making inaccurate judgments with regard to consciousness.
Will science ever solve The Hard Problem?
Philosophically speaking, Dennett and many other physicists take the scientific description of the world in terms of physics and chemistry as metaphysically fundamental. To them, science is the main description of how the world is, the problem with such worldview is that the limits of science are the limits of the human mind; the magnificent and precise tools of science are a mere extension to human comprehension, and since we cannot step outside of ourselves we might never be able to know the full scope of reality as species. As such, the depth of science is determined by an individual’s cognitive abilities. Surpassing the current levels of a human’s consciousness through science is somewhat impossible since the current advancements are not promising. However, one should not assume that this claim implies the inadequacies of the cognitive science affect its effectiveness in explaining conscious understanding.
I am certainly not implying that we should in any way devalue the scientific method or the scientific understanding of how the human body works. Rather I believe that we should not take science as metaphysics; seeing it not as a very useful and reliable human activity that enables us to make sense of the world we live in, but instead as an ultimate truth of the world in itself. In the light of this, technological singularity seems particularly hopeful. If sometime in the future AI becomes more intelligent than us, they might be able to comprehend things beyond our grasp, and then either boost our brains until we can understand it, or simply explain it to us. Consequently, the current provisions do not render the possibility of explaining consciousness entirely impossible. There is still a constructive provision of making commendable achievements in the future to replicate consciousness.
With the nature of the argument presented above, it is worth mentioning that science might never be able to solve the hard problem associated with consciousness. This is largely accredited to the fact that science cannot equally define the composition of the cognitive structure and overall consciousness. According to Chalmers, cognitive science is only capable of explaining the easy problems present in the consciousness dilemma. Owing to the fact that human beings have a conscious mind capable of developing solutions in challenging situations in real time, the development of scientific machinery cannot duplicate the current levels of consciousness. Block mentions that the level of cognitive understanding incorporated in computers and other modern machinery can derive solutions out of a specified algorithm but are incapable of making independent decisions from what they have learned (Block 2011). Consequently, it is not possible for science to solve the current hard problem existent in one’s understanding of consciousness.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Chalmers is right in drawing a distinction between the easy and hard problems. This is largely accredited to the fact that he outlines the capacities of easy and hard problem solving. On the contrary, Dennett’s claim of addressing the hard problem of consciousness is rather inadequate as it gives a bias perspective on the inadequacies of Chalmers’ claim. Block’s phenomenal consciousness is vital for the progression in the cognitive sciences mainly because it offers conceptual clarity. As such, the relevance of Chalmers’ argument in explaining the impossibilities of explaining hard problems through cognitive science is undisputed. It is not cynical to suggest that the current approach may not be the appropriate one to address consciousness with. On the contrary, it is cynical to deny other possibilities indefinitely, pending the success of an approach that consistently veers away from the problem rather than confronts it.
Works Cited
Block N. Review of Consciousness explained by Daniel C. Dennett. J Phil 1993;90:181-93
Block N. On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 1995;18:272-278
Chalmers D. Facing up to the problem of consciousness. J Consc Stud 1995;2:3200-3219.
Dennett D. Facing backwards on the problem of consciousness. J Consc Stud 1996;3:4-6
Dennett D. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown, & Co., Boston, 1991.
Block, N. "The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct." Analysis 71.3 (2011): 419-431.
