In the modern world, stereotyping has become a way to subtly (or not so subtly) marginalize groups that do not quite fit into the mainstream. It serves as a means of generalizing wide swaths of people as individually similar (or even identical) to the culture to which they belong. Stereotypes often take one aspect of a particular culture and apply it to each individual who is a part of that culture. For some, stereotyping is just a matter of expediency. Applying certain character traits to a certain group of people, they might say, makes interactions run more smoothly. Of course, stereotyping at its heart can have detrimental effects on a marginalized group of people. This piece explores the excuses for and the detriments of stereotyping based on race, gender, and age. It also touches on the cognitive nature of prejudice and how that affects the way individuals view entire groups. Ultimately, the question comes down to whether or not there is ever a legitimate excuse for stereotyping.
Stereotypes play an enormous role in both social cohesion and cognitive function. Human beings have long had a penchant for categorizing other human beings. Evidence of this kind of prejudice is everywhere and has created an almost “Us versus Them” ethos in modern societal discourse (Fiske, 2005, p. 40). An individual’s perception and their past experiences often shape how they interpret the world around them. Unfortunately, this has often led to the promulgation of racism, sexism, ageism, and many other kinds of discrimination. Scholars have argued for over half a century about the true sources of stereotyping and “prejudgment,” (Allport, 1954/1979). Of course, there are two schools of thought regarding stereotyping: (a) it comes from an incontrovertible, automatic cognitive response and (b) it is based on a number of factors including cognition, personal motivation, and confirmation bias (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993, p. 273). The former nearly abolishes the idea that stereotyping is a choice and the latter places blame fully on an individual in question. This concept of preferential treatment has marginalized minorities and “others” across millennia.
The exceedingly unfortunate thing about the cognitive predilection aspect of stereotyping is that it almost gives people a license to ostracize or categorize other people who do not fit within a certain group or pattern. Indeed, humans are prone to pigeonholing groups outside the mainstream based on criteria like “gender, ethnicity, age, occupation, or religious affiliation,” (Sinclair & Kunda, 1999, p. 887). Ultimately, however, researchers tend to emphasize the fact that acting on stereotypes is at least partially dependent on one’s own freewill and not wholly bound by cognition or cultural influences (Fiske, 2005, p. 42). They are also quick to point out that the ingrained tendency toward discrimination is difficult to overcome precisely because it is so cognitively rooted.
Racial stereotyping
Racial and ethnic stereotypes are some of the most prevalent, persistent, and annoying facets of discrimination. Whether consciously or not, most people exhibit some form of racial stereotyping in their day-to-day lives. Of course, there are abject bigots who consciously and consistently derogate people of another race regardless of their social acumen or occupational standing. But, racial stereotypes often play out in much subtler and less incendiary ways.
In fact, one study carried out by Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) illustrates the effect of a concept called “aversive racism.” This form of stereotyping occurs when an individual from a majority group exhibits an exaggerated positive bias toward an individual of a marginalized group. For instance, a white employer looking to hire a new employee might be overtly friendly and excessively acquiescent to a black applicant. In Dovidio and Gaertner’s study in which students were asked to judge the viability of a peer counselor (for simulated employment at their university), black applicants were chosen for employment more frequently if they appeared to be the most qualified even if going up against a white applicant with similar qualifications. If a black and white applicant’s qualifications were ambiguous, students often chose against the black applicant. The study suggests that even self-defined non-prejudicial “whites may give white candidates the ‘benefit of the doubt,’ a benefit not extended toblack candidates,” (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, p. 318).
This also suggests that whites are more prone to lauding an exceptional black candidate as a literal “exception to the rule” (i.e. the rule that blacks are generally less qualified) and derogating a black candidate’s weak or ambiguous qualifications as indicative of their personality (p. 318). Even though some people might profess to being entirely non-prejudicial, it is clear that some of those people work under a prejudicial framework, even if it is subtle.
An egalitarian aversive racist might remind any accusers that he or she espouses non-racist, non-prejudicial views. This might manifest itself in the subtlety of a statement like, “he was actually really eloquent,” in reference to a black man. Even though this statement seems to be complimentary, it actually runs afoul of all the non-prejudicial, humanist views to which the person saying it might subscribe. It operates under the framework that minorities are frequently ineloquent and suggests that the person saying it does not view minorities in a particularly positive light. Indeed, as a study by Finke (2000) points out, “when an aversive racist encounters a context that would expose discrimination, tolerance results,” but in situations where exposing their discrimination is not a concern, “prejudice results,” (p. 304). They might rationalize this behavior with invocations of their overall generosity or love for humanity, but the ideology still persists: they only discriminate when in contexts that will not expose their prejudice. Indeed, perhaps the most troubling thing about aversive racists is that they do not know they are racists (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000, p. 315). This creates an almost imbalanced relationship in which stereotypes are viewed as the collective status quo and individual human beings are judged based entirely on that status.
Gender stereotyping
Just like stereotyping based on race, gender stereotyping is rooted in a hierarchical system of what is and is not acceptable for certain genders to do. This usually manifests itself in the “performance” of gender roles. Women and men are supposed to act in certain ways, wear certain clothes, and fill societal roles to appear as “normal” as possible. But this type of stereotyping can also have negative impacts on a wide range of people.
It is undeniable that the society in which we live is primarily male-dominated (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 573). Males are often seen as the primary breadwinners. They often hold the highest positions in political or corporate settings, and this is certainly a normative view. Women, however, are often seen as docile caretakers charged with tending to the family and maintaining the house. These are two entirely disparate views that can certainly serve to marginalize women (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 574). Of course, most people are aware by now that gender roles can never be fixed and exist on a sort of continuum that ranges from masculine to feminine and everywhere in between.
Still, these gender roles are rooted in the collective consciousness. If a woman exhibits traits that are not quite feminine enough, she will likely be ostracized by both females and males. Even then, one of the most prominent excuses for the lack of women in leadership roles stems from the idea that they “display fewer of the traits and motivations that are necessary to attain and achieve success in high-level positions,” (Eagly & Karau, 2002, p. 573). Many people might argue that women are better-suited for “home” life and that having a career is actually a detriment because of their perceived inclinations toward weakness. This idea, however, is rooted in antediluvian concepts that devalue women as active and motivated members of society with the ability to excel in any position they set their minds to.
Ageism
The last of the three major social categories that humans use to classify each other is age. Stereotypes relating to age abound across generations and can lead to significant misinformation and devaluation. In ancient times, elders were revered facets of a vibrant community. They were lauded for their wisdom and what some thought was their divine importance (Nelson, 2005, p. 208). Over time, though, the popular perception of elders made them out to be dispensable and otherwise “used-up.” Many people today think of people in older generations as remarkably insignificant because they have been “marginalized, institutionalized, and stripped of responsibility, power, and, ultimately, their dignity,” (Nelson, 2005, p. 208).
The truly unfortunate thing about this stereotype is that older people are still functioning adults no matter how much society marginalizes them. They still have all the cognitive and emotional capacity of younger human beings and, yet, they are still somehow devalued. Indeed, one of the most patronizing manifestations of this stereotype is the ubiquitous “overaccommodation and baby talk,” (Nelson, 2005, p. 209). Younger people often try their best to complete tasks for their elderly friends or family. They also tend to speak slowly and loudly in concise sentences to ensure that the older adults understand. Of course, this has the potential dual effect of angering the older adult and then legitimizing the idea that they indeed are working with a decreased set of cognitive skills (Nelson, 2005, p. 209).
It is important to respect older adults and to not stereotype as lower-functioning, slower-moving facsimiles of “real people.” The fact is, they are real people and deserve to be treated as such.
Conclusion
Despite the fact that stereotyping is rooted in a human’s consciousness, it does not intimate that humans must employ it. Although certain cognitive functions and experiential memories are bound to create some kind of prejudice, the onus of racist, sexist, and ageist behaviors is on each particular individual. Still, cognitive factors play a large role in determining “prejudgmental” and prejudicial behavior. Humans, some would say, are programmed to prefer the “in-group” over the “out-group,” (Fiske, 2000, p. 305). People want to achieve acceptance, but, if they live an environment where acceptance is already freely given, they will naturally resist the inclusion of an “outsider.” Even so, it is important for people to evaluate their perceptions of race, gender, and age to ensure that they are not devaluing another human being’s existence.
References
Allport, G. W., (1954/1979). The nature of prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books
Banaji, M. R., Hardin, C., & Rothman, A. J. (1993). Implicit tereotyping in person judgment. Journal of personality and social psychology, 65(2), 272-281. Retrieved from http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/userhome/psych/chardin/Banaji_Hardin_Rothman_1993.pdf
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2000). Aversive racism and selection decisions. Psychological science, 11(4), 315-319. Retrieved from http://www.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/Reference Media/Dovidio_Gaertner_2000_Discrimination.pdf
Eagly, A. H., & Karau, S. J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), 573-598. doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.109.3.573
Fiske, S. T. (2005). Social cognition and the normality of prejudgment. In J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick & L. A. Rudman, On the nature of prejudice: fifty years after Allport (pp. 36-53). doi:wxy.seu.edu.cn/humanities/sociology/htmledit/uploadfile/system/20110228/20110228020027443.pdf
Fiske, S. T. (2000). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination at the seam between the centuries: evolution, culture, mind, and brain. European journal of social psychology, 30, 299-322. Retrieved from http://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~schaller/Psyc591Readings/Fiske2000.pdf
Nelson, T. D. (2005). Ageism: Prejudice against our feared future self. Journal of Social Issues, 61(2), 207-221. Retrieved from http://academics.tctc.edu/adn_nursing/Nelson-Ageism-Prejudice Against Our Feared Future Self.pdf
Sinclair, L., & Kunda, Z. (1999). Reactions to a black professional: Motivated inhibition and activation of conflicting stereotypes. Journal of personality and social psychology, 77(5), 885-904. Retrieved from http://www.atkinson.yorku.ca/~jsteele/PDF/Sinclair_Kunda_JPSP_1999.pdf
