Interwar Technological Developments and Their Effect on
The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919 to bring an end to World War I, “the war to end all wars.” The introduction to the Treaty set forth a general plan to accomplish this objective:
and honourable relations between nations by the firm establishment of the understandings
of international law as the actual rule of conduct among Governments, and by the
maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings
of organised peoples with one another Agree to this Covenant
Ironically, this meticulous declaration was signed by the allied and axis powers and in just a few years, it would become a meaningless paper document. In commenting on the Treaty, a British general said, “After ‘the war to end war’ they seem to have been pretty successful in Paris at making a ‘Peace to end Peace’” . In Article 8 of the Versailles Treaty, terms were set out for the reduction of armaments by the Allies and general disarmament of the axis powers: “the limits of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the Council. The Members of the League agreed that the manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections.” Furthermore, in anticipation for infractions against this mandate, Section 8 also stated, “The Members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments, their military, naval, and air programs and the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to war-like purposes.” Not only was the provision against rearmament intentionally violated in subsequent years and particularly in the years immediate to the outbreak of World War II, but the provision for the exchange of “full and frank” information regarding such activities was also willfully violated. Therefore, the question arises, did this combination of circumstances ignite World War II? This essay highlights on a global perspective, how the allied and axis powers demonstrated, despite the violations of the Versailles Treaty, technological developments in the interwar period and also how these technological dynamics significantly affected the outcome of World War II.
Germany
The focus of technological development in the early interwar period was in bombers: “After World War I, the concept of massed aerial bombinghad become very popular with politicians and military leaders seeking an alternative to the carnage of trench warfare, and as a result, the air force[of] Germany had developed fleets of bomber planes to enable this.” The testing of new aircraft technologies, such as Stuka dive bombing aircraft and the technological details of dive bomb bombardment of military and civilian populations, received “real-life” testing in the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s.
In other areas of technology related to armaments, the development of technologies contributing to fast, powerful, and effective tanks and artillery was seen as the other most effective form of battle force. The objective was to move rapidly to create an invasive force to avoid being bogged down in trench warfare as happened in World War I: “throughout the 1920s and 1930s, German arms manufacturers and the Wehrmacht had begun secretly developing tanks. As these vehicles were produced in secret, their technical specifications and battlefield potentials were largely unknown to the European Allies until the war actually began.” The tanks were developed in four types, the Panzer I, II, III, and IV, each of which was adapted for a particular type of terrain and battle strategy. In the 1930s, Germany also embarked on a program focused on the technology for developing an atomic bomb but it did not progress very rapidly due to a great degree to antisemitic restrictions against the most knowledgeable personnel. Technological research and development also focused on the navy: “Germanybegan clandestine activities in an attempt to retain some of the technology which she had garnered during [World War I]. In due time Germany had not only managed to continue research and development but had also actually trained some crew members in the U-Boat” operations. After the rise to power of the Nazis, the naval and U-boat technologies' research and development increased substantially through the start of the war in 1939.
Altogether, technological developments in aircraft and bombing techniques, tanks and artillery, naval ships and operations all contributed significantly to the initiation and waging of offensive and then defensive warfare during World War II. The only technology not substantially pursued into the war was chemical warfare. The German project to create the technology for an atomic bomb was not completed during that time period. Nevertheless, technological developments in the interwar period contributed significantly to the initiation and continuation of the war until its final year. Thus, while theoretically restricted from the pursuit and development of warfare technologies, by 1939, Germany was advanced over the major allied powers of The United States, Great Britain, and France (see below).
The Allies
Countering the U.S., the full adherence to the terms of the Versailles Treaty was the fact that Britain, and France had treaties with other countries, territories, and/or colonies under their influence, jurisdiction, and control which they had to maintain and defend. As the result of the Treaty itself, previous German colonies were transferred to allied countries. Thus, the arms limitation on the allies in the Treaty held little significance.
However, several factors limited the growth of warfare technology and innovation in the interwar period for the allies, although it was not a direct result of the terms of the Versailles Treaty. The economic circumstances of the allied nations and the reactionary pacifism following World War I were two dominant factors that resulted in a delay in military technology and innovation. World War I had caused major adverse effects to the economic base of the allied countries. Both industry and agriculture were affected by the war either directly or indirectly. Reorientation and reconstruction from war to a peacetime stability was required. “Once the economy had recovered and in its economic boom of the roaring twenties, war was just not a viable option. People were enjoying life and the war to end all wars had finished. The economy did not support establishing a war machine economic base to support future wars.” Then came the Great Depression which further severely limited funds for research and development of warfare technologies.
The second major factor was a significant change in the mindset of the allied populations. The cost of World War I had been devastating, both in human lives and in monetary funds, and the populations were not interested in additional “wartime” expenses in peacetime. Further, following the lead of the populations, funds allocations by national governments for military technology were significantly reduced or curtailed. There was also the rise in power of an isolationist, pacifist, and anti-war social and political movements. Therefore, in the turbulent years of the 1920s and 1930s, “Furthest from anyone’s mind was military innovation.” Thus, there were important economic and social-public opinion factors that mitigated against interwar warfare technological development in the interwar period for the allies which had nothing to do with the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
The United States
Technological development in the interwar period was very low in the United States for a variety of reasons not directed to the result of the Versailles Treaty: “In America an anti-war, anti militarist lobby had formed and opposed any increase in the size of defense budgets, this along with military commitments to Asia, Russia and Caribbean basin countries served to sap the Department of War of its resources. America had also developed an isolationist mindset “ These factors not only significantly hinder the development of warfare technology but also prevented the procurement of weapons for offensive or defensive warfare from foreign powers as the Americans felt secure from European aggression and warfare. One example of the separation of the American government from reality at the time was the Kellog-Briand Pact of 1928 between the United States and the allied and axis powers of Europe, “providing for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.”.
The most significant technological development in the interwar period started in 1939, with the initiation of the atomic technology research project that became the Manhattan Project resulting in 1945 with the production of the Atomic Bomb. The second most significant development in the U.S.' technological innovation in the interwar period was the Norden Bombsite. Other than those programs, and despite the several journeys to Germany by Charles Lindberg touring and reviewing manufacturing facilities and aviation technological developments in the mid and late 1930s, in which he was aware of German aircraft research and rearmament, the U.S. did not gear up significant technological warfare research and development until after the declaration of war on Japan and Germany in December 1941. Nevertheless, while interwar technological development was minimal, and while post-declaration of war technological research and development was significant finally in the defeat of Germany in Europe in ending the war (along with the use of the Norden bombsite), it was the technological development of the Atomic Bomb that started late in the intrerwar period, which ended the war with Japan.
Great Britain
“From 1920 until early 1939, the British army existed in an anti-military milieu [which]reinforced anti-war and anti-military attitudes that more and more characterized the conventional wisdom” In this environment, the army received minimal resources for research and development of technologies of warfare. In regard to naval technology, the British was focused only on maintaining its fleet for the protection of the colonies and colonial transport, not on the possibility or probability of the outbreak of another war. Therefore, aircraft carrier and submarine technological research and development was neglected. In fact, it was proposed by some in the government to abolish the submarine service altogether. By the same token, technological research and development in the areas of aircraft for wartime purposes lagged in Britain right up to the start of World War II in 1939. “Up to the start of the war, the Royal Air Force continued to struggle against conventional concepts of warfare in which the air force maintained a precarious position.
Thus, military and wartime technology in Great Britain was significantly retarded due primarily to the factors discussed above for the allies in general. Great Britain's contribution to the ending of the war, like that of the United States, was primarily the result of rapid technological research, development, and production after the outbreak of war in 1939, not in the interwar period.
France
“Throughout the Interwar period, France did not take their preparations for a ground war seriously” other than the construction of the Maginot line, which was France's effort to “wall itself off” from Germany. In essence, the Maginot line focused on a kind of architectural technology. Huge concrete bunkers were constructed along France's eastern border. “Inside there were tunnels, underground railroads, and thousands of men who served in the forts who "slept, trained, watched, and waited for a war that never came." The French felt their country would be safe from German aggression hiding behind the most massive defense line in the world.
Beyond the Maginot Line, French military technology in the interwar period was focused on the reorganization of the army and development of artillery mechanized units. Based on their experiences in World War I, the French developed three different types of tank technologies—tanks to accompany the infantry, light battle tanks built for rapid offensive movement, and “rupture” tanks to crush enemy lines and fortifications—all three of which they were successful at. In the restructuring of the army and in the establishment of the Army War College, policy in France came to be based on the principle that, “Technological innovations must be exploited to the maximum extent possible, and not just made to fit the existing doctrine. They must be incorporated into doctrine and tactics, and be balanced with personnel, training and education systems.” However, little such technological innovations actually took place. Thus, the innovation in France in the interwar period focused on policy and doctrine, not on actual technological research and development. While the contributions of the high-quality French tanks was important in the beginning of the war in 1939, in the long term, the lack of adequate strategy backed by military technological development resulted in a rapid victory by Germany of the French military forces and German occupation of France until the last year of the war, Thus, French technological development in the interwar period was not significant in ending the war.
In conclusion, as this country-by-country survey of the principle axis and allied states of interwar technological research and development has demonstrated, the critical two provisions of the Versailles Treaty intended to control the armaments of the allies and end rearmament of the axis powers were violated almost immediately by Germany in the first few years after the signing of the Treaty. Additionally, while the Treaty-violating technological research and developments by Germany prolonged the war due to the allies' countries' concomitant lack of interwar technological development, in the end, it was the rapid increases in military technology undertaken by the U.S. and Great Britain after the start of the World War II which were effective in ending the European war and the late interwar technological U.S. initiation of research and development of the Atomic Bomb that ended the War in Asia in 1945.
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