Abstract
The Piper Alpha disaster is well known for it resulted in the highest number of casualties who lost their lives in the history of off shore oil and gas rigging. This paper reviews literature on the Piper Alpha disaster presenting an overview of the circumstances that led to the occurrence of the tragedy. Further, it examines the role that different parties played with regard to their contributions to the situation. Subsequently, an analysis of the course of action taken with regard to the management of the disaster as it happened and in its aftermath is as well evaluated. The paper also examines literature on the lessons that the oil and gas drilling industry has drawn from the disaster. The results of the literature review are indicative of a rich contribution of scholarly works on the Piper Alpha disaster presenting the oil and gas drilling industry with priceless knowledge necessary in disaster management and risk assessment.
Introduction
This is the world’s worst oil rigging accident that led to the loss of 167 lives of men who worked at an offshore oil extraction plant in the North Sea (Duff, 2008). The company Piper Alpha began production in 1976 extracting oil and later engaged in the extraction of gas as well. In 1988 however disaster struck when a series of explosions killed three-quarters of the workers on site leaving only about 67 survivors who lived to tell the tale of how they made it out with their lives (Ross, 2008). It has been termed as the world’s deadliest offshore oil rig accident that is largely blamed on negligence on the part of maintenance of safety standards and disregard of safety procedures based on a report on the inquiry of the cause of the disaster prepared by Lord Cullen (Macalister, 2013).
The Crisis
The Piper Alpha Disaster (TPAD) was occasioned by human error on the part of the personnel working different shifts at the offshore oil production plant. NASA’s (2013, p.2) account of the event observe that on the 6th July 1988 the eventful day when the disaster struck a pressure regulator valve was damaged. Improvisation by one of the workers led him to use a blind flange an equivalent of a round metal plate for sealing the open pipe in place of the damaged valve. Later on in the night when the night shift workers took charge at around 9.55 p.m. they open up too much pressure in the pipelines that the blind flange could not handle. Momentary alarms went off in the facility followed by a series of explosions that less to massive loss of lives (NASA, 2013, p. 2).
Similar sentiments are developed by Pate’-Cornell (1993, p. 231) who describes the TPAD as a human error that is far from what people would consider an act of God. Allen (2011) contends that simple condolences are not enough to provide an explanation for the disaster that led to the massive loss of lives due to negligence on the part of the management of the oil rig.
The management of the facility is as well put to fault in regard to the failure of the management to make decisions that could have averted the crisis. Further, the failure of the management at the site to mitigate the occurrence of the disaster was seen to be in the structures put in place to tackle an instance of an accident as such. The organization’s culture, procedures and structures served counterproductively in developing mechanisms that were necessary to effectively manage the disaster (Pate'-Cornell, 1933, p. 215).
The failures of the management in mitigating the disaster has also been blamed on the poor record keeping and information sharing mechanism that were in place at a time. Consequently, the failure of the valve A was recorded and its operation shut but there was a bit of a failure on the part of the shift workers involved communicating this to the incoming shift workers during the night shift. As a result, the valve was put to work after another valve B failed engineers on site noted that they could not find records on the status of the operation of valve A and assumed it was operational. The result of this negligence was not only irresponsible but catastrophic leading to the loss of 167 lives (Allen, 2011).
Whereas maintenance measures were taken by the workers on site to ensure that the operations of the facility were not compromised, it is worrying to note that the maintenance of valve A was done in a manner that place the operations of the facility and the lives of the workers at risk. According to European Agency for safety and Health (2014) regular maintenance is essential in ensuring that machines and other facilities are monitored to secure the safety of workers on site. Moreover, maintenance in itself is a risky venture that also requires that it is done in a safe manner to ensure the safety of those maintaining the facilities.
The Center of Risk for Health Care Research and Practice (2014) also agrees with the sentiments by NASA (2013, p. 2) in regard to the negligence and irresponsibility in the management of the disaster during and after its occurrence. In essence, if proper mechanisms of disaster management were employed perhaps the disaster could have been avoided in regard to the magnitude of the damage that was realized.
Human error once again props up as the main cause of the disaster, pointing out the lack in appropriate leadership that could have been utilized to ensure the safety of those at the site. There was insufficient analysis of the hazards that stared in the face of the operations at the site coupled by inadequacies in training personnel at the facility in the appropriate means to manage disastrous situations. Moreover, the evacuation procedures during a disaster were either not communicated as appropriate or measures were not taken to ensure that all personnel had ease of access to securing their lives in case of a disaster. In the end more than 150 lives were lost majorly comprising of workers who could not find their way out of the gushing oil and gas flames (Scott, 2011).
Coordination between the leadership and personnel also became an issue of worry as they were more or less used to informal means of communication that eventually affected the maintenance procedures on the site. The night shift workers overlooked the need to counter check records in regard to the state of valve A that ultimately led to the disaster. The relaxed state of affairs in regard to the communication's mechanisms is a human error that is largely to blame for the demise of the 167 who died that night (Center of Risk for health care research and practice, 2014).
The blame on the disaster based on a report prepared by Lord Cullen settled on the lack of disaster preparedness and criticism of the safety procedures on the facility as the main cause of the disaster. However, probes by insurance firms on the incident placed the blame on two workers who managed valve A but who were also unlucky to have died during the disaster as they did not live to tell their side of the story (BBC, 2005). Interestingly, no blame has been directed to the management in regard to laxity in ensuring adherence to safety standards and procedures. In effect, no actual accountability for the disaster has to date been made in the event that led up to the loss of 167 men whose families still seek justice and closure on the matter (Allen, 2011).
Disaster Management During and in the Aftermath of the Crisis
The management’s irresponsibility was also seen in its lack of disaster preparedness mechanisms. For instance, when the alarm systems went off and the first explosion hit fire extinguishing PTW system was not in operational condition. As a result in the night of the disaster they did not start automatically as they were expected to although indications of clogging were also cited as to have prevented the system from working anyway. Centrally, the level of preparedness by the management of the disaster proved wanting since its management was quite irresponsible making it impossible to mitigate measures for managing the disaster (Allen, 2011).
Conditions during the disaster as well proved very difficult to manage provided that there were limited resources on the part of the management and the adequate mechanisms to rescue workers trapped during the disaster. To a great extent the plant’s conversion from an oil rigging to a gas rigging facility has a lot to do with the culmination of the disaster to the extreme levels that were witnessed. The leaking gas pipe at valve A is to blame for the disaster that sparked the beginning of a massive fireball which engulfed the entire facility. The heat was so much it melted the metal work that held the facility together making it impossible to facilitate rescue operations from the air and vessels on the water (Carey, 2014).
Pitcher (2013) also observes that the manner in which rescue operations were conducted immediately after and during the disaster were to no avail majorly due to the lack of access to the disaster area. The living quarters of the workers who were not on shift were such that workers were trapped. In this regard, their quarters sank into the sea killing the workers through drowning. However, most lives could have been saved if only there were mechanisms in place to ensure that there is ease of access to the movement during emergency situations (Pitcher, 2013).
The walls around the quarters were also not aerated which resulted into the clogging of the gas in the rooms and in the hallways where most personnel were working and living. Resultantly, the majority of the persons trapped in the hallways were burnt beyond recognition due to the high concentration of the gas as they tried to make their way out.
Perhaps on a wake up call note the aftermath of the disaster saw several bodies in the oil industry star struck over the magnitude of the damage that had been caused by the disaster. In reaction, the bodies took cognition of the risks that are involved in the oil and gas rigging business. Hence, calls for the development of safety procedures and in the working environment became an issue for debate. For instance, activists developed the Oil Industry Liaison Committee to coordinate action by oil and gas industry workers from different unions. All these in an attempt to ensure the security of people working in oil and gas rigs (Rothnie, 2014).
Scholars such as Hull Alexander and Klein (2002, p. 433) were however concerned about the welfare of the survivors of the disaster than the impact it had in the aftermath. In their evaluations, they examined the mental states of the survivors in regard to their traumatic experiences from the event. A study conducted by the three scientists revealed that out of a total of seven survivors out of the ones interviewed showed signs of post-traumatic stress disorder.
The moral of the investigation on the survivor’s state of mind was to develop future mechanism that can be utilized in ensuring that survivor wellbeing can be improved in the case of the occurrence of situations of emergency such as was witnessed in the Piper Alpha disaster (Hull et al., 2002, p. 436). Similar sentiments of psychiatric analysis of the victim’s state of mind have as well been furthered by Alexander (1991, p. 7) who is also concerned about extending a hand to the surviving victims of the disaster together with their family. The kind of help offered is psychiatric which is instrumental in the management of the traumatic experiences of the individuals. Moreover, it helps them cope with life after their traumatic episodes especially in instances where victims are disabled from the disaster.
The psychiatric evaluation also proves crucial in the analysis of the coping mechanisms that the family members can put in place to mitigate and deal with trauma, as a result, of the occurrence of a disaster. Ultimately, these joint efforts are meant to improve on the mental health of victims and survivors of catastrophic disasters in the future (Alexander, 1991, p. 10).
Ultimately, the aftermath of the disaster led up to the development of inquiry into the disaster led by Cullen as mentioned earlier. The inquiry developed up to 106 recommendation's in regard to the establishment of safety procedures. Centrally, the recommendations notably required that the responsibility of ensuring safety in the North Sea safety be placed on the hands of the Health and Safety Executive body which was deemed to be more competent and concerned about safety of oil workers than the body that was then responsible for the same The Department of Energy (Center of Risk for health care research and practice, 2014).
Lessons Learned
Among the gains that have been mentioned to have arisen from the disaster are based in the recommendations by Lord Cullen specifying that the industry should comply with goal setting regulations. In this regard, the Health Safety Executive body has designed guidelines that are used to identify areas of risk and provide guidance on measures and procedures that are most suitable for managing such risks (Pearse, et al., 2001, p. 5). According to Slaven and Flin (1997, p. 336), to ensure that there is compliance with the regulations of the Health Safety Executive body it is necessary that a competent and qualified disaster manager is assigned to a particular oil and or gas rigging facility with the sole instruction of ensuring that the safety of the facility.
As a result of the development of independence in the management of risk in oil and gas rig disaster management the Piper Alpha disaster as well initiated legislation that is meant to introduce relevant aspects of safety in the oil and gas rigging sectors. Further, the pieces of legislation were tailored to ensure that the focus on safety is shifted from a prescriptive to performance based approach (Dahle et al., 2002, p. 37).
Hence, the goal approach has been found to be both flexible and fitting. In this sense oil and gas drilling companies are not restricted to meeting particular specifications on safety. Rather, they are given a free will to choose for their own the safety mechanisms that are available and necessary so long as they receive approval from the safety regulatory body after thorough inspection. Moreover, under guidance and monitoring by a qualified manager the occurrence of disasters can be mitigated professionally. This is because the presence of qualified personnel in the field in regard to the management of the disaster can be dependable in ensuring the facility is safe for workers as well as for general environmental safety and health (Slaven & Flin, 1997, p. 340).
Similarly, industry players have learned that they have to involve the workforce in the efforts towards the mitigation and management of risks in the oil and gas extraction sites. Training sessions on safety procedures have been found necessary to equip individuals with the skills and expertise of effectively managing an emergency situation (Donald & Canter, 1994, p. 17). In this regard, some form of consultation between the management and the workforce is necessary to ensure that there is development of an understanding between the two factions particularly concerning safety procedures in the institution (Easthope, 2007, p. 3).
According to Smith (2001, p. 61), the disaster manager in the oil and gas rigs should build a risk management team around him who actively asses the risk situation of the ground. In essence, the prerogative of the management is to ensure that there is coordination among team players for the effectiveness of the management objectives in regard to ensuring the safety on the facility.
Pitcher (2013) finds that training of workers in the industry has also made them better prepared for disaster situations particularly in regard to communication channels development. Formalization of communication has enhanced the sharing of information regarding safety procedures in oil and gas rigs. Ultimately, the level of coordination has in turned enhanced competencies in the effective management of disaster situations as and when they occur.
The improvement of the coordination efforts between management and workers can also be seen in the manner in which there is a generation of a safety culture in the industry. Industry players are increasingly concerned about safety measures which contribute into joint efforts that prove successful in mitigating the management of risk at the facility (Cullen, 1980, p. 3).
Another important lesson in the aftermath of the crisis was the insurance claim that the Lloyd’s of London had to pay. The figure in total which stands at US $1.4 billion is the highest insurance claim in the history of manmade disasters experienced in the world (Center of Risk for health care research and practice, 2014).It became a great lesson to other insurers across the world in regard to maintaining proper assessment of risks before insuring an oil and gas rig. More importantly, it served to ensure that safety procedures in regard to mitigation efforts towards the development of safety mechanisms are adhered to (Pate-Cornell, 1993, p. 215).
The fourth lesson to be drawn from the Lord Cullen report’s recommendations is the design of the oil and gas rig structures that are continuously taking a form that makes ease of access attainable. The design is made in anticipation of emergency situations where crowding may result into loss of lives. This is because it is often the case that people squeeze into small spaces in emergency situations eventually blocking access making the situation worse. By adopting a spacious design, the facilities are able to accommodate more people at a particular time in regard to areas of frequent movement where immediate access is required (Pitcher, 2013).
Ultimately, the lessons learned from the disaster serve to resound the popular words of Weir (1999, p. 248) “Those who cannot learn from the history are condemned to repeat it." Hence, on this note the lessons drawn from the Piper Alpha disaster have served to ensure that proper measures are taken in the mitigation and management of emergency situations in oil and gas rigs worldwide. Therefore, these lessons have initiated important milestones in ensuring the safety of personnel working at the facilities to avert another disaster which may lead to unnecessary loss of lives (Gordon, 1998, p. 107).
Conclusion
The Piper Alpha disaster has been described as the worst in the history of mankind to have ever occurred on the oil and gas rigging industry. The accident is the worst in history to have occurred offshore killing a total of 265 workers and another 2 rescue personnel. It is an event that will ever remain fresh in the minds of the slightly over 60 survivors who lived to tell the tale of their liberation from the flames that claimed the lives of their colleagues.
The literature reviewed has developed three fundamental topics on the Piper Alpha disaster. These include the disaster itself, the mitigation efforts and the lessons to be drawn from the disaster. Foremost, the review finds that the disaster’s source was largely blamed on human error in regard to negligence in the handling of safety procedures and taking precautions. Nonetheless, the paper finds that poor disaster preparedness and poor disaster management protocols as well led to the escalation of the magnitude of the crisis leading to loss of 167 lives.
Secondly, the paper has reviewed the courses of action that were available for exploration during and in the aftermath of a disaster. To this end the literatures reviewed suggest that rescue efforts were thwarted due to inaccessibility to the location through the air or by sea. This made rescue efforts impossible to initiate. The aftermath was a shock wave on the deaths that were, as a result, of the disaster which generated calls among industry players for better safety management of oil and gas rigging facilities to save the lives of workers in the future.
The paper has as well analyzed the lessons to be drawn from the crisis. In this regard, the literature reviewed reveals that the disaster was an eye opener to industry players such as workers unions, health and safety institutes and insurance companies on the need to carry out effective risk analysis in the future. These lessons have in turn led to the development of mechanisms that sustain and maintain safe working environments for workers in the oil and gas rigging industry. Primarily, the paper is a comprehensive review of the literature on issues surrounding the Piper Alpha disaster.
References
Alexander, D. A., 1991. Psychiatric intervention after the Piper Alpha disaster. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 84(1), pp. 8 - 11.
Allen, B., 2011. Piper Alpha: condolences are not enough. [Online] Available at: http://www.healthandsafetyatwork.com/hsw/piper-alpha-lessons[Accessed 2 7 2014].
BBC, 2005. 1988: Piper Alpha oil rig ablaze. BBC On this Day, 6 7.
Carey, R., 2014. Piper Alpha Disaster. [Online] Available at: http://www.educationscotland.gov.uk/scotlandshistory/20thand21stcenturies/piperalpha/index.asp[Accessed 2 7 2014].
Center of Risk for health care research and practice , 2014. Piper Alpha accident. [Online] Available at: http://www.smd.qmul.ac.uk/risk/yearone/casestudies/piper-alpha.html[Accessed 2 7 2014].
Cullen, W. D., 1980. The Public Inquiry into the Piper Alpha disaster, London: HMSO.
Dahle , I. B. et al., 2002. Major Accidents and their Consequences for Risk Regualtion. In: B. Grall & G. Soares , eds. Advances in Safety, Reliability and Risk Management. London: Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 33 - 37.
Donald , I. & Canter , D., 1994. Employee attitudes and safety in the chemical industry. Journal of loss prevention in the process industries , 7(3), pp. 1 - 19.
Duff, S., 2008. Remembering Piper Alpha Disaster. BBC NEWS, 6 June.
Easthope, L., 2007. Public Enquiries: Thematic Review, s.l.: Emergency Planning College.
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work , 2014. Maintanance. [Online] Available at: https://osha.europa.eu/en/topics/maintenance[Accessed 2 7 2014].
Gordon, R. P., 1998. The Contribution of human factors to accidents in the offshore oil industry. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Volume 61, pp. 95 - 108.
Hull , A. M., Alexander , D. A. & Klein , S., 2002. Survivors of the Piper Alpha oil platform disaster: long-tern follow-up study. The British Journal of Psychiatry, Volume 181, pp. 433 - 438.
Macalister, T., 2013. Piper Alpha disaster: how 167 oil rig workers died. The Guardian, 4 July.
NASA, 2013. The Case for Safety: The North Sea Piper Alpha Disaster. The NASA Monthly Safety e-Message., May, 7(4).
Pate'-Cornell, M. E., 1933. Learnig from the Piper Alpha Accident: A Postmotem Analysis of Technical and Organizational Factors. Risk Analysis An International Journal, 13(2), pp. 215 - 232.
Pate-Cornell, M. E., 1993. Learning from the Piper Alpha Accident: a post-moterm analysis of technical and organizational factors. Risk Analysis, 13(2), pp. 215 - 232.
Pearse , W., Gallagher , C. & Bluff , L., 2001. Occupational Health & Safety Management Systems. Melbourne , Crown Content .
Pitcher, G., 2013. Piper Alpha: the legacy remains. New Civil Engineer UK, 4 July.
Ross, P., 2008. The Night the Sea Caught Fire: Remembering Piper Alpha. The Scotsman, 15 June.
Rothnie, N., 2014. The North Sea 1. The Reaction to Piper Alpha. [Online] Available at: http://peopleandnature.wordpress.com/article-store/the-north-sea-1-the-reaction-to-piper-alpha/[Accessed 2 7 2014].
Scott, W., 2011. Piper Alpha Oil Rig Disaster. Brught Hub Engineerin, 11 10.
Slaven , G. & Flin , R., 1997. Selecting managers for a hazardous environment. Disaster Prevention and Management, 6(5), pp. 336 - 342.
Smith, D., 2000. Crisis Management Teams: Issues in the Management of Operational Crises. Risk Management, 2(3), pp. 61 - 78.
Weir, A., 1999. The Tombstone Imperative: The Truth about Air Safety. London : Simon and Schuster .
