A non-state actor can be defined as any entity that acts within the scope of international politics, but does not belong to a state structure. They do not have legal sovereignty over a specific group of people. The terrorist cell known as Hezbollah qualifies as a violent non-state actor; it is an independent militant group based in Lebanon whose goal is to free the borders of Palestine from the "Zionist entity" that is Israel (Saad-Gohrayeb, 2002). The Israel-Lebanese conflict as a whole involved a number of other nonstate actors, primarily terrorist and extremist militias such as the Amal, SSNP, LCP and PFLP-GC. These non-state actors became the true opposing force in this conflict; instead of two nation-states battling each other, non-state actors turned the conflict into a battle of ideologies. Furthermore, it changed the nature of the conflict from open warfare into something much more complex and pervasive in Israeli daily life (Gavriely-Nuri, 2008).
In addition to the Hezbollah militia, there are at least three other non-state actors in the conflict: the Amal militia, the LCP (Lebanese Communist Party) militia, and the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command) militia (Hovespian, 2008). These non-state actors allow for people to be united by ideology instead of home soil; there is no home country for these groups, merely areas of engagement. Non-state actors will headquarter themselves within certain friendly countries such as Iran, but will not act on behalf of a sitting government. The Amal movement, for example, allied itself with Syria; it is a Shia political movement, and acts as the military component of the Movement of the Disinherited. The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, on the other hand, This is what sets them apart from nation-states, and what made Hezbollah and other non-state actors so difficult to systematically eliminate.
These non-state actors stemmed from the actions of political parties in the region; essentially, movements like the Movement of the Disinherited or the SSNP would begin militarizing themselves in order to advance their own political position. This created a militarily active political system, in which factions formed within a country consisting of their own set of militaries. Instead of a singular military looking after the interests of a ruling government, multiple militaries fought for the sake of their own interests. The establishment of a war against non-state actors left Israel in a very difficult position, one very much unlike most other armed conflicts to date. By fighting against several non-state militias, Israel was not fighting against another nation-state who wanted to expand their territory; these non-state actors have no home state, and therefore no affiliation to any country (Ziadeh, 2006).
The infighting among these various militias, and the noncooperative, unaffiliated attacks against Israel in 2006 indicate an internalization of Lebanon; the political process consists of infighting instead of working together to fix internal problems. In the case of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict, these various militias would work independently to enforce their own agendas; the sparking of the 2006 conflict was merely seen as a chance to work toward their own goals (Ziadeh, 2006). The SSNP, for example, works under a near-fascist viewpoint, a recognized political party that wishes to include Lebanon in their vision for a superior Syria. Meanwhile, the Amal movement sought to fight for the Shiites living in Lebanon and to gain more resources for them. However, there are often purported to be close ties between Amal and Hezbollah. Regardless of the level of affiliation each group had with Hezbollah (the primary instigators), it was shaky at best, and was never fully indicative of their overall political goals (Ahmad, 2004).
In conclusion, non-state actors and other militias played an important role in the 2006 Lebanon conflict. They acted with similar goals and objectives as Hezbollah (freeing Palestine from the 'Zionist entity' of Israel), while not being strictly affiliated with them. This had the effect of exacerbating an already bloody conflict, and allowing the sectarian violence to reach more destructive levels. Often, these non-state actors contribute to the effect of larger groups like Hezbollah to create a greater cumulative destructive effect on countries like Israel. In the case of the Israel-Hezbollah conflict over Lebanon in 2006, the Amal and LCP militias, among others, contributed to the fighting while inserting their own agenda into the mix. Once war broke out, these nonstate actors joined the fight, but not for the reasons shared by Hezbollah.
List of non-state actors:
Hezbollah militia
Syrian Social Nationalist Party
Amal militia
Lebanese Communist Party militia
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command militia
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